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Abstract 
The UK government has sought to make changes to commercial property leasing 
practices. This has been the case since the recession of the 1990s.  Industry self-
regulation using an industry code of practice has been the vehicle for these changes.  
However, the code has had little direct success in changing practices. This is despite 
repeated threats of legislation as a constant backdrop to this initiative.   
The focus for this research is on the role of the industry bodies in the code initiative.  
They have been central to self-regulation in commercial leasing.  Thus, the aim is to 
investigate the role of industry bodies in the process of institutional change. The 
context is industry self-regulation. The specific setting is commercial leasing. The main 
industry bodies in focus are the British Property Federation and Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors. 
An existing model of institutional change forms the framework for the research. A 
chronological narrative is constructed from secondary data. This is analysed, 
identifying the actions of the industry bodies within the conceptual stages of the 
model. The analysis shows that the industry bodies had not acted as convincing agents 
of change for commercial leasing.  In particular there was a lack of theorisation, a key 
stage in the process. The industry bodies did not develop a framework necessary to 
guide their members through the change process. 
These shortcomings of the industry bodies are likely to have contributed to the failure 
of the Code.  However, the main conclusion is that, if industry self-regulation is led by 
government, then the state must work with industry bodies to harness their potential 
as champions and drivers of institutional change.  This is particularly important in 
achieving change in institutionalised environments.  
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Chapter 1 Problems in the commercial leasing market 
1.1 Introduction 
Many businesses in the UK lease their premises rather than owning them; just over half 
of UK commercial property (by value) is estimated to be owned by investors (Mitchell 
2014).  Owners and occupiers of leased property come together as lessors and lessees 
in the commercial leasing market.  Therefore this is a market that encompasses, and 
has an impact on, many organisations.  The most visible feature of the leasing 
transaction within this market is the rent that organisations agree to pay.  This is an 
aspect of leasing that can cause disquiet for businesses, particularly during periods of 
recession when profits are poor, yet rents may remain high. 
However, the issues around commercial leasing are more complicated than this.  A 
lease creates a business relationship between an owner (landlord) and an occupier 
(tenant) which often extends over several years.  This can be seen in the current 
average lease length of 6.8 years (Investment Property Databank 2014).  However 
some leases are much longer.  As Investment Property Databank show, when this 
calculation is weighted by rent, the average lease length is 11.1 years; properties of 
higher rental value tend to be let for longer periods. 
The formal lease agreement is usually a long and detailed document.  This sets out the 
terms of the lease including the length (duration) along with the rights and 
responsibilities of each party in areas such as the payment of rent, repairs and 
insurance.  It puts in place systems to cover future events such as provisions to review 
(change) the rent or the possible need to assign (transfer) the lease from the tenant to 
a new occupier. It also specifies the actions to be taken in respect of a breach of 
contract by either party.  These obligations mean that the lease contract is important to 
an occupying organisation in terms of its ability to respond to changing circumstances 
and possibly even in terms of its ability to survive. 
Since the recession of the early 1990s, when many occupiers felt trapped in onerous 
leases, the UK government has tried to get landlords and their advisors to make 
changes to market practices.  The objective has been to encourage landlords to offer 
choice and to be flexible in negotiating the terms of leases.  In this way, the 
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government has aimed to make leases more closely aligned with the business needs 
and time horizons of occupiers. 
Government has chosen to try and achieve these objectives through an industry code 
of practice, generally known as the Lease Code, i.e. through industry self-regulation.  
The government commissioned research from the University of Reading to monitor the 
operation of each version of the Lease Code (Department of the Environment 
Transport and the Regions 2000, Crosby, Hughes and Murdoch 2005, Crosby and 
Hughes 2009).1  This research revealed that, even though it has had twenty years in 
operation,  the Code has had little direct success in changing practices nor has it 
achieved the government’s ambition of becoming a ‘handbook’ for leasing for small 
business occupiers.  This is despite government oversight and pressure, the 
involvement of a wide range of interested parties in creating the Code, and two 
fundamental revisions to the original document.2  While the research revealed broad 
failure in the ambitions of the Code, the remit of the research did not permit 
investigation into the causes of this failure.  My motivation for this thesis is a desire to 
understand some of the reasons, and to provide at least a partial explanation for what 
went wrong. 
In this introductory chapter the key problems of the commercial leasing market are set 
out, along with an outline of the approach taken by policy makers to resolve these 
issues.  From this discussion comes the focus for this thesis on industry bodies.  They 
have been central to self-regulation in commercial leasing and my broad aim for this 
research is to examine their role in this initiative.  The first step in this argument is to 
outline the process of agreeing a lease of commercial premises, as this is central to 
understanding the working of the market and the problems within it. 
1.2 The leasing process 
Premises are let by means of a lease from the owner (landlord) to the occupier 
(tenant).  This creates both a contract and an interest in land.  The process of 
negotiating the terms of a lease can be protracted and, as identified by Crosby et al. 
                                                        
1 I was a researcher on the latter two of these monitoring exercises. 
2 Commercial Leases Group (1995),  Commercial Leases Working Group (2002) and Joint Working Group 
on Commercial Leases (2007).  
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(2005), it is often split into two distinct parts.  First there is the negotiation of the 
‘commercial terms’.  This is usually undertaken by the landlord’s letting agent in 
discussion with the prospective lessee or the lessee’s property agent.  Letting/property 
agents are likely to be members of the Royal institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), 
or at least to work for organisations which are regulated by the RICS.  At this stage the 
key terms are agreed.  There is no set list of these terms, but those likely to be agreed 
are rent, lease length, inclusion of any rent reviews, and if (and when) the tenant will 
have the option to break (bring the lease to an end) during the lease.  Usually there 
then follows a negotiation between lawyers representing the two parties, during which 
the detail of the lease will be agreed leading to the final document. 
1.3 Uncertainty and imperfect information 
In order to achieve a lease that suits their needs, the prospective landlord and tenant 
need to have and make choices.  Theoretically at least, the lease is created as a result 
of negotiation. To reach an agreement that does reflect the needs of both parties, this 
must be a genuine and open process.  In order for this to occur, both parties need to 
know the options and consequences of the various choices.  Because a lease extends 
over time, this means predicting the future, or at least incorporating mechanisms that 
are able to deal with future uncertainties and change.  These aspects of leases 
distinguishes such contracts from those where the entire nature of the transaction is 
determined at its formation, such as the purchase of a cup of coffee, or even much 
larger consumer purchases such as a car or house.  Macneil, the leading exponent of 
relational contract theory, describes long-term contracts as having gaps in planning and 
having processes in place to create flexibility (Macneil 1978).  More fundamentally, as 
Simon set out in his concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1947, 1955), it is often too 
costly or simply not possible to acquire all of the knowledge needed at the time 
decisions have to be made. Therefore the parties to a lease need to seek, estimate or 
guess the relevant information to enable them to agree the most suitable lease 
structures and clauses. 
1.4 Market problems 
One of the defining features of the commercial property market is the difficulty that 
potential occupiers face in assembling information to make these informed choices.  In 
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addition, an accusation often made is that potential tenants have little real choice 
anyway as the landlords dictate terms and are often loathe to consider alternatives.  
Addressing these issues of information asymmetry and monopolistic control by 
landlords is central to the Lease Code initiative.  These two enduring problems of the 
leasing market are discussed below. 
1.4.1 Information asymmetry 
In their work on economics as applied to property, Harvey and Jowsey (2004) note that 
it is difficult for buyers to acquire knowledge in the property market because of the 
infrequency of transactions, the local nature of knowledge and the heterogeneity of 
property.  This means that, when transacting in the property market, it is difficult to 
find exact comparables or to acquire the information necessary to analyse transactions 
and inform purchase decisions.  Additionally, the buyer and seller in commercial leasing 
often come to negotiations with different levels of knowledge as well as differing 
expectations and understanding.  This may be because one party is inexperienced in 
leasing.  This is often the case with small business tenants (SBTs). 
Potential tenants, particularly small ones, may not have all of the information needed 
to make an informed choice, but they may not be aware of this shortfall.  Crosby et al. 
(2005) surveyed a cross section of tenants who had recently taken leases.  The 
researchers found that only 25% of tenants had taken professional advice.  There was a 
strong correlation between those not taking advice and a lack of knowledge about the 
lease terms agreed, and these tended to be in the lower value properties (generally  
SBTs).  Hughes (2007) analysed the information sources used by SBTs who had recently 
taken leases; although this was a small-scale survey it again suggested that SBTs did not 
take professional advice at the initial stages of the leasing process, they relied on the 
advice of friends, family or colleagues.  In any event, their focus was generally 
elsewhere as the leasing process was only part of a business set-up or development.  
Yet, while these entrepreneurs did not consider that they were lacking information, the 
interviews revealed that many interviewees had only a basic understanding of lease 
terms and the implications of what had been agreed. 
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1.4.2 Lack of competition 
At a general ‘market’ level, there are many buyers and sellers in commercial property.  
However Harvey and Jowsey (2004) identify three conditions which lead to sellers (i.e. 
property owners) having a degree of monopolistic control: 
1. Geographical division of the market leading to imperfect competition between 
local markets. 
2. Imperfection of the capital markets preventing potential buyers from borrowing 
the money required for purchasing large lots. 
3. The spatially fixed nature of property putting landowners in strong position 
relative to buyers who, are often focussed on a particular location. 
This is pertinent to the leasing context where, for example, retailers have requirements 
to be located in particular town centres and often in very specific locations within a 
town centre to attract customers.  This narrows down the choice of landlord from 
whom they can buy, i.e. take a lease.  While other occupiers, such as those in offices 
may be more footloose, there are often geographical constraints or requirements 
emanating from the occupier’s business.  Therefore, in the leasing market there is 
evidence of monopolistic control by landlords who have traditionally had the upper 
hand in commercial property leasing over their tenants; lease terms and practices have 
reflected their requirements, such as that of providing long-term security of income. 
So, for example, it is common for landlords to insist on rent reviews in leases that can 
only stay the same or ratchet the rent upwards; these are known as upward only rent 
reviews (UORRs).  All of this may lead to a sense by tenants that they have no real 
choices. 
1.4.3 Wider impact of these issues 
There are wider social implications of particular leasing practices and terms being 
imposed by landlords.  An example of this is the UORR.  This form of rent review was 
cited by the New Economics Foundation (Simms et al. 2005) as particularly impacting 
on small and independent businesses.  The UORR was argued to be unfair to all tenants 
as landlords benefit from increasing rental values but tenants are prevented from 
benefitting from any falls in the property market.  However, Simms et al. contended 
that small businesses suffered more than their larger counterparts as they have less 
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leverage in their negotiations on leases with landlords.  Hence UORRs were said to 
contribute to the creation of clone towns which look exactly like any other due to the 
presence of the same global and national chains. Such towns were identified as 
providing a poorer range of shops for local people than non-clone towns (Simms et al. 
2005).  Similarly, the Greater London Authority identified UORRs as a lease term which 
contributed to the problem of empty shops in the city (GLA Economy Committee 2013).  
This was because high rents were found to be a common cause of shop closures.  The 
report argued that the weak position of small businesses meant that that they were 
unable to negotiate revised terms and so continued to pay rents under UORRs that did 
not reflect current market conditions. 
1.5 Public policy and intervention 
Many types of contract are regulated in the UK.  As Brownsword (2006) noted in his 
review of contemporary contract themes, specific contexts such as housing and 
employment have attracted a profusion of legislation.  He also identified the split 
between consumer and business contracts as the former become ever more regulated, 
to such an extent that modern consumer contracts have little to do with “the ideals of 
voluntary contractual obligation” (Brownsword 2006:11).  By contrast, business 
contracts tend to have remained rooted in free-market principles, commercial leasing 
being a good example.  Commercial leases have historically been negotiated with 
relatively little interference from the state.  There are statutory limits on certain lease 
provisions, and statute provides and governs the right to renew leases, but, on the 
whole, the UK law has not directly controlled the terms that the parties to a 
commercial lease are able to negotiate.  Largely, leases have been governed by 
contract law with parties free to agree their lease terms. 
However, the issues outlined above were harnessed and articulated by various people 
in such a way that this created the impetus for change in the recession of the early 
1990s. Burton’s report on the plight of retailers in rented shops (Burton 1992) 
highlighted the problems arising from the landlords’ monopolistic position.  In 
particular he identified the ability of landlords to insist on UORRs in leases.  He saw 
these rent review clauses as distorting rents and creating an inefficient market.  He also 
found that it was very difficult for prospective tenants to access the information they 
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needed when agreeing the terms of their leases.  The concerns of retailers were 
brought to Parliament by various MPs and the government of the day consequently 
proposed legislation in the specific areas of UORRs, confidentiality clauses and the rent 
determination processes at rent review and lease renewal (Department of the 
Environment 1993). 
The property industry responded with a vigorous defence of current practices.  They 
also defended market forces and the ability of these forces to respond to changing 
circumstances and so meet occupier needs.  The prevailing political ideology at a time 
was neo-liberalism (see Chapter 2).  Consistent with this, the government decided not 
to legislate and steered the property industry towards a system of self-regulation 
(Department of the Environment 1994). This led to the first Code of Practice for 
Commercial Leases (Commercial Leases Group 1995), developed by a group of 
stakeholders in the leasing process including organisations representing landlords, 
tenants and their legal and property advisors, but monitored by government. 
The government’s hope was that the commercial leasing industry would change its 
long-standing practices though the use of a code of practice.  This can be seen in 
comments such as this from the Department of the Environment Under-Secretary of 
State (Tony Baldry) prior to initial discussions on a code: 
We consider the best way forward would be for the industry to adopt a code of 
practice which not only draws attention to the implications of upward rent 
review clauses but encourages flexibility in other terms. 
Hansard: HC Debate 19 July 1994 Vol 247 c111W 
It was envisaged that a leasing market would emerge that was characterised by choice 
and flexibility and that the Code would be a document that could be used in 
negotiations, so creating informed ‘customers’ i.e. potential tenants (especially SBTs). 
1.5.1 Limited success of Code 
There have been some changes in commercial leasing practices since the early 1990s 
that appear to be in line with government ambitions. This can be seen in the increased 
diversity of lease lengths, including short leases without rent reviews, increased 
incidence of break clauses and changes to the approach to repairing liabilities (the 
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division of responsibilities between landlord and tenant).  There have also been 
changes to subletting clauses (that control the tenant’s ability to lease all or part of the 
property to another party during the lease) that are more subtle but significant.  These 
changes are documented by Crosby et al. (2005) and acknowledged by various 
stakeholders in the process, including government. 
Nevertheless, the government report on the operation of the 1995 Code identified that 
these changes were essentially market driven with poor dissemination and little direct 
use of the Code itself (Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions 
2000).  Consequently, the Code was revised, and a second edition was published in 
2002 (Commercial Leases Working Group 2002).  The government report on this edition 
(Crosby et al. 2005) found limited progress in achieving the objectives of choice and 
flexibility in lease terms, the continued use of UORRs and also low awareness of the 
Code particularly among smaller landlords and SBTs.  A third edition of the Code was 
produced in 2007 (Joint Working Group on Commercial Leases 2007), which was 
structured to create an information source and guide to leasing for occupiers 
(particularly SBTs) but this was also not well disseminated (Crosby and Hughes 2009). 
Because of the limited impact of the Code, there have been repeated threats of 
legislation from various government ministers since the introduction of the Code in 
1995.  There was a proposal to legislate (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004) 
although this was withdrawn.  The grounds for threatened intervention have largely 
been linked to arguments about economic efficiency, and have been particularly 
concerned with achieving flexibility in the lease terms offered by landlords.  However, 
twenty years since the first edition of the Code, self-regulation is still the means by 
which governments hope to reform leasing practices; the third edition of the Code is 
still in operation.  While the Code itself does not appear to have had a direct influence 
on practices, the pressure from government that is behind the Code initiative may have 
had, and may continue to have, an indirect effect. 
1.5.2 Enduring problems 
Despite an indirect influence on practice, the introduction of the Code has not removed 
government concerns regarding the lease terms offered by landlords and the processes 
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by which leases are agreed.  In launching the 3rd edition of the Code, the government 
minister (Yvette Cooper) expressed disquiet about: 
continuing elements of inflexibility, particularly the predominant use of upward 
only provisions in rent review clauses and inflexible provisions for tenants exiting 
property they no longer need. 
Hansard, HC 28 March 2007 Col 87WS 
Asymmetry of information remains an issue, particularly following the report to 
government identifying that the 3rd edition of the Code was not being disseminated 
(Crosby and Hughes 2009).  In 2009 the relevant minister (Ian Austin) expressed 
disappointment that small business tenants were not being told about the code and 
that it was “not a primary tool for the negotiation of new leases” except for a few large 
tenants. He saw this as being fundamental to providing information to prospective 
tenants, continuing that: 
 A professional, modern industry will surely have an interest in ensuring that its 
customers are fully and properly informed about the leasing choices they are 
making. 
Hansard, HC Written Ministerial Statements 3 July 2009 Col 29WS 
Portas (2011) pointed to the prevalence of UORRs and the need to find alternatives in 
her report to government on the future of Britain’s high streets.  She also advocated 
promotion of the Code as a way of improving landlord and tenant relations.  The 
government responded that change must be encouraged.  The government response 
also recognised that dissemination of the Code was still an issue, setting out a plan to 
publicise it through professional bodies and other agencies (Department of 
Communities and Local Government 2012). 
However, since the reports on the operation of the Code, there has been no further 
research on lease structures3 or the leasing process in the UK.  There is an annual 
survey of occupiers undertaken by the Property Industry Alliance which aims to 
measure commercial occupiers’ overall satisfaction with their landlord as well as 
                                                        
3 Apart from the annual review of lease events from Investment Property Databank. This tracks lease 
length and break clauses.  
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satisfaction on a range of measure.  The latest report (GVA 2012) gives a 61% 
satisfaction score for leasing and highlights that SBTs are less satisfied than their larger 
counterparts with their landlords.  However, this is an open online survey so it is not 
necessarily a representative sample; it is also very small scale, the last available report 
(2012) was based on the responses of 182 occupiers. 
Essentially this means that currently there are policy statements from government 
which show a belief that more change is needed but any evidence on current practices 
is largely anecdotal.  However, it remains that self-regulation of commercial leasing 
does not appear to have had the anticipated effects. 
1.6 Research area 
The phenomenon at the heart of this research is the process of changing 
institutionalised practices in markets that are monopolistic and characterised by 
asymmetric information.  The market within which this is examined is that of leasing 
commercial property, with a focus on the UK market which exhibits a tension between 
free-market ideals and government regulation.  These issues are especially important 
because leases in the commercial sector typically form the context within which 
economic activity takes place (and, hence, economic growth). 
Leasing takes place in a market with vocal and influential industry bodies.  Two key 
bodies are the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), which is the professional 
association representing property professionals, and the British Property Federation 
(BPF), a trade association whose members include the main organisations that own and 
let commercial space.  These industry bodies have been instrumental in writing and 
promoting the various editions of the Lease Code.  The research investigates their role 
at the centre of industry self-regulation in commercial leasing and the largely 
ineffective attempts to change industry practices via a Lease Code. 
The overall aim for this research is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the 
process of institutional change, particularly in the context of industry self-regulation.  
Shedding some light on this requires engagement with different theoretical discourses.  
The literatures on governance and regulation are relevant to understanding the use of 
industry self-regulation as a policy tool.  The literatures on professional bodies and 
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trade associations help to identify the capability of these two types of industry body in 
governance and in relation to public policy agendas.  The work on institutional change 
enables a discussion on their potential to steer an industry in changing and to identify 
the process of change.  This results in a process-based model of change which can then 
be used to analyse commercial leasing in the light of these various dimensions.  These 
are explored in the next two chapters and used to then develop the specific research 
questions for the study. 
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Chapter 2 Self-regulation and the role of industry bodies 
This chapter first examines self-regulation as a policy tool and governance mechanism.  
The nature of industry bodies and their role in creating a normative framework is then 
explored.  This provides the basis for considering the ways in which industry bodies can 
enable institutional change through self-regulation. 
2.1 Defining self-regulation 
In his account of contemporary regulatory developments in Britain, Moran (2003) 
noted that self-regulation is a difficult term to explain, not least because it is used to 
describe a wide variety of institutional arrangements.  Baggott studied the nature of 
self-regulation and its capacity to provide effective regulation in the context of the 
public interest; he suggested a definition of “an institutional arrangement whereby an 
organization regulates the standards of behaviour of its members” (Baggott 1989:436).  
However, this is a very broad definition.  As Gunningham and Rees (1997) noted in their 
examination of self-regulatory regimes, arrangements described as self-regulation can 
be found at the level of an individual entity such as a club or corporation which 
regulates itself with no reference to anyone else,  or alternatively it may refer to the 
self-regulation of a group.  The problem of the lease relationship calls for a more 
articulate reference to the context in relation to groups.  In this sense, Huyse and 
Parmentier (1990:259) offer a conception that seems more useful as self-regulation is 
conceived as “the normative orders of professional communities and business 
networks”.  Industry self-regulation is a form of this type of self-regulation and is at the 
centre of the argument about changing leasing practices. 
Within industry self-regulation there are important differences in terms of formality 
(Baggott 1989).  In an informal system, regulation is simply part of daily business, with 
trust and implicit understandings underpinning transactions (Moran 2003).  Such 
arrangements have been found since the industrialisation of the 19th century in the 
‘club markets’ described by Collins (1999) in his study of contractual relationships and 
their relationship with the legal system.4  The range of industries with such 
                                                        
4 A club market is described as a group of people regularly doing business with each other who rely 
largely on trust and non-legal sanctions to underpin their transactions (Collins 1999: 212). 
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arrangements is diverse.  It includes, for example, the diamond and cotton industries 
and the systems of private governance described in detail by Bernstein (1992 2001).  
Private governance systems and informal mechanisms of control, including peer 
pressure and the fear of being ostracised, were also found in the futures market 
studied by Gunningham (1991). 
These inward-looking systems of self-regulation can be contrasted with industry self-
regulation undertaken in a more explicit, outward facing and formal manner with 
codified rules, as in commercial leasing with the Lease Code.  There are many examples 
of formal schemes, such as that within the advertising industry examined by Boddewyn 
(1985).  UK Advertising Codes are operated by the industry through its own (but 
independent) regulator, the Advertising Standards Authority.  Likewise there are many 
prominent formal environmental self-regulatory schemes, such as the chemical 
industry’s Responsible Care scheme run by the International Council of Chemical 
Associations and studied by Gunningham (1995). 
Another dimension to the use of the concept of self-regulation concerns the distinction 
between economic and social industry self-regulation. Gunningham and Rees (1997) 
describe controlling the market as economic self-regulation, such as by rate-setting and 
control over market entry.  By contrast, social self-regulation aims to minimise any 
adverse consequences of business activities for others such as customers or the public.  
The territory of social self-regulation is wide and encompasses product and service 
standards as well as addressing environmental issues.  While these initiatives benefit 
the members of these organisations by, for example, boosting consumer confidence 
and potentially increasing demand, their primary aim is to minimise the negative 
consequences of business activities for the workforce, customers or clients, or more 
widely for the environment. 
In summary, the kind of self-regulation that appears most relevant to the study of the 
UK leasing market is defined as being a formal scheme of industry social self-regulation.  
The Lease Code is such a scheme.  It is codified and is concerned with the effects of 
industry practices on tenants i.e. the customers of the property industry.  It attempts to 
counter the monopolistic position of landlords and information asymmetry and to 
change practices that include inflexibility in the leases being offered and offering 
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inappropriate lease structures. Indirectly it may also address the wider social 
implications of commercial leasing practices such as the development of clone towns as 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
2.2 The increasing use of self-regulation as a policy instrument 
2.2.1 Changing ideology 
The move by the UK government to bring commercial leasing into the regulatory 
sphere in the 1990s is, in many ways, not surprising.  Neither is it surprising that 
industry self-regulation, rather than legislation, has been used in an attempt to change 
industry practices and to achieve policy objectives.  These actions are consistent with 
broader contemporary changes taking place in governance.  These changes were driven 
by a rise in neoliberalism in many western democracies, including the UK, which had 
started in the 1970s.  Governance is a concept with many aspects and interpretations 
but is here defined as the “regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative 
practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals 
and services,” (Lynn, Henrich and Hill 2001:7). 
At the centre of the neoliberal ideology is “the necessity and desirability of transferring 
economic power and control from government to private markets” a feature noted by 
Centeno and Cohen (2012:318) in their study of the development of neoliberalism.  The 
UK was a leader in the withdrawal of the state from large-scale direct intervention and 
the liberalisation and privatisation of markets (Moran 2003).  So, for example, the UK 
government spearheaded the privatisation of publicly-owned organisations such as 
telephone services and utilities during the 1980s and 1990s. 
However this has not led to an absence of regulation by the state.  Quite the contrary, 
as many scholars of governance and regulation have observed, it has led to a state 
which has extended its reach.  Moran (2003) observed an increase in the scope of 
economic life that is subject to some kind of public oversight and contended that, in 
many ways, what has emerged is more control although it is less direct.  Mayntz (2003), 
writing on modern governance structures, also argued that a delegation of regulatory 
functions has not weakened the state but it has changed the form of state control. The 
result of these changes and the extension to the state’s reach was most notably 
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described as the “regulatory state” in the analysis of government expansion by 
Anderson (1962).  Braithwaite (2000:223) studied crime control in various jurisdictions, 
including the UK.  From this he observed that “the most important feature of this new 
regulatory state is that most of the regulation is neither undertaken nor controlled by 
the state”.  Similarly Moran (2003:6) commented that the state has created 
“frameworks of rules that are then implemented elsewhere.”  So, for example, the 
newly privatised industries of the UK were not left to operate unchecked.  They were 
(and still are) subject to elaborate regulatory systems with government regulators 
being introduced such as such as Ofgem (for gas and electricity markets) and Ofwat (for 
water and sewerage).  A commonly used metaphor in the governance literature is that 
the state is now ‘steering’ but other actors are doing the ‘rowing’.  This was originally 
presented as an ideal by Osborne and Gaebler (1992); the title of their book 
Reinventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public 
sector captures their enthusiasm for the new forms of governance. 
In the West, including the UK, there has plainly been a drawing back from direct control 
and intervention, by government in particular, and the state in general.  The 
contributors to The Oxford Handbook of Governance identify key aspects of the 
changes.  For example, Lynn (2012) noted that, as we have entered an era of ‘new 
governance’, there have emerged forms of governing that include both governmental 
and non-governmental actors.  Similarly, Rhodes (2012:33) observed that these forms 
of governance capture “the changing boundaries between public, private and voluntary 
sectors, and the changing role of the state.” As part of this there has been a 
diversification of the instruments of regulation (Levi-Faur 2012). 
 Self-regulation is part of this mix within the regulatory state, not just for previously 
public sector organisations but also within the private sphere, by virtue of a wealth of 
“compliance systems, codes of practice and other self-regulatory strategies.” 
(Braithwaite 2000:225).  Indeed, Gunningham and Rees (1997) described a surge in the 
use of self-regulation as a policy instrument in western economies since the 1970s.  The 
environmental arena provides support for this point.  As Koehler (2007) noted in her 
review of voluntary environmental programmes, industry self-regulation via these 
programmes is becoming common-place in the US, and is actively encouraged by the 
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regulators. Meanwhile Khanna (2001) observed such a trend towards voluntary 
environmental schemes within OECD countries, hence her study of the effectiveness of 
non-mandatory schemes on environmental performance. 
Therefore, returning to the specific case of UK commercial leases, when business 
occupiers demanded action from the politicians to address perceived problems in the 
early 1990s, legislation was clearly an option.  However, given the ideological context at 
the time, it was never really likely.  Rather, the pressure from occupiers and the 
prevailing ideology provided the conditions to introduce a scheme of industry self-
regulation. 
2.2.2 Interaction with the state 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the state often has a strong involvement in 
self-regulation.  This can be seen in UK commercial leasing where the impetus for self-
regulation came from government and the Lease Code was written at the government’s 
behest following an initial threat to legislate. 
Yet, one definition of industry self-regulation is “a regulatory process whereby an 
industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, organization (such as a 
trade association or professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating 
to the conduct of firms in the industry” set out by Gupta and Lad (1983:417) in their 
analysis of it as an alternative to regulation.  This definition places the primary 
responsibility for setting up and operating the regime with an industry body.  However, 
it does not preclude the involvement of government or the state in the process and 
there are many examples of strong state involvement in industry self-regulation, not 
least the voluntary environmental programmes already mentioned or even commercial 
leasing.  However, there is variation to such an extent that Baggott (1989) identified the 
level of state involvement as a variable in his classification system for self-regulation; 
similarly Ogus (1995) used the degree of autonomy from the state as a key variable in 
his typology. 
At one extreme, self-regulation may sometimes be seen as an alternative to regulation 
and a means for an industry to avoid state involvement.  King and Lenox (2000), in their 
examination of the operation and effectiveness of the chemical industry’s Responsible 
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Care scheme, noted that the original purpose of the US Chemical Manufacturers 
Association (now American Chemistry Council) was to protect firms from government 
regulation.  However, Gupta and Lad (1983) recognised that industry self-regulation is 
frequently operated with the oversight of government agencies.  So, for example, the 
UK Advertising Standards Authority operates its Codes in conjunction with Trading 
Standards Authorities and Ofcom (the regulator for the UK communications industries).  
Koehler, following her review of voluntary environmental programmes, went as far as 
to say that voluntary environmental programmes are often designed to “improve the 
efficacy and scope of existing regulations” (Koehler 2007:691), the connection between 
state and industry self-regulation being therefore very strong. 
Gupta and Lad (1983) also observed that, while the state may not be directly involved, 
schemes of self-regulation often operate under the threat of direct regulation.  It may 
be contended that such a threat is a necessity, a research question raised by Gupta and 
Lad from their analysis of the nature of the literature.  From a governance perspective, 
there is a view that a strong state presence in some form is required and there is a 
need for ‘procedural control’ of these new forms of governance (Mayntz 1983).  Even 
those writing from a neo-corporatist perspective on governance accept that private 
interest governments are kept responsive to wider societal needs through the threat of 
the state to intervene (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). 
The significance of the watchful eye and threat of a regulator as an important part of 
industry self-regulation has indeed been demonstrated in different industries and 
countries.  For example Short and Toffel (2008) found that a proactive stance of the 
regulator made a positive difference to disclosures of violations of environmental laws 
in the USA.  Looking at a range of countries, Boddewyn (1985) concluded that the 
interaction of the regulator and industry was needed to control advertising behaviour. 
Such examples show that there is often a hybrid approach to regulation.  Gunningham 
and Rees (1997), finding evidence of close links between self-regulation and 
government regulation in sectors as diverse as the chemical industry and healthcare, 
concluded that industry co-regulation was a better way of thinking of this form of 
governance than simply industry self-regulation. 
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For UK commercial leasing, the Lease Code was written, and is run, by industry bodies 
and other stakeholders.  However, government has had a high level of involvement in 
this self-regulation.  The initial threat to legislate led to the government instigating 
industry discussions on self-regulation.  The government then took on the role of 
monitoring the success of the scheme to assess the extent to which practices change.  
Therefore, on the face of it, government participation and oversight has remained 
strong.  Although government interest has to some extent waned, there remains a 
continuing threat of legislation if the required change in practices does not take place 
and if policy objectives are not met. 
2.3 Role of industry bodies 
The growth in self-regulation as a mode of governance and the associated extension of 
state involvement into previously unregulated spheres are relatively recent 
phenomena.  This brings a new role in governance to industry bodies such as trade 
associations and professional bodies.  However, as Moran (2003) noted, since the 19th 
century it has been quite common for private institutions to take responsibility for 
running markets in the UK, whether for labour, goods or services.  The club markets 
identified by Collins (1999) have already been mentioned.  Alongside this has been the 
emergence of ‘new’ professions, such as accountants, surveyors and actuaries, during 
industrialisation.  These professions were built on self-regulation, with the state 
conferring authority on the professional associations, then stepping back and giving the 
associations control (Moran 2003). 
The ability of occupational associations to provide a contemporary alternative to state 
regulation has been promoted by neo-corporatism (for example Schmitter 1974, 
Streeck and Schmitter 1985).  These scholars regard organised interest groups such as 
industry or professional bodies as well placed to achieve public policy objectives.  
Certainly, these groups are increasingly drawn into the public policy arena.  This is 
linked to the rise of neo-liberalism and the focus of governance on the role of non-state 
actors in both the creation and implementation of public policy (Mayntz 2003).  In 
particular they are drawn in through the use of self-regulation by policy-makers. 
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2.4 Trade associations and professional bodies 
There are two types of industry organisation typically involved in industry self-
regulation; industry associations and professional bodies.  They are very different types 
of organisation.  Within UK commercial leasing, the British Property Federation (BPF) 
and the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) are the main organisations of 
each type respectively.  They represent the supply-side in the self-regulation of 
commercial leasing and have been instrumental in writing and promoting the various 
editions of the Lease Code.  In order to understand the perspective each may bring to 
self-regulation and to leadership in changing industry practices, these two 
organisations are considered in turn.  The focus is on their capability for governance 
and their connection to agendas of public policy. 
2.4.1 Trade Associations 
Trade associations are a form of business association.  Nash (2002) studied the 
emergence of trade associations as agents of improved environmental performance.  In 
this she observed that membership of associations is voluntary and typically open to 
organisations with certain specified characteristics.  In his guide to trade and business 
associations, Mack (1991) similarly distinguished trade associations as bodies 
representing specific industries or lines of business in contrast with wider umbrella 
groups, such as chambers of commerce, that represent business interests irrespective 
of industry.  While his focus was primarily on associations within the USA, these 
distinctions can be seen in UK groups.  Hence, within the property industry, the British 
Property Federation (BPF) opens its membership to  “any person, firm, partnership, 
company or association or any combination or association thereof directly or indirectly 
interested in United Kingdom real estate” (British Property Federation 2013a:4).  Mack 
(1991) also noted that the members of trade associations are usually competitors in 
their own markets; certainly the membership list of the BPF includes the major land 
owners and their advisors who compete for business on an everyday basis.  Trade 
associations are reliant on support and funding from their members.  Nash (2002) 
observed this and linked it to a preoccupation with recruiting and maintaining 
members.  The level of reliance on members for funding can be seen in recent accounts 
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for the BPF which show subscription income of £2,059,200 and other income of just 
£306,584 (British Property Federation 2013b). 
These various characteristics might suggest that a trade association like the BPF would 
be rather inward looking and focused entirely on the challenges of satisfying their 
membership.  While concerns of their membership are clearly paramount, this is rather 
a partial view of their standpoint as a trade association, as the next section shows. 
Involvement in public policy 
The nature of trade associations has changed over time. Galambos (1966) charted their 
development in the USA where, in the 19th century, they were largely “dinner club 
associations” with no real purpose beyond providing a place to meet and chat.  In the 
early 20th century they became “service associations” and began to work with, and 
lobby, government to achieve their aims of creating a stable environment for business.  
In the 1920s emerged the “policy-shaping association” which aimed to establish “an 
industry-wide viewpoint” (Galambos 1966:112) and so established their own identity 
and became influencers of their membership rather than simply reflectors of views: 
This particular form of trade association was distinguished by outstanding 
leaders, a well-defined and carefully articulated ideology, and formidable 
cooperative programs.  It was a semi-autonomous economic institution with an 
identity clearly distinguished from its members.  In seeking to implement 
associative values, it impinged forcefully upon individual manufacturers, 
members, and non-members alike. 
Galambos (1966:292) 
Nash saw modern trade associations as serving two functions; they provide the 
“organizational vehicle for political or economic collective action by their members” 
(Nash 2002:6) but they also perform a more prosaic function of offering services, such 
as insurance and training, to their members.  The role as a collective body is key, as 
they are in a position to provide the industry’s collective voice but also to be the 
industry’s rule-maker and to be the organisation tasked with improving the perception 
of an industry amongst the public, (Nash 2002:6).  This was particularly apposite to the 
environmental field Nash was studying, but is also relevant to commercial leasing.  In 
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particular, the BPF can play a part in dispelling the negative perceptions arising from 
the sense of monopolistic control of the market by landlords. 
The Objects of the BPF show its role as a collective body.  These are set out in the BPF’s 
Articles of Association and are shown below: 
Objects 
4. The objects for which the Federation is established are to promote the 
interests of its Members and other persons, firms, partnerships, companies and 
associations (including combinations thereof) which are directly or indirectly 
interested in real estate and would qualify for membership of the Federation 
under these Articles, by:  
(a) engaging with government and other policymakers within the United 
Kingdom and overseas and with the media and general public to improve 
awareness and understanding of the real estate industry and the social and 
economic contribution it can make;  
(b) seeking to secure, across all relevant policy areas, legislative, regulatory and 
fiscal conditions which are most conducive to the success of its Members and 
other interested persons and best suited to enabling the real estate industry to 
make that contribution;  
(c) acting as a forum for the real estate industry to come together, debate issues 
of common interest, pool expertise and, insofar as it is possible and desirable to 
do so, speak with one voice;  
(d) providing its Members with access to information and an understanding of 
the policymaking process, its drivers and context, and promoting best practice 
within the industry; and  
(e) liaising as appropriate with other industry and business bodies, political, 
academic and social stakeholders. 
British Property Federation (2013a) 
The BPF includes engaging with policymakers and influencing policy in its remit (objects 
a and b), and liaising with other bodies and stakeholders (object e).  It also aims to be 
the voice of the industry (object c).  Influencing policy embraces the stabilising function 
mentioned by Galambos (1966) whereby the BPF seeks to maintain favourable 
30 
 
conditions for the business of its members.  Relevant to the aim of changing industry 
practices through the Lease Code, the BPF has an objective of the promotion of best 
practice in the industry (object d). 
In commercial leasing, the BPF has played a role in devising (and revising) the Lease 
Code.  This shows an engagement with policy by the BPF and promotion of best 
practice that goes along with this.  However, in doing this, the BPF also has to achieve 
the aim of maintaining favourable business conditions for members and so achieve its 
overall objective (set out in its Objects) to promote the interests of its members.  This 
raises a question on the extent to which self-interest may have impacted on the BPF’s 
role in promoting change in leasing. 
2.4.2 Professional associations 
Mack (1991) contrasted professional with trade associations in terms of their 
membership; he noted that the former represent individual practitioners while the 
trade bodies tend to mainly comprise organisations.  Therefore, to understand 
professional associations, it is first necessary to consider the notion of a professional. 
The literature on the sociology of the professions is useful here.  Key defining 
characteristics that are identified in this literature include: exclusive ownership of a 
distinct body of knowledge and area of expertise; control over access to the profession; 
working for the public good; the mutual recognition and support of the professional 
community (see the seminal studies of professionalism by Elliot 1972; Freidson 2001; 
Evetts 2003). 
It is the professional association that has the function of maintaining and nurturing 
these characteristics.  For example, the regulations of the RICS provide for the 
establishment of professional groups in the different areas of specialism.  The remit of 
these groups includes “recommending routes to attaining Professional Competence” as 
well as publishing “the requirements for competency in its own specialism, including 
any necessary qualification or experience” (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
2010:R7.5). 
Professional associations have long been responsible for what Streeck and Schmitter 
(1985:32) call “regulated self-regulation” in that they have effectively negotiated the 
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terms of regulation of its members (with the state) and then had responsibility for 
enforcing it.  In her examination of the rise of professionalism in England and the US, 
Larson (1977:15) noted that “the attitude of the state toward education and towards 
monopolies of competence is thus a crucial variable in the development of the 
professional project”.  In the UK, the state-protected monopoly is manifest by the 
granting of a royal charter to the professional association by the Privy Council. This is 
only granted where the association represents “a field of activity which is unique and 
not covered by other professional bodies” (Privy Council 2015).  Professional bodies in 
the UK have therefore determined their own rules governing entry, standards of 
behaviour and professional development.  Alongside this, the study of contemporary 
British professions by Spada (2009) observed that they also have to ensure that these 
rules are not broken, that service levels are maintained, and they must have 
mechanisms to deal with members who do not conform. 
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) is the association for property 
professionals involved in commercial leasing.  It has a Royal Charter dating back to 1881 
which, among other things, sets out the institution’s Objects.  These Objects are set out 
below: 
3. The objects of the Institution shall be to secure the advancement and facilitate 
the acquisition of that knowledge which constitutes the profession of a surveyor, 
namely, the arts, sciences and practice of: 
(a) determining the value of all descriptions of landed and house property and of 
the various interests therein and advising on direct and indirect investment 
therein; 
(b) managing and developing estates and other business concerned with the 
management of landed property; 
(c) securing the optimal use of land and its associated resources to meet social 
and economic needs; 
(d) surveying the fabric of buildings and their services and advising on their 
condition, maintenance,  alteration, improvement and design; 
(e) measuring and delineating the physical features of the Earth; 
(f) managing, developing and surveying mineral property; 
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(g) determining the economic use of resources of the construction industry, and 
the financial appraisal, management and measurement of construction work; 
(h) selling (whether by auction or otherwise) buying or letting, as an agent, real 
or personal property or any interest therein  
and to maintain and promote the usefulness of the profession for the public 
advantage in the United Kingdom and in any other part of the world. 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (2009) 
The Objects show the professional and geographical territory that is claimed for 
members of the RICS.  The role of the RICS as a learned society asserting ownership of, 
and promoting, an area of expertise and body of knowledge can be seen in the objects.  
The final sentence of the Objects sets out the public interest focus of the organisation.  
These Objects can be contrasted with those of the BPF.  The RICS has the overall 
objective of “the advancement and facilitate the acquisition of that knowledge which 
constitutes the profession of a surveyor” rather than, as with the BPF, promoting the 
interests of its members. 
Professional associations have governance mechanisms to control how members 
behave.  These are standards of professional practice and codes of ethical conduct.  
The RICS has five professional and ethical standards which are part of their regulations 
and so are binding on all members.  Thus members have to demonstrate that they: 
1. Take responsibility; 
2. Treat others with respect; 
3. Always provide a high standard of service; 
4. Act with integrity; 
5. Act in a way that promotes trust in the profession. 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (2013) 
These five standards are supported with information and guidance for members.  
Beyond this, the RICS publishes a wealth of guidance in the form of practice 
statements, codes of practice, guidance notes and information papers.  While some of 
these are mandatory and others voluntary, the aim is always to enable members to 
remain “professionally competent” and to adopt “best practice” (Royal Institution of 
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Chartered Surveyors 2014c).  As with the BPF, such a commitment is central to the 
objective of the Lease Code to change current practices. 
Public interest and public policy 
One of the defining characteristic of professionals noted above is that of serving the 
public interest.  The study by Hill and Lorenz (2011) of the professional institutions in 
the built environment found that the institutions include this commitment in their 
charters or constitutions. The primacy of the public interest can be seen in the Objects 
of the RICS through the use of the words “for the public advantage” (RICS 2009).  The 
public interest perspective distinguishes professional associations from trade 
associations; this was acknowledged by a recent incoming president of the RICS who 
commented that “since 1881 our Royal Charter has required us to act in the public 
interest.  This is what separates the RICS from a trade association.” (Brooke-Smith 
2014).  Theoretically this shapes the behaviour of a professional body.  Brooke-Smith 
continued to say that a professional association has to consider the long-term public 
interest even if it means “difficult choices in the short term.”  This commitment to the 
public interest has implications for self-regulation and the approach taken to promoting 
change to meet public policy objectives. 
This assurance of best practice allied with public interest can be seen in the RICS 
leading in various initiatives such as the Lease Code or the Private Rented Sector Code 
of Practice (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 2014b), the latter aiming to 
improve the experience of tenants renting residential property. 
As with trade associations, professional associations also have a role in influencing 
policy.  They may respond to government agendas.  In their review of British 
professions, Spada identified two ways that professional bodies are involved in such 
policy-making: 
1. In a responsive manner when advice is sought by government on a specific 
policy issue. 
2. In a proactive way when a professional body goes to government with advice 
on policy which may be on the agenda sometime in the future. 
Spada (2009:28) 
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Beyond this professional bodies are keen to get involved in setting the agenda.  The 
Spada researchers interviewed a representative of the RICS who referred to the 
organisation interacting with government when it believes something should be on the 
government agenda; the Law Society interviewee spoke of being involved in agenda 
setting “before ideas develop (into more inflexible) policy proposals”(Spada 2009:28). 
On its website, the RICS makes clear its desire to influence: 
RICS seeks to influence governments, international organisations and key 
stakeholder organisations around the world with the aim of developing and 
embedding truly international standards and creating a vibrant and sustainable 
land, property and construction sector. 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (2014a) 
The RICS, along with other professional associations in the built environment, is 
involved in promoting issues of public policy such as sustainability (Hughes and Hughes 
2013).  This is through a range of activities, for example the promotion of 
environmental assessment tools for buildings such as the Building Research 
Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM).  It is also through 
engagement in high level debate and initiatives.  So, for example the CEO of the RICS 
was invited to attend a UN Climate Summit in September 2014 with a view to 
contributing to a global climate change agreement. 
2.4.3 Moral authority 
Thus far, this examination of trade associations and professional bodies suggests that 
these bodies have the functions and structures needed for a role in governance 
through self-regulation.  Beyond this however, such responsibilities require these 
bodies to exert moral authority over their members, and to create a normative 
framework through which they can lead the industry in adopting good practices. 
There is a strong strand within the regulation literature which supports the view that 
industry bodies are capable of doing this.  Gunningham and Rees (1997:371) describe 
industry bodies as mediating institutions which can provide “an effective industrial 
morality that brings the behaviour of industry members within a normative ordering.” 
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In saying this, they reference the views of Weber and Durkheim who recognised the 
importance of these groups during 19th century industrialisation.  Durkheim saw these 
associations as being the social groups that could bring individuals together and exert 
moral authority in a secular society (Aron 1965).  Weber saw the potential of industry 
associations to be more successful regulators than the state because of their direct 
relationships with their members (Gunningham and Rees 1997).  Likewise, Durkheim 
believed that the state was too remote from individuals and in contact with them too 
intermittently, to be able to “socialise them within” ([1893]1933:28).  He identified a 
need for groups that occupied the space between individual and state, ones that were 
close enough to individuals to draw them into social life; this was seen as a role for an 
occupational group because “an occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated 
only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel its needs, and able 
to follow all their variations.”(Durkheim, [1893]1933:5). 
The closer relationship of associations, rather than the state, to the regulated group is 
recognised by Streeck and Schmitter (1985).  They noted that this tends to help 
acceptance of regulation by those affected.  They also point out that associations can 
use tangible group-specific norms and perceptions to encourage compliance (rather 
than trying to appeal to the issues of wider society as the state would have to do). 
Similar points come through the self-regulation literature.  Gunningham and Rees, 
referencing Durkheim’s idea of moralising industrial life, argued that “an industry 
association must establish a normative framework for its members and, equally 
important, develop ways to ensure its efficacy.” (Gunningham and Rees 1997:372).  The 
development of an industry morality and the associated normative framework is, 
according to Gunningham and Rees (1997) an important first step in industry self-
regulation. 
They identified key features of such a framework: 
 It provides a shared basis for challenging, questioning and guiding industry 
practices. 
 It is a product of reflection and conscious deliberation 
 It recognises multiple values and commitments. 
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 It takes a critical standpoint 
 It defines and upholds a special organisational competence 
 There is an expectation of willing obedience but not grudging acquiescence 
from the companies involved. 
 It provides a legitimate account of the industry’s activities to the public 
Gunningham and Rees argued that these principles and practices must be 
institutionalised through the development of industry-wide policies and procedures to 
ensure the commitment of firms.  They were not alone in arguing that industry 
associations are best placed to steer good practices.  For example, from his study of the 
advertising industry, Boddewyn (1985) contended that because an industry has a sense 
of ownership of the rules on behaviour, they are accepted and enforced from within 
the industry without the hostile response that often accompanies legal solutions.  
Braithwaite (1993) argued that this sense of commitment can achieve better results 
than government. 
This all suggests that industry bodies should be more successful in calling their 
members to order than the state would be.  However there can be a tension for 
members between responding to the requirements of the association and meeting the 
needs of their businesses.  This raises the question of why an individual practitioner or 
business might acquiesce to the demands of the association, even if business drivers 
might suggest otherwise.  This brings the concept of legitimacy into play. 
2.4.4 Industry bodies as sources of legitimacy 
Commercial leasing operates in an institutional environment, i.e. one characterised by 
rules and requirements.  These requirements (and the associated approval) often come 
from the state, but can originate from professional or trade associations, increasingly 
so with the new modes of governance.  From an institutional perspective it may be 
argued that organisations conform to these rules to gain approval, i.e. legitimacy.  
Legitimacy was analysed by Suchman (1995:574) and defined as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.”  Legitimacy is crucial for the success of an organisation to such an extent 
that Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organisational structures are created to gain 
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legitimacy rather than being created to meet the technical needs of the organisation; 
these structures may even be to the detriment of the technical needs.  D’Aunno, Sutton 
and Price (1991) studied drug abuse treatment, finding that community centres fitted 
in with traditional practices of the sector, rather than adopting new ways of working, 
and so gained external support.  They summarised: “When organizations face 
environments characterized by strong belief systems and rules, survival and 
effectiveness depend more on the legitimacy acquired from conforming to widely held 
expectations than on efficient production” (D’Aunno et al. 1991:636).  So, for example, 
in Oliver’s study of the Canadian house-building industry, she concluded that 
responding to institutional pressures and developing good relations with rule makers 
(building inspectors, government agencies and professional associations) was central to 
the success of individual companies (Oliver 1997). 
The importance of external legitimacy to organisations, and the variety of sources, can 
be seen in studies in very different contexts.  For example Singh, Tucker and House 
(1986) found that voluntary social services agencies in Toronto were keen to be listed 
in the community directory and to get a charitable registration number; those that 
gained this external legitimacy were more likely to survive than those that did not. 
In commercial leasing, professional and trade associations are in a strong position to 
confer legitimacy on the practices of their members.  In particular, professionals need 
the approval of their associations to survive and to gain resources; therefore the badge 
of the RICS or Law Society will enable a firm to attract workers, clients and funding.  
Consequently property professionals and their firms are driven not just by their own 
organisational requirements, but also by the need for external approval by the 
associations.  This raises questions for the analysis of the role of industry bodies in the 
Lease Code, particularly the extent to which conforming to the Code is seen as required 
for legitimacy. 
2.4.5 Split personalities 
There is some evidence in the literature of the ability of industry bodies to regulate and 
provide an industry morality, and that members will follow their lead to gain legitimacy.  
These ideas are fundamental to industry self-regulation as a governance mechanism.  
However, these notions are countered by a view in the economic and political science 
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literature that industry associations are largely there to serve their own ends 
suggesting that they are not concerned with providing normative frameworks at all.  
This is summed up by Gunningham and Rees: 
For some they are a source of great mischief where price-fixing and other anti-
competitive behaviors hide behind the veil of industry self-rule; for others they 
are driven by interest group bargaining  where companies conspire against the 
public good (and seek to avoid government regulation) by producing self-serving, 
lowest-common-denominator standards. 
Gunningham and Rees (1997:372). 
It has already been noted that the primary aim of the BPF, as set out in its Objects, is to 
promote the interest of its members.  Even the incoming RICS president of 2014 
recognised that professional institutions can appear to be self-serving in the way that 
they seek to control practices and entry into professions (Brooke-Smith 2014). 
Alongside this, the tensions that occur between serving the client’s interests and that 
of the public have been noted by several writers.  Hill and Lorenz (2011) observed this 
in the field of property valuation.  Interviews conducted during the monitoring of the 
Lease Code suggest that members and officials of the RICS and Law Society see the 
client’s interest as paramount (Crosby and Hughes 2009). 
This resonates with the power paradigm that emerged in the sociological literature on 
the professions in the 1970s which saw them as a means of controlling and organising 
an occupation.  So, for example, Larson (1977) described the ‘professional project’ as 
one of monopolistic control, usually endorsed by the state, and standardisation of 
services through definition and demonstration of claimed knowledge.  As Muzio et al. 
(2013) noted in their study of the role of professions in processes of institutional 
change, this perspective sees professions leveraging “their superior technical, political 
and organizational resources to retain control over their own occupational labour 
markets” 
However these authors also refer to recent calls to move beyond an obsession with 
monopoly and, rather, to consider how the professions “retain their normative value 
beyond their privileged market position” (Muzio et al. 2013:704).  They noted the lack 
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of attention in the sociological literature to the role of the professions in “building and 
transforming political, social and economic institutions”. 
The split personalities of the professionals and their associations are, perhaps, to be 
expected.  Gunningham and Rees argue that industry associations are complex and 
which “like persons, have multiple selves” (Gunningham and Rees 1997:372).  This is a 
complexity found in business organisations more generally.  Ayres and Braithwaite 
investigated some of the issues around involving business in the regulatory process and 
remarked: 
[M]ost business actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to values of 
economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility. Business 
executives have profit-maximizing selves and law-abiding selves; at different 
moments, in different contexts, the different selves prevail. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992:31) 
Gunningham and Rees recognise these contrary tendencies in associations and argued 
that “industry associations are both economic and normative institutions, and that the 
market model of institutions enriches and supplements, but does not supplant, the 
normative model” (Gunningham and Rees 1997:373).  In considering the roles of 
industry bodies in self-regulation of commercial leasing, recognition of these two 
dimensions can perhaps add explanatory power. 
2.5 Chapter summary 
Self-regulation is a broad term but the kind of self-regulation that appears most 
relevant to the study of the UK leasing market is defined as being a formal scheme of 
industry social self-regulation.  The Lease Code is such a scheme.  Self-regulation was 
introduced into commercial leasing in response to the pressures from disgruntled 
business occupiers in the 1990s.  While legislation was an option, the decision by 
government to use self-regulation is consistent with contemporary neo-liberal ideology 
pervading western democracies. 
Self-regulation in leasing has a strong relationship with the state as the latter initiated 
the scheme and then oversaw the creation and operation of the Lease Code.  It is not 
unusual for state and non-state actors to work together; this is a common feature of 
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new forms of governance in general and self-regulation in particular.  However, 
industry bodies have responsibility for running such schemes.  Trade associations and, 
particularly, professional bodies have been operating self-regulation amongst their 
membership since the industrialisation of the 19th Century.  They have the mechanisms 
in place and have the moral authority to lead industry by providing a normative 
framework within which self-regulation can take place.  In an institutionalised 
environment, the legitimacy gained by conforming to these frameworks is critical for 
the success of individuals and firms and can therefore drive behaviours of organisations 
and individuals.  In commercial leasing, professional and trade associations are in a 
strong position to give such approval and from this can flow workers, clients and 
funding. 
However these bodies are operating in a market environment and pressures of the 
market may conflict with this normative dimension.  Therefore it is recognised that the 
BPF and RICS, as the dominant industry bodies in commercial leasing, may have 
conflicts to resolve as they take on this role leading self-regulation yet must attend to 
their members’ interests. 
For the public policy objectives of self-regulation of commercial leasing to be achieved, 
this means steering an industry through institutional change; the capacity for an 
industry body to do this is the subject of the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Industry change 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that industry bodies such as the RICS and BPF are well 
placed to regulate their membership, perhaps more so than the state.  Their members 
are likely to require legitimacy from their associations and so seek to conform to their 
rules and requirements.  However these bodies are operating in a market environment 
and self-interest may impact on this normative dimension.  Nonetheless, industry 
bodies have the potential to lead their industries in adopting good practices through 
self-regulation.  However, in commercial leasing the anticipated change in industry 
practices through the introduction of the Lease Code did not happen, despite the 
involvement of the industry bodies.  The question arises whether these industry bodies 
use their position in conferring legitimacy to encourage change or whether they tend to 
reinforce a status quo. 
The first part of this chapter considers the role of industry bodies in reinforcing existing 
practices or driving change.  In the second part of the chapter the process of industry 
change is discussed, highlighting the role that industry bodies can play in this.  This 
leads to a model of institutional change which provides a framework for the analysis of 
the role of industry bodies in the self-regulation of commercial leasing. 
3.1 Agents of change? 
One of the main functions of professional associations is to reinforce collective beliefs 
and associated practices through training and enforcement.  By adopting these 
practices a professional can gain legitimacy.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) used existing 
industry studies to show that an organisational field (broadly, an area of economic 
activity) dominated by professionals will lead to the individuals and organisations 
behaving the same way in a process called normative isomorphism.  They saw this 
being because of the education and training of professionals, and also because of the 
highly developed professional networks spreading similar ideas.  Professional and trade 
associations are vehicles “for the definition and promulgation of normative rules about 
organizational and professional behaviour”; these mechanisms create a pool of “almost 
interchangeable individuals” who share similar views throughout an organisational field 
regardless of the organisation they work for (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:152).  Building 
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on this work, (D’Aunno et al. 1991) observed external support from professionals 
leading to isomorphism in the mental health sector. 
Isomorphism does not of itself imply stasis, but it does imply organisations in a field all 
moving towards homogeneity of structure and culture.  Thus, in their study of change 
in the professional business services sector in Alberta, Canada, Greenwood et al. 
(2002:62) saw professional associations as often being” part of the explanation for the 
sustained resilience of institutionalized practices” and so may be seen as means by 
which practices are reproduced rather than agents of change, a central argument in the 
work of D’Aunno et al. (1991).  Abel (1989), in his study of the legal professions, also 
found legal associations to be reactionary and dedicated to preservation rather than 
being progressive. 
All of this might lead to the view that industry associations are not natural agents for 
change. Yet there are plenty of examples in the literature to support the notion of 
these bodies driving change and granting legitimacy to new practices in a range of 
industries.  The study of Norwegian fisheries undertaken by Holm (1995) is one such 
case.  He observed that trade associations are guided by established practices and so 
are inherently conservative structures which aim to perpetuate the existing practices 
and procedures but that they also aim to create new institutions and amend old ones; 
new institutional practices are built on old ones.  Greenwood et al. (2002) studied 
changes in the provision of business services (centred on the accountancy profession) 
and observed a central role for professional associations who, whilst not initiating the 
change, were critical in its legitimisation.  They also suggested that change isn’t 
necessarily isomorphic as several ideas for replacement practices may emerge but only 
some of them will be accepted and themselves become established.  The chemical 
manufacturing industry’s global Responsible Care Program and the American Institute 
of Nuclear Power Operations show the success of trade groups in achieving a shift in 
industrial morality and practices in response to particular events and social change (see 
Rees 1997 and Gunningham and Rees 1997). 
Other examples are not so clearly linked to industry bodies but they show the power of 
external legitimacy to drive change in professionalised fields.  Tolbert and Zucker 
(1983) studied the adoption of civil service reforms in the USA which originally was 
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strongly related to city characteristics.  However, adoption then became related to 
institutional definitions of the legitimate structural form for municipal administration 
that were becoming established during the process.  Similarly Meyer, Stevenson and 
Webster (1985) studied urban fiscal agencies, finding strong relationships between 
organisational attributes and city characteristics in early years but none later.  In these 
cases the initial drivers for action were the improvement of the task at hand, but, as 
with the study by Tolbert and Zucker, once the models are established the desire to 
conform and gain legitimacy becomes the paramount driver. 
Change was as the centre of DiMaggio’s study of the development of art museums in 
the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (DiMaggio 1991).  He observed that 
museum professionals were working with others from different organisations to create 
this new organisational field.  Yet these professionals were not in opposition to their 
employers in their organisational contexts; they followed their organisation’s operating 
procedures by day. So, while relatively little conflict occurred within the organisations, 
professionals had stimulated change “by mobilising to construct an environment they 
could control at the level of the organizational field” (DiMaggio 1991:287).  DiMaggio 
makes the general observation that “most professional activists compartmentalize their 
organizational and environmental roles and activities” (DiMaggio 1991:288).  A key 
conclusion of his study was that change was not driven at a local level, but rather by 
the emergence of field wide structures at a national level, in this case professional 
associations were key.  As the art museum form became established, this provided 
openings for change, conferring legitimacy on the movement. 
The interplay between the organisational level and the field level can also be seen in 
the study of financial reporting within the top 200 US firms as listed by Fortune 
magazine (Mezias 1990).  Mezias looked at specific changes in accounting practices 
within these firms and considered what had driven them to adopt such practices.  He 
concluded that the wider changes were driven by the accounting profession, the 
nation-state and (powerful) organisations. But, the move to change to particular 
reporting procedures began at the interorganisational level as the interest of these 
groups coincided. 
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It is not clear whether there was any mismatch of interests in DiMaggio’s study, 
however the findings from Mezias suggest that change is more likely to happen when 
these interests coincide.  Likewise, in their study of clinical guidelines used in 
institutional change for the medical profession, Adler and Kwon (2013) observed the 
relationships between field, organisations and individuals inherent in the role of the 
professional associations.  The authors argued that the associations are simultaneously 
“vehicles by which the broader field affects professionals and professional 
organizations, and vehicles that afford individual professionals and professional 
organizations bottom-up influence in the evolution of the institution of professionalism 
and the surrounding field” (Adler and Kwon 2013:949).  In commercial leasing, there is 
a relationship between property- owning companies and advisors, and their respective 
associations which are comprised of individuals who work in these organisations.  The 
nature of the interplay between these on the attempts to change well-established 
practices remains to be seen. 
Within the property sphere there is little literature on the role of industry bodies in 
changing practices although Hill and Lorenz (2011) and Hill et al. (2012) make the case 
for them to grasp the nettle of change.  They question how property valuation 
professionals frame and address the issues within their domain, arguing that they have 
a duty to challenge what the client is asking them to do, specifically to bring in 
considerations of sustainability. They contend that the professional bodies must show 
leadership, setting this in the context of the development of professionalism and the 
public interest remit.  Hughes and Hughes (2013:30) looked at the professions in the 
built environment and noted that: “if a profession and its institution are to have 
continuing validity, then its members must surely be able to demonstrate the on-going 
relevance of their knowledge, their right to define it and all that flows from this, 
including the normative systems they set up around it.” 
It may be that the industry bodies themselves need a sponsor of change to spur them 
on.  An important aspect of DiMaggio’s 1991 study was the attitude of the museums’ 
patron Carnegie and his financial support of the professionals (rather than individual 
organisations).  There are perhaps parallels here with commercial property leasing; the 
emphasis of government ‘patronage’ has been to support the movement for change via 
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the activities of professional and trade groups. In this case it is more than support 
though.  It is strong pressure to change and to achieve policy objectives, as the 
government sees the industry bodies as the vehicle to deliver it via self-regulation. 
So far the discussion in this chapter has suggested that industry bodies have a central 
role to play in establishing and maintaining collective beliefs and practices, but also 
they have the potential to enable change and are often under pressure to do this.  
Sometimes they may drive change (Mezias 1990); in other cases they do not lead, but 
by endorsing change they legitimise it (Greenwood et al. 2002).  However, they may 
resist change, being more reactionary than progressive (D’Aunno et al. 1991).  The 
associations cannot be seen in isolation from their members or member organisations, 
and the interplay between them can be significant in driving change. 
In order to study the role of the industry bodies in promoting change in commercial 
leasing, the process by which the Lease Code was introduced and operated will be 
examined.  The next section considers the process of industry change in an 
institutionalised environment, with a view to creating a framework with which to 
analyse this process in leasing. 
3.2 The process of industry change 
The process of industry change has not been the focus of a wealth of research in 
relative terms.  Greenwood et al. (2002) described a lack of knowledge on how and 
why institutionalised practices within an industry wither or change, with most accounts 
focusing on the effects (such as isomorphism).  They formulated a model of the process 
which builds on earlier work by Tolbert and Zucker (1996).  The latter is therefore 
discussed first.  Tolbert and Zucker created a model of the way that practices become 
institutionalised within an industry.  They identified three stages:  Pre-
institutionalisation; semi-institutionalisation; full institutionalisation. 
The first stage occurs as a response to specific stimuli or problems; new structural 
arrangements are generated by different organisations for the problems they face.  
Some may imitate others within their networks if they perceive that the solutions will 
address their own problems. But largely there is independence of ideas and there may 
be many of them. 
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The second stage occurs as structures become ‘objectified’.  Tolbert and Zucker saw 
this as being a process by which a consensus develops between organizations on 
workable and useful new structures; the more organisations that have used a particular 
solution then the more likely it is that others will follow suit.  “Industry champions” 
have a role here (Tolbert and Zucker 1996:183) as they can be instrumental in the 
process of theorising. This is where a general problem is identified and a diagnosis 
made of the source of the problem, to which proposed structures are the solution (and 
can be demonstrated to be the solution).  Industry champions can be instrumental in 
diffusing these structures across organisations. 
At this stage of semi-institutionalisation, structures may still fall by the wayside; they 
remain relatively untested and those using them are likely to be still evaluating them.  
It is only when the final process of what Tolbert and Zucker call ‘sedimentation’ occurs 
that structures can be seen as fully institutionalised.  At this point structures are 
adopted across organisations and over a sustained period of time. However, for this to 
happen several criteria must be met; Tolbert and Zucker see this final stage as being 
dependent on “relatively low resistance by opposing groups, continuing cultural 
support and promotion by advocacy groups, and positive correlation with desired 
outcomes.”(1996:184). 
Greenwood et al. (2002) built upon this work and that of others, adapting it to deal 
specifically with institutional change i.e. the breakdown of existing structures as well as 
the creation of new ones.  In the same vein as Tolbert and Zucker, they suggested that 
identification and analysis of the process, when focussing on the role of the various 
actors within it, can help explain the course of institutional change within the 
organisational field.  They reviewed the literature on the change process observing 
that, although organisational fields are often highly institutionalised, they can change.  
This happens through a process of deinstitutionalisation, with new ideas and practices 
emerging in a non-isomorphic fashion and eventually taking hold, so becoming 
themselves the new ways of doing things i.e. the new institutions.  They distilled this 
into a six step model of institutional change which clearly draws on that of Tolbert and 
Zucker.  This is set out in Figure 1.  The evidence for each stage from the literature is 
discussed below. 
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3.2.1 Stages of change 
Precipitating jolts 
The initial stimulus for change can come from a variety of sources.  For example, 
Meyer, Brooks and Goes (1990) observed the incremental changes and sudden jolts 
that can lead to industry revolution in their study of the hospital sector.  Here, 
technological change, the removal of established barriers to entry and the increase in 
competitive forces were the triggers.  Lounsbury (2002) charted the new ideas and 
practices in the field of finance that arose from deregulation and the rise of financial 
experts and professionals.  Such jolts can be seen in the profound social changes that 
occurred during the industrialisation of Britain in the 19th Century and which led to the 
rise of the use of contract (Atiyah 1979).  Legal changes can also precipitate change, 
even if the legislation is somewhat uncertain; Edelman (1992) observed organisations 
creating their own structures to show compliance with ambiguous equal opportunities 
legislation, while Kelly and Dobbin (1999) observed companies changing their maternity 
leave practices in response to very weak legislation which was subject to challenge.  In 
her study of the erosion of institutionalised practices, Oliver (1992) described these 
various stimuli as “pressures for deinstitutionalization” and categorised them as 
political, functional and social pressures (Oliver 1992:567).  Greenwood et al. (2002) 
adopted a similar interpretation but refer to them as sources of precipitating jolts, 
using (similar) categories of regulatory, technological and social. 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
• Social 
• Technological 
• Regulatory 
II: Deinstitutionalization 
• Emergence of new players 
• Ascendance of actors 
• Institutional entrepreneurship 
III: Preinstitutionalization 
• Independent innovation 
• Technical viability 
paramount 
IV: Theorization 
• Specification of general 
organizational failing 
• Justification of abstract 
possible solution 
• Moral and/or pragmatic 
legitimacy 
V: Diffusion 
• Increasing 
objectification 
• Pragmatic 
legitimacy 
VI: Reinstitutionalization 
• Cognitive legitimacy 
Fads and fashions 
Figure 1: Stages of institutional change 
(Source: Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002) 
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Deinstitutionalisation and preinstitutionalisation 
These pressures or jolts kick start the process of questioning existing practices, firstly by 
deinstitutionalisation.  This is a stage absent from Tolbert and Zucker’s model as they 
were not dealing with change; however they recognised that a reversal of 
institutionalisation was possible as a response to major environmental shifts and this 
would allow opposition to existing structures (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).  Oliver 
described this stage as “the process by which the legitimacy of an established 
organizational practice erodes or discontinues” (Oliver 1992:564).  Erosion reflects a 
gradual decline in practices (such as a dress code if no longer enforced), while 
discontinuation results from a more proactive rejection of practices (such as challenges 
to job classifications that are based on stereotypical gender roles). 
Greenwood et al. saw this stage taking place through the entry of new players into the 
field, the ascendance of existing actors or by local entrepreneurship.  In their own case 
study of the changing business of accountants, this phase saw the questioning of the 
remit of accountants; this came from existing actors, largely from the president of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta who was himself a partner in a major 
accounting firm.  A strong example of local entrepreneurship comes from the study of 
the radio broadcasting industry by Leblebici et al. (1991).  Part of their analysis 
documented the innovation coming from independent stations during the 1950s as a 
response to the loss of audience and advertisers to television; these included the 
emphasis on the personality of the ‘DJ’ (rather than having anonymous announcers) 
and the agreement with record companies to provide records for free in return for 
airtime publicity.  Similarly Meyer et al. (1990) saw initial differentiation as hospitals 
innovated and adapted independently, prior to what they described as a full scale 
industry-wide revolution. 
These ideas serve to rock the institutional boat disturbing “the socially constructed 
field-level consensus by introducing new ideas and thus the possibility of change” 
(Greenwood et al. 2002:60).  These initial responses to the problems will create several 
possible new institutional structures as actors acting independently of each other 
perceive the problems they are addressing as local phenomena.  This can be seen in the 
stage called preinstitutionalisation by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) described above. 
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Greenwood et al. presented deinstitutionalisation as a different stage to 
preinstitutionalisation in their model.  However, it is difficult to see how these two 
stages can be distinguished in practice or how their subheadings support such a 
distinction; the rejection of ideas seems to be inextricably bound with the suggestion of 
solutions or replacement practices. 
Theorisation 
The phase identified by Greenwood et al. (2002) as critical to changing practices in an 
institutionalised environment is that of theorisation.  Strang and Meyer (1993:492) 
defined this as “the development of abstract categories and the formation of patterned 
relationships such as cause and effect”.  In this context industry bodies can be seen as 
‘champions’ which Tolbert and Zucker (1996) saw as interest groups who promote 
structural change and who spearhead change through the theorisation process.  
Tolbert and Zucker divided this into a two stage phase leading up to objectification, and 
described the importance of industry’ champions’ in each; to be successful, first they 
must identify a general problem and this must be widely recognised and accepted.  In 
their study of accountancy, Greenwood et al. found that initially this was not the case; 
rather there was simply a general interest in new ideas within the accounting 
profession.  They commented that “the failure of the initial theorizers to provide a 
convincing problem probably influenced the indifference to the idea” (Greenwood et 
al. 2002:72). The focus did eventually change to defining a problem which was 
generalised to a need for transformation in the profession as it was under threat.  
Change was subsequently presented by the professional bodies as progressive, 
inevitable and normal.  However, it took almost 20 years for the need for such change 
to be endorsed within the accountancy profession:  “Theorizing is thus not a 
momentary act but, at least in the present case, one that required sustained repetition 
to elicit a shared understanding of the problem.” (Greenwood et al. 2002:73) 
The second stage of theorisation identified by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) is a process 
whereby principles are developed which support and justify the solutions being 
proposed.  In this way previously independent deviations from established practices 
can become abstracted and so made available for wider adoption.  Greenwood et al. 
contended that these solutions may be adopted because they fit well within the 
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prevailing normative frameworks (so having moral legitimacy) or because they have 
functional superiority i.e. a pragmatic legitimacy.  They argued that, while changes that 
result in economic benefits may gain legitimacy by results and so others will copy, in 
normative settings ideas have to be justified in this way prior to diffusion.  This is where 
the industry bodies are key due to their role in defining and reinforcing beliefs and 
practices and so conferring legitimacy, as discussed above.  The question is whether, in 
any particular situation, they follow the path noted by Holm (1995) in his study of the 
Norwegian fishing industry; that is do they seek to create new institutions and amend 
old ones, or do they reinforce existing ones? 
Diffusion 
This is the process whereby the newly legitimated ideas spread through organisational 
communities.  Tolbert and Zucker (1996) described the objectification of new 
structures which requires social consensus as to their value and this leads to their 
increasing adoption. Greenwood et al. identified this as a common theme in the 
literature saying that “as innovations diffuse they become ‘objectified’ gaining social 
consensus concerning their pragmatic value … and thus they diffuse even further” 
(Greenwood et al. 2002:61).  Diffusion of new ideas and practices can happen peer to 
peer (horizontally) both within and between organisations and vertically through 
hierarchical relationships within organisations.  However, in many organisational fields, 
professional associations and other industry bodies have an important role to play.  
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) saw the role of the champion continuing through into this 
part of the process, drawing on evidence from studies across a broad range of 
industries.  They referred to the post-war spread of formal selection procedures and 
performance evaluation promoted by members of the emerging personnel 
management profession (as found by Baron, Dobbin and Jennings 1986); also the role 
of consultants in adopting total quality management practice taking place at the time 
Tolbert and Zucker were writing. 
As Adler and Kwon (2013:949) noted, in highly professionalised occupations, the 
associations are “a key vector of normative and mimetic diffusion”.  Their research was 
of the diffusion of guidelines in US health sector.  They found that the support or 
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opposition given to this by the professional associations very much depended on the 
predicted consequences: 
…some guidelines are fully compatible with traditional professional norms, and 
indeed medical associations have long played a role in sponsoring such 
guidelines’ development and diffusion. Many other guidelines, however, are 
corrosive of those norms, and we should expect associations to play a more 
complex role in regard to these.  While we would expect associations initially to 
oppose such guidelines and refuse to support their development or diffusion, 
external forces that are bearing down on doctors, healthcare organizations, and 
the associations themselves may force associations to soften this opposition. 
Adler and Kwon (2013:950) 
Reinstitutionalisation 
This is the final stage of the change process identified by Greenwood et al.  It occurs 
when ideas and practices become taken for granted and the natural ways to behave- 
i.e. they have cognitive legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  This chimes with the process 
described by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) as ‘sedimentation’ whereby new structures or 
practices spread across different organisations and also survive over time.  However, 
Greenwood et al. noted that some ideas and practices almost get there but fail to 
become fully institutionalised. They acquire some normative acceptance but are the 
‘fads and fashions’ identified by Abrahamson (1991).  As Greenwood et al. note, they 
“recede with the rhythms of transient fashions” (Greenwood et al. 2002:61). 
3.2.2 Discussion of the model 
The model set out by Greenwood et al. (2002) is supported by the literature and is 
persuasive as a representation of the process of institutional change.  However, while it 
seems logical that the stages of deinstitutionalisation and preinstitutionalisation occur, 
the observable aspects that Greenwood et al. describe under these headings appear to 
be predominantly the process of innovation.  Nevertheless, the literature on 
deinstitutionalisation makes a strong case for this as a part of the model. 
The stages set out by Greenwood et al. (2002) and discussed above are presented as a 
linear sequence.  Figure 1 shows the model as U shape but examination of the stages as 
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discussed by Greenwood et al. reveals no apparent reason for this curve.  For example, 
there is no loop suggested (which perhaps the curve might indicate).  Hence the 
relationship between the stages can be redrawn in a more accurate linear 
representation as shown in Figure 2. 
3.2.3 A model for analysis 
Industry bodies have played a role in the largely unsuccessful attempt at institutional 
change in commercial leasing.  The model by Greenwood et al. appears to be an 
appropriate framework to use in examining the process by which the Lease Code was 
introduced and operated.  The model focusses on the processes of change including the 
challenging of existing practices, which makes it useful for mapping what actually 
happened (or did not) in the attempt to shift the industry norms and practices.  It 
makes it possible to track and analyse the role of the various actors, including 
individuals and organisations.  This is particularly useful for tracking the behaviour of 
the industry bodies in the various stages of institutional change as they have unfolded.  
In this way the part which these bodies have played in each of the stages can be 
examined. This thesis is concerned with leasing practices that are well-entrenched and 
it is important to see how opposition to these arises and the role of the industry bodies 
in that opposition.  Therefore the linear model is adopted with the headings as they 
stand and will be used to examine the attempt to change practices in commercial 
leasing. 
3.3 Chapter summary 
Professional associations and industry bodies can drive change and create new 
frameworks of rules and requirements and there are many examples of this occurring 
in different industries.  However, there is also a danger that industry bodies may seek 
to reinforce existing beliefs and practices rather than being the agents of change.  
There is also an interplay between organisational field, organisations and individuals 
which can impact on how or whether an industry changes. 
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The process of industry change in an institutionalised environment is captured in the 
work of Greenwood et al. (2002).  This work shifts the focus from earlier work to reflect 
institutional change within an organisational field, rather than just the creation of new 
structures.  From an initial ‘jolt’ to precipitate change, they move to a stage dealing 
with the breakdown of existing structures (deinstitutionalisation).  The next stage is 
preinstitutionalisation as new ideas by individuals or organisations emerge.  Their 
framework highlights that without clear articulation of a ‘convincing problem’ in the 
subsequent, critical stage of theorisation, it is unlikely that change will be seen as 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
• Social 
• Technological 
• Regulatory 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
• Emergence of new players 
• Ascendance of actors 
• Institutional entrepreneurship 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
• Independent innovation 
• Technical viability paramount 
IV: Theorisation 
• Specification of general organizational 
failing 
• Justification of abstract possible solution 
• Moral and/or pragmatic legitimacy 
V: Diffusion 
• Increasing objectification 
• Pragmatic legitimacy 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation 
• Cognitive legitimacy 
Fads and fashions 
Figure 2: Linear model of institutional change 
(adapted from Greenwood et al. 2002) 
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necessary.  This is where industry bodies can play an important role as champions of 
change at the level of the organisational field.  Only then can solutions become 
established and diffuse through the organisational field.  They can become the new 
‘taken for granted’ solutions in a stage of reinstitutionalisation.  Or, if theorisation is 
unsuccessful, solutions can go by the wayside as ‘fads and fashions’.  
In order to study the role of the industry bodies in promoting change in commercial 
leasing, the process by which the Lease Code was introduced and operated will be 
examined.  This is in the context of there being no change in practices that could be 
attributed directly to the Code, despite industry bodies developing the scheme and 
being in a position to provide legitimacy to new practices.  The linear model developed 
by Greenwood et al. (2002) is an appropriate framework to use in this study as it can be 
used to map what actually happened (or did not) in the attempt to change the leasing  
industry norms and practices.  The operationalisation of the model is set out in the next 
chapter which sets out the research questions and addresses research method.  
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Chapter 4  Research question and methods 
The overall aim for this research is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the 
process of institutional change, particularly where that process is driven by industry 
self-regulation.  Specifically the focus is on the UK commercial leasing market, a market 
that has features of monopolistic control and is characterised by asymmetric 
information.  The research sets out to address the role of industry bodies in the self-
regulation of commercial leasing and their role in attempting to change industry 
practices via a Lease Code.  This is of interest given that the Code has had limited 
impact.  There is little evidence that it has led to the changes in practices that were 
anticipated. 
4.1 Theoretical context 
To contextualise the research question, it may be helpful to summarise the arguments 
in Chapters 2 and 3.  Neoliberalism shaped the political context within which self-
regulation was introduced into commercial leasing.  Despite a withdrawal from direct 
regulation, there has been an extension of the state’s reach into new areas of 
economic life through the use of a diverse range of regulatory instruments, including 
self-regulation.  Thus, while legislation was an option for achieving policy objectives in 
commercial leasing, the decision by government to use self-regulation is consistent 
with the prevailing neo-liberal ideology. 
The state often has a strong involvement in industry self-regulation but as might be 
expected it relies heavily on industry bodies, particularly trade bodies and professional 
associations; both types feature in the self-regulation of commercial leasing.  However 
there are differences between the nature and purpose of trade bodies and professional 
associations and such differences may impact on their approaches to self-regulation.  
Despite the differences of approach, these industry bodies are in a position to exert 
mortal authority over their members and create a normative framework to steer good 
practices. Through this framework they are in a position to confer legitimacy on the 
practices of their members.  This raises questions for the analysis around the role of 
industry bodies in the Lease Code, particularly the extent to which conforming to the 
Code is presented as required for legitimacy. 
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There is a view from the economic and political science literature that industry 
associations are largely there to serve their members’ own ends.  This might suggest 
that industry bodies are not concerned with providing normative frameworks.  
Alternatively, perhaps they have split personalities, which is not unusual in business.  
However, at the very least, they may have conflicts to resolve as they take on self-
regulation aimed at achieving public policy objectives. 
The changes that are being targeted with the Lease Code go to the heart of the leasing 
industry practices; the continuing use, and defence, of the Upward Only Rent Review is 
a prime example of a lease term that is proving difficult to displace.  Therefore, for the 
Lease Code initiative to be successful requires achieving change in practices which have 
become institutionalised. Chapter 3 explored the role of industry bodies in reinforcing 
existing practices or driving change.  There is a body of work on industry bodies, 
particularly professional associations, which suggests that they maintain and enforce 
existing practices rather than facilitating change.  Conversely there are examples to 
support the notion of industry bodies driving change. 
Key aspects that emerge regarding industry bodies and the self-regulation of 
commercial leasing are: the political context; the degree of state involvement; the 
provision of a normative framework with which to steer the membership; conflicts 
between this normative dimension and market pressures; the extent that industry 
bodies drive change; the differences between the industry bodies.  These may be 
investigated by examining the process of institutional change within the industry.  
Greenwood et al. (2002) created a model of institutional change that provides for the 
breakdown of existing institutionalised practices as well as the creation of new ones.  
This model provides a framework within which to examine the introduction and 
operation of the Lease Code.  In particular it enables the analysis of the role of the 
industry bodies in the various stages of institutional change. 
4.2 Research question 
While the focus of the research is on commercial leasing, the research aim and the 
theoretical context set out above shows that the problem connects to broader 
questions of the role played by industry bodies in the process of institutional change 
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and of their role in self-regulation.  However, bringing this back to the commercial 
leasing industry and the attempts to change leasing practice since 1992 through the 
Lease Code initiative, a more specific research question can be framed to drive the 
research design: What role have the industry bodies played in the attempt to achieve 
institutional change in commercial leasing through self-regulation? 
4.3 The industry bodies 
This research question focusses on the bodies that represent the supply-side of the 
commercial leasing industry.  These bodies are in a position within the organisational 
field to influence the industry norms and practices.  The two dominant industry bodies 
in this context are the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) and the British 
Property Federation (BPF).  The RICS is the professional institution which counts 
amongst its 118,000 members those individuals who are involved in the owning, 
managing or letting of commercial property.  While there is no legal requirement for 
membership, the RICS has wide recognition as the primary professional body in 
property.  This means that it is usual for someone working in the property side of 
commercial leasing to be either a member, or from an RICS-regulated firm.  The 
significance of the RICS in the field is demonstrated in its holding the secretariat of the 
various Code working groups throughout the period of self-regulation. 
The BPF is a trade association that represents property interests.  It was formed in 
1974. Their website describes the association as “the membership organisation for the 
UK real estate industry. We represent all those involved in real estate ownership and 
investment.”5 The BPF invites membership from “any organisation that owns, invests in 
or manages real estate, or provides professional services to companies that do.” 6  It 
has around 400 member organisations who are predominantly real estate companies 
and professional firms like lawyers, agents, planners and accountants. 
There are other organisations that represent landlord interests such as the British 
Council for Offices (BCO) and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and these have 
been involved in the development of self-regulation in leasing.  However, while 
                                                        
5 http://www.bpf.org.uk/about-bpf accessed 8th September 2015. 
6 http://www.bpf.org.uk/membership/join-us accessed 8th September 2015. 
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important, they tend to have a different focus and so are not the leading bodies where 
leasing is concerned. BCO was formed in 1990 and has a membership list that includes 
those involved in construction as well as the investors and landlords; so, while having 
an interest in leasing, the organisation has a wider interest in the design and creation 
as well as the acquisition and occupation of office space.  The investor/landlord 
members are also largely members of BPF.  The ABI is a members’ group formed in 
1985 which represents the insurance companies predominantly in terms of their own 
industry i.e. insurance.  Like the BCO, they represent owners of property and so they 
have an interest in the property industry and have been involved in the self-regulation 
process.  But, as with BCO, their property owning members tend to be members of the 
BPF and it is the latter organisation that takes the lead on property matters. 
While the RICS is the predominant professional institution, the Law Society also has 
members who are involved in leasing as commercial property lawyers.  Lawyers have 
certainly been centrally involved in the development of the codes of practice through 
the period of self-regulation. However it is the practices of their clients, i.e. the 
property owners and their agents, which are under investigation in this particular 
study, hence the focus on the RICS. 
Therefore, while recognising that there may be an argument to examine the parts 
played by these other various organisations in the commercial leasing story,  the 
particular position that the BPF and RICS have within the organisational field suggest 
that it is valid to focus on their roles in addressing the research questions. 
4.4 Research methodology 
The research is concerned with the commercial leasing market which immediately gives 
it an economic context.  However, the research question places the study in the realms 
of governance and institutional change. 
The focus is on the dynamics and actions of actors at the level of the organisational 
field, such as industry bodies and the government.  The research question is concerned 
with how, and why, activities at this level may have resulted in the lack of change in 
institutionalised practices.  This requires an exploration of what has happened in 
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leasing to identify theories and patterns in an inductive way.  However, it is possible 
that the findings may, in turn, drive other more deductive studies. 
Following from this, the epistemological stance is interpretive as the research questions 
are concerned with understanding what happens in the change processes.  However, a 
degree of explanation is sought, much in the way that Weber saw sociology as “science 
which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a 
causal explanation of its course and effects” (Weber 1947:88).  As Bryman notes, in this 
approach the causal explanation comes from an interpretive understanding rather than 
looking for forces external to the social action (Bryman 2004).  In this study of 
commercial leasing, the research question focuses on the interplay between actors 
such as government and industry bodies, looking to that social interaction for both 
understanding and explanation. 
Fundamental to the approach taken to the underlying problems in commercial leasing 
is the principle that the behaviours of actors are shaped by the rules and requirements 
that are institutionalised in their environment.  However, allied to this is the 
constructivist view that these institutions are also shaped by actors; it is the attempts 
at shaping and reshaping of these that is central to addressing the research question. 
This inductive approach, interpretivist paradigm and constructivist orientation can be 
seen in the research question for this thesis.  As Bryman notes, qualitative research 
strategies tend to be most appropriate for questions built on such philosophical 
foundations (2004).  Therefore, a qualitative approach has been taken. 
In his work on the use of records in research, Scott summarises the problems of 
designing an appropriate research method for a study such as this:  “The aim of social 
research is to describe and explain the actions of agents and the structures that they 
produce and reproduce in the course of their lives. But neither ‘actions’ nor ‘structures’ 
are actually observable: they are inferred from the behavioural and other observational 
evidence through which they are manifested” (Scott 1990:2). 
The issue is what manifestations are to be studied and by what method.  Although the 
model in Chapter 3 provides a useful framework for examining change, it does not 
define the method to be used.  Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) identify interpretive 
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and historical approaches as relevant and well-used qualitative methods of studying 
institutional change.  Similarly Van de Ven and Poole (2005) see ethnographic and 
observational  studies as appropriate to studying the change processes, along with 
archival or case studies.  The analysis of Suddaby and Greenwood suggests that a 
historical method is most in accord with the processual view being taken in this thesis, 
particularly as it recognises the complexity and messiness of causal patterns in change. 
There is certainly a necessity to look backwards as the relevant actions and behaviours 
span a period of 23 years from 1992, when the need for change in commercial leasing 
was first mooted, to the present day.  This in itself precludes a contemporary 
ethnographic or direct observation type of study and makes a historical method more 
applicable. 
There are many advantages to taking a historical approach to studying institutional 
change.  As Suddaby and Greenwood noted:  “Historical methods focus systematically 
on past events, using archival documents and retrospective interpretations of actors in 
an effort to understand the processes by which institutions emerge, self- maintain, and 
erode” (Suddaby and Greenwood 2009:183). 
Suddaby and Greenwood also point to the advantage that historical methods have by 
lending themselves to the identification of phases in change processes; an example of 
this is the study of the stages of change in the radio broadcasting industry by Leblebici 
et al. (1991).  The political, social and economic dynamics at different points in time are 
critical in understanding the prevailing institutional arrangements in leasing as well as 
the emergence and decline of potential alternatives; this suggests the use of phases in 
a historical analysis.  Historical methods also recognise that institutional arrangements 
are the result of social construction.  As Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) note, an 
examination of historical documents is usually central to such studies, and this brings 
with it an understanding that these are the products of particular dominant groups.  As 
with leasing, hearing the voices of these groups may be important aspects of the 
research. 
Such a study may also produce a changed understanding of how the current 
institutional arrangements were formed, as the received wisdom is put aside.  An 
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example of this is in the historical analysis of Rowlinson and Hassard (1993) which 
revealed that Cadbury’s labour management policies were the result of practical 
requirements.  The much vaunted idea that they were inspired by the family’s Quaker 
beliefs was deliberately created much later. 
Inevitably over a period as long as 23 years, people change and memories fade.  This 
makes the use of interviews difficult; for example Golden (1992) found that 
retrospective accounts of business strategy were often inaccurate, suggesting that this 
may be because of faulty memory or efforts to cast past actions in a more positive light.  
Because of such issues, the focus is on secondary data in the form of archival 
documents.  Therefore, in attempting to describe and explain what has happened in 
commercial leasing in a manner that can answer the research questions, a broadly 
historical analysis of the process has been made using an analysis of existing 
documentary records over the relevant period.  This analysis uses the model set out in 
Chapter 3. 
Such a study is not without its challenges.  Van de Ven and Poole (2005) noted that the 
complexity of processes can make it difficult to see the patterns and generate 
explanations.  Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) highlighted the difficulties in identifying 
appropriate periods of analysis; this is discussed further in the analysis section below.  
They also note that it is easy to become fixed on the detail of the narrative at the 
expense of theoretical coherence.  There are also issues to consider regarding the 
documents used in such an analysis; these are addressed in the next section. 
4.5 Data sources 
In presenting an account of the commercial leasing story the aim is to give an 
interpretation that is credible and plausible.  This requires careful choice of data 
sources and subsequent analysis; the role of the industry bodies in change must be 
represented as accurately and objectively as possible.  Different data sources can be 
used to establish and triangulate the chronology and actions of actors, which are 
important aspects of the story.  However, the actors in these events will have different 
perspectives, and this is central to the narrative.  Documents which are written from 
these perspectives are more difficult to triangulate, but of paramount importance is 
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that such documents are sincere in their viewpoint and attempt to be accurate from 
that viewpoint (Scott 1990:22).  The open recognition of the sources in presenting 
findings of opinions and views, should enable the credibility of the account to be 
established; the latter being noted by Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Hammersley (1992) 
as particularly important in such research.  The setting of the narrative within the 
model of institutional change should enable an assessment of the generalisability/ 
transferability to other situations to be envisaged. 
The sources used can be categorised using Scott’s typology of sources (Scott 1990).  In 
terms of authorship, those relevant to this study were all official (rather than personal) 
and within this some were state sources and some private.  In terms of accessibility, the 
sources were largely available in open archives or published, with few being of a more 
restricted nature.  However, that did not mean that all the relevant material had 
necessarily been retained over the years. This study spanned a period where 
documents were typically being transferred to electronic media for archiving.  In such 
processes, not all documents are transferred and decisions to cull mean that some 
material from a pre-electronic era was lost.  This raises questions of whether the 
surviving material is representative (Scott 1990:25). 
A key source of information used, which conforms to Scott’s official -state category, 
was Hansard.7  This is the official edited record of proceedings in the UK Parliament, 
including verbatim reports from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords; 
edited hard copies have always been produced the day following the one being 
reported, but now the transcripts also appear online during the day in question.  
Debates, statements, petitions, oral and written questions and answers from both the 
House of Commons and House of Lords are available online from 1803 onwards.  The 
database was searched for all references to commercial property leasing since 1990.  In 
this way, the verbatim account of the initial debate in the House of Commons in 1992 
was retrieved along with the ministerial response and the subsequent announcement 
of a consultation on legislation.  Hansard then records a ministerial statement that 
there would be no regulation and that changing leasing practices would be industry-
                                                        
7 Up to 2005: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/  
post-2005: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/ 
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led.  From then on Hansard provides the government statement of objectives for 
industry codes, details of monitoring programmes, accounts of progress and 
disappointment, regulatory threats and industry cajoling throughout the research 
period.  This archive measures well against Scott’s criteria (Scott 1990) for assessing the 
quality of evidence, it is a comprehensive and authentic database; the meaning is 
always clear and is accurate in representing the stated views of politicians. 
Another long-term archive that proved useful was the Estates Gazette (EG), one of two 
weekly property industry magazines; this source is classified as official- private in 
Scott’s typology.  EG has been in print since 1858 and is now also available digitally on a 
subscription basis, so ascribing it an open-archival status (in Scott’s terms), with a 
searchable archive of full length articles and news items going back to 1986.8  This 
database was used to find contemporary accounts of the Lease Code story from the 
first relevant article of 1994.  This includes reports and commentary on events such as 
government statements, publication of editions of the Codes and reports as well as the 
reporting of comments and views from various actors.  This produced an extensive 
collection of relevant material which helped to fix the chronology of events and also 
provided references to other material that may add insights.  The contents of a 
magazine like EG have to be treated with caution.  While the archive is complete and so 
is representative, the journalistic viewpoint and desire for an interesting story must 
always be borne in mind.  For example, there is more reporting of BPF activities and 
views than of the RICS on commercial leasing; but this may be for purely journalistic 
reasons or the BPF may be more adept at getting into print.  Nevertheless this 
reporting can give some insight into the actions of the industry bodies and can be used 
in conjunction with other sources so triangulating the evidence. 
To complement the picture of BPF activities emerging through the EG, their various 
publications and on their website, it was important to try to gain a more complete 
representation of the activities and expressed views of the RICS.  For example, EG 
articles mentioned an RICS internal code-monitoring group; however the records of this 
group are restricted material.  A meeting with a senior RICS executive established that 
                                                        
8 www.egi.co.uk 
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the institution did not archive such records centrally and therefore it was necessary to 
find the relevant individuals that had been responsible for the original records (if they 
still worked there); ultimately this did not yield any further data.  One resource that did 
prove useful was the in-house RICS magazine, the title of which has been subject to 
change, as a continuous series of these is held hard-copy in the RICS library.  This 
source was mined for relevant articles but a question mark hangs over the 
representativeness of this material.  The RICS communicates with its members in many 
different ways, including emailed newsletters, letters and meetings. Therefore while it 
may be considered that the views expressed in the in-house magazines are authentic 
and credible, any apparent gaps cannot be given any significance. 
There are certain documents which are central to the leasing story and which have 
been used as documentary sources.  Alongside Hansard, various other official-state 
documents provided information on government thinking and action.  Twice during the 
research period, the government threatened to legislate and issued consultation 
documents on this; these documents and the associated responses by RICS, BPF and 
other interested groups formed useful data.  These are no longer available as the 
various organisations (including government) have rationalised their tangible and 
electronic archives and largely culled them.  Fortunately, most of these were already in 
the author’s possession because of previous research projects.  However the RICS 
response to consultation in 2004 could not be located. 
There have been three versions of the Code of Practice for Commercial Leasing which 
show how the framing of the issues evolved over the period (Commercial Leases Group 
1995; Commercial Leases Working Group 2002; Joint Working Group on Commercial 
Leases 2007).  These documents are co-written by a group with a range of landlord and 
tenant representatives and so do not directly represent the view of the BPF or the RICS, 
nevertheless read in conjunction with the EG reports of the code group discussions 
they provide a useful insight.  The government commissioned the University of Reading 
to monitor the success of the first two editions of the Code and then to report 
specifically on the dissemination of the third code; these reports have been published  
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(Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000; Crosby et al. 2005; 
Crosby and Hughes 2009).  The research for the first two reports included interview 
surveys of property agents and lawyers as well as questionnaire surveys of landlords, 
tenants and their property and legal advisors; the reported results of these surveys 
provide insights into the attitudes and actions of the members of the industry bodies at 
Table 1: Data sources  
Date Source 
From 1992 Up to 2005: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 
post-2005: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/ 
From 1994 www.egi.co.uk 
1992-1995 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors,  Chartered Surveyor Weekly RICS 
1996-2001 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors,  Chartered Surveyor Monthly RICS 
2002-2009 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors,  RICS Business RICS 
2010- Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors,  Modus  RICS 
1992 Burton, J. (1992) Retail rents: Fair and free market? London: Adam Smith Institute. 
1993 Department of the Environment (1993) Consultation paper on commercial property leases. London: 
DOE. 
1993 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. (1993). Commercial property leases: comments by the RICS. 
London: RICS. 
1993 British Property Federation (1993) DOE Consultation paper Commercial Leases: Response by the 
British Property Federation. London: BPF 
1994 Department of the Environment (1994) Government proposes code of practice on upward only rent 
reviews.  London: DOE. 
1995 Commercial Leases Group (1995) Commercial property leases in England & Wales: Code of practice. 
London: RICS. 
2000 Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions (2000) Monitoring the Code of Practice 
for Commercial Leases. London: DETR 
2002 Commercial Leases Working Group (2002) A code of practice for commercial leases in England and 
Wales. London: RICS. 
2003 British Property Federation and British Council for offices (2003), BPF & BCO Model clauses for a full 
repairing and insuring office lease of a whole building.  London: BPF & BCO   
2003 HM Treasury (2003), Budget Report: Building a Britain of economic strength and social justice. 
London: HMSO. 
2004 Crosby, N., C. Hughes, and S. Murdoch (2005) Monitoring the 2002 code of practice for commercial 
leases: interim report. London: ODPM 
2004 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004), Commercial property leases: Options for deterring or 
outlawing the upward only rent review clauses. London: ODPM. 
2004 British Property Federation (2004) A BPF response to the ODPM’s consultative paper on: Commercial 
Property Leases; Options for deterring or outlawing the use of Upward Only Rent Review clauses. 
London:  BPF 
2004 British Retail Consortium (2004) Commercial property leases: options for deterring or outlawing the 
use of upward only rent review clauses.  London: BRC. 
2005 Crosby, N., C. Hughes, and S. Murdoch (2005) Monitoring the 2002 code of practice for commercial 
leases. London: ODPM. 
2007 Joint working group on commercial leases (2007) The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England 
and Wales 2007. London: JWGCL. 
2007 British Property Federation (2007) Commercial landlords’ accreditation scheme. London: BPF. 
2009 Crosby, N. and C. Hughes (2009) Monitoring the 2007 Code for Leasing Business Premises. London: 
CLG. 
2011 Portas, M. (2011) The Portas Review: An independent review into the future of our high streets. 
London: BIS. 
2012 Department of Communities and Local Government (2012) High Streets at the Heart of our 
Communities: the Government’s Response to the Mary Portas Review.  London: CLG. 
2012 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. 2012. Small business lease. RICS. 
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various points.  The research for the third code included interviews with 
representatives of the BPF and RICS and shed light onto their views and actions post-
2007.  The websites of RICS9 and BPF10 were also used as a resource, particularly to find 
the details of specific relevant initiatives such as the RICS small business lease and the 
BPF commercial landlord accreditation scheme. 
These sources and additional material used as data are listed in Table 1 with archives 
first and then other source material in chronological order.  Individual documents are 
also referenced in the bibliography. 
4.5.1 Data analysis 
The model of institutional change set out in Chapter 3 is central to the analysis.  The 
change process in leasing has been framed by government as a test of the ability of the 
industry to self-regulate and it is clear from the literature that industry bodies are 
central to this.  Using this model for examining the leasing story will firstly enable the 
role of the industry bodies in institutional change to be analysed but secondly, by 
focussing on the industry bodies it will generate the data to enable the question on 
self-regulation to be addressed. 
In order to use this model, it had to be operationalised and this is set out in Table 2.  
The first two columns identify the stages of change and their meanings and a third 
column outlines the data that will be sought within the documents as evidence of the 
stage, the nature of activity and expressed views of the actors. 
From the documentary evidence, a chronological narrative was constructed of the 
period since 1992 during which attempts have been made to change leasing practices.  
As is common with historical methods the material was organised and analysed into 
distinct phases.  Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) noted that periods are useful 
analytical devices for separating out influences at particular points in time.  So for 
example, Leblebici et al. (1991) identified distinct stages in the story of change in the 
US radio broadcasting industry; these changes were demarcated by the actor taking the 
leading role in the organisational field at the time.  The time period of the commercial  
                                                        
9 www.rics.org.uk  
10 www.bpf.org.uk  
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leasing study encompassed the negotiation and creation of three editions of the Lease 
Code, the implementation phases, the government’s assessment of success and failure 
to each edition and then the reactions to this.  The narrative follows these activities 
through each edition.  There are several ways of dividing up the narrative, but the 
Table 2: Operationalised model  
Stage Meaning Operationalisation 
Precipitating jolt Pressures for change  Evidence of pressures for change which 
could be: social (including economic), 
regulatory or technological. 
Deinstitutionalisation The removing of legitimacy from 
existing  practices  
Evidence that any of the actors in the 
organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing practices 
Gradually stop doing something 
Proactively challenge/reject leasing practices 
Areas that might be questioned include key 
aspects of leases eg: 
UORR 
Long leases 
Rent review system 
Confidentiality and transparency 
Privity of contract 
Lack of information (for tenants) 
Flexibility in leases 
Choice for tenants 
Assignment and subletting 
Preinstitutionalisation Introduction of new ideas and 
replacement practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest ideas of new practices (in areas such 
as set out above) 
Independently adopt different practices 
Theorisation (part 1) Recognition and specification of 
general problem 
Evidence that supply-side actors, particularly 
RICS & BPF: 
Recognise that there is a problem with 
leasing practices (in areas such as set out 
above) 
Believe that there is no problem in these 
areas 
Theorisation (part 2) Development of principles to 
support solutions for general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as an industry 
solution 
See regulation as industry solution 
Take the lead in shaping Code 
Evidence that the Code is gaining legitimacy 
Diffusion Legitimated ideas spread through 
communities and are adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by actors (particularly 
BPF and RICS) 
Solutions seen to be spreading/being 
adopted 
Solutions not seen to be spreading 
Policing the implementation of the Code 
Reinstitutionalisation  Ideas and practices are accepted as 
the natural ways of doing things. 
Evidence that different practices: 
Have become taken for granted/natural way 
to behave 
Have not become natural way to behave 
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production of a new edition of the code produces a fairly natural end of a phase.  
However, the response to the 2nd edition was a particularly intense and active period, 
and it seemed most logical to end this period with the monitoring report, i.e. prior to 
the production of the 3rd edition. 
Therefore the narrative is divided into five phases: 
1. From the events that provided the stimulus for change in 1992 leading up to the 
production of the first code of practice during 1994; 
2. The reaction to the first code in 1995 through to its apparent failure identified in 
2000 and the production of a second edition; 
3. The reaction to the second code through to government pressure to produce a 
more effective code following their monitoring report in 2005; 
4. The work to produce a third code starting in 2005, through to its lack of impact 
identified in 2009; 
5. 2010 onwards. 
The material listed in Table 1 was coded against the framework in Table 2.  This then 
enabled the evidence to be analysed to show which stages of institutional change were 
happening within each time period and particularly the actions of the industry bodies 
within these stages.  As the periods were analysed separately it enabled a picture to be 
built up of progression within and through the stages and how they related to the 
periods.  So, for example, it became apparent whether theorisation by the industry 
bodies became more evident in later periods.  This made it possible to determine the 
extent to which the stages overlap and are revisited through the process. 
In this way the analysis sought to establish the extent to which the RICS and BPF 
behaved as agents of change.  As this was all within the various and clear phases of self-
regulation, this historical analysis can shed light on this as a method of achieving 
industry change in leasing. 
4.6 Chapter summary 
The theoretical context of this research is multi-faceted.  It includes the dimension of 
governance which has led to the use of self-regulation by policy-makers as a route to 
changing commercial leasing practices.  This requires consideration of the nature of 
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self-regulation and the role of industry bodies within it.  The activity is at the level of 
the organisational field, and therefore the theoretical context includes the process of 
institutional change at that level. 
The overall aim for this research is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the 
process of institutional change, particularly where that process is driven by self-
regulation.  A more specific research question has been framed to drive the research 
design: What role have the industry bodies played in the attempt to achieve 
institutional change in commercial leasing through self-regulation? 
This question focusses on the supply-side bodies of the industry, the two key ones 
being the professional body, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) and the 
other being the landlords’ association, the British Property Federation (BPF). 
The model set out in Chapter 4 provides a useful framework for the research, but it 
doesn’t define the method to be used.  Given the largely historical nature of the 
research, and the focus on the process of change, a historical method is the most 
appropriate approach.  Retrospective interviews were considered but are not likely to 
generate the data needed for this study and therefore a secondary analysis of archival 
documents is considered the most suitable method. 
The data sources used include Hansard, Estates Gazette, RICS magazines, Code 
monitoring reports, government consultation documents and responses.  From this 
data a chronological narrative can be constructed and divided into phases.  This can 
then be analysed to show which stages of institutional change were happening within 
each time period and particularly the actions of the industry bodies within these stages.  
The next chapter sets out this narrative and analysis of each period. 
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Chapter 5 Self-regulation in commercial leasing 
In this chapter the historical narrative of the commercial leasing study is set out.  This is 
done using the documentary sources identified in Chapter 4.  The narrative is organised 
into phases and is constructed using the stages of the model of institutional change set 
out in Chapter 3.  The operationalised model is then used to analyse the evidence and 
so ascertain the stages of the process being undertaken in each phase.  The analysis is 
related to the research questions in the discussion in Chapter 6.  The narrative starts in 
1992 however, for the actions and behaviours of the actors to be understood, this 
narrative has to be set in context.  Current commercial leasing practices have their 
roots in the 19th Century and are the product of political, economic and social 
influences.  The next section gives this background. 
5.1 Historical context 
5.1.1 The rise of the landlord 
According to Moore (1966:19), in his analysis of the development of democracies, the 
English Civil War paved the way for the rise to power in the 18th century of a 
“committee of Landlords”; the Civil War and the Enclosure Acts led to a Parliament 
made up of landed aristocrats.  As Atiyah (1979) noted in his study of contract, the 
concept of property certainly changed with the Civil War as aristocrats went from being 
tenants to owners of their property.  It was this “propertied class who now held the 
political power and who made the rules, [but] at least they did abide by the rule, and 
not by arbitrary fiat.” (Atiyah 1979:15).  So, while the land and power was clearly 
concentrated in few hands, there were now laws and rights that could potentially be 
used by anyone. Atiyah noted that even the Enclosure Acts did not allow property to be 
simply taken away from peasants; there was at least respect for the rights of property 
and compensation was paid. 
Land was typically kept within the aristocratic families by a process of strict settlement, 
whereby each generation becomes a life tenant, an interest which came with many 
restrictions.  As Atiyah observed, in the 19th Century this had an effect on urban and 
industrial development.  Under the Settled Land Acts (1882-1890) life tenants could 
grant building leases for up to 99 years, which meant that they retained control over 
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the use of the land.  So, right from the start, landlords maintained a high degree of 
control over their land and property.  As contemporary jurist, Sir Frederick Pollock 
noted: 
Desirable building ground near towns, and still more the ground of towns and 
cities already long occupied, and eminently those districts and sites which are 
favoured by business or fashion, are a monopoly in the hands of the landowner.  
The landowner dictates his terms to the building lessee, who in turn dictates 
them to an occupier, making the occupier’s obligations, for his own protection, 
exactly follow those of the original lease. In this way the population of whole 
cities may be said to live at the will of a few great landlords.  Over whole square 
miles of what is commonly called London, the Duke of Westminster or the Duke 
of Bedford may without appeal or control forbid any given kind of business to be 
carried on. 
Pollock (1896:157-158). 
5.1.2 State intervention in commercial property leasing 
As the social and economic issues around land and property occupation and ownership 
grew in the 19th Century, so there was an acknowledgement that state intervention in 
the commercial leasing market was perhaps necessary.  In 1886 a Select Committee 
was set up to investigate land tenure systems in the British Isles including the leasehold 
system (Haley 1999).  The report on business tenancies recognised that legislation was 
needed to protect tenants who, having no right of renewal, were being asked to pay 
very high rents or forced to leave their premises; this also meant forfeiting any 
improvements they had made to the properties.  The Committee’s recommendation 
was financial compensation rather than right of renewal, working on the basis that this 
would encourage landlords to grant renewal. 
However, the first piece of permanent legislation covering all business tenants did not 
come until quite some time later in the form of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927. 
Haley (1999) discussed the reasons for this delay and the various obstacles to reform in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Initially, it was partly due to the power and 
influence of the landed gentry in parliament (particularly among the Conservative 
members).  But even after this had waned after World War One and landlords no 
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longer had the political power, there was a reluctance to interfere in the market and 
potentially discourage investment, at least until it became politically expedient to 
acquiesce to the wishes of the vocal business community in the run-up to the 1929 
election.  Any discussions around legislation were framed as being intended to bring 
the unscrupulous landlords up to the standards of the reasonable landlords (so the 
latter had nothing to fear). 
One of the key elements of the 1927 Act was the system for compensating tenants at 
the end of their tenancies for the loss of goodwill and for the value of improvements.  
Haley (1999) criticised these systems of financial compensation as not being robust and 
so largely ineffectual.  However as he noted, the principle of legislating business 
tenancies was established.  Along with the financial compensation for tenants’ 
improvements, the 1927 Act imposed a statutory requirement that landlords could not 
unreasonably withhold consent to an assignment or subletting, with the courts 
deciding on what is reasonable.11  This could only reliably be avoided by an absolute 
prohibition on such disposals.  The 1927 Act also made it difficult for a landlord to 
prevent a tenant carrying out improvements to the demised premises.12  Despite its 
limitations, this Act defined the areas in which the state would intervene in the 
commercial landlord and tenant relationship.  It introduced several key interventions 
into the terms of the bargain struck between landlord and business tenant; these have 
been amended since but their scope has not been expanded. 
The next, and more significant, piece of legislation regulating business tenancies was 
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.  Again the stated intention seems to have been to 
improve the behaviour of the unusual rogue landlords (Haley 1999: 223) but 
nevertheless this legislation provides a general right of renewal of leases for business 
tenants.13  Haley remarked that it was “designed to redress the inequality of bargaining 
power which traditionally pervades the relationship of landlord and tenant” (Haley 
1999: 224).  However, it did not aim to regulate the content of leases agreed between 
landlord and tenant, its reach being very limited.  Limiting its impact even further, the 
                                                        
11 Imposed by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, s 19(1) 
12  As a result of the combined effect of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, section 19(2) and the 
compensation provisions contained in Part 1 of the same Act. 
13 Through Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 
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1954 Act provided a mechanism to allow incoming tenants to consent to ‘opt out’ of 
the right of renewal which, until 2004, involved an application to court.  Crosby et al. 
(2005) noted the dramatic increases in applications in the recessionary conditions of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s speculating that the reason for this was that landlords 
did not want the perpetuation of the ‘favourable’ lease terms then being granted to 
entice tenants in a period of recession.  Subsequent legislation14 has made it even 
easier to exclude this right.  So, while the right of renewal established in the 1954 Act 
endures, it certainly has never been universally enjoyed by tenants. 
The other key intervention into commercial leasing began to be contemplated in the 
1980s by a Law Commission Working Group but eventually came to fruition in 1995 
with the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (LTA 1995).  This removed the long-
standing principle of privity of contract15 with the intention of releasing tenants from all 
liabilities following a lawful assignment.  This intervention came about because of 
various reported cases in the 1980s where (former) tenants were held liable for large 
sums of money following the failure of their assignees to pay their rent.  What was 
particularly galling to tenants was the fact that, in some of these cases, assignees had 
made agreements with the landlord that affected rent and it was this level of rent that 
was reverting to the original tenant for payment.  It had always been possible for 
tenants to negotiate for post-assignment liabilities to be excluded  within the lease, 
although as Bridge remarked in his discussion of the reforms,  it would be “rare for the 
tenant to be in a sufficiently strong negotiating position to compel the landlord to 
accept such terms” (Bridge 1996:318). 
The initial recommendation of the Law Commission Working Group (1986) was that 
privity of contract should simply be abolished.  However the final legislation was a far 
cry from this.  Davey (1996) and Bridge (1996) provide informative narratives charting 
the progress and changes from this initial idea and highlight the problems in legislating 
in this field.  They noted the influence of the powerful landlord lobby groups such as 
the British Property Federation (BPF) but Davey also highlighted the apparent desire of 
                                                        
14 Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies)(England and Wales) Order 2003 which came into effect on 1 
June 2004. 
15 This is the legal principle under which the original tenant remains liable on all of the lease covenants 
(including rent) for the whole of the lease term even after a disposal of the lease by way of assignment. 
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MPs to protect the small business tenants and to ensure that any reforms had their 
blessing.  The landlords’ arguments were that, with the increased risks that abolition of 
privity of contract caused, the value of their investments would be damaged.  It was 
said that this would lead to less investment in new development, therefore less 
property to let.  A further objection was that the assignment process itself would be 
affected to the detriment of tenants as landlords would have to be more careful who 
they allowed to take assignments of the leases. 
Once again, parliament faced the pressure of competing interests as it considered 
legislation on commercial leasing issues.  The pressures regarding privity of contract 
were described by Davey (1996).  On the one hand, the recession in the early 1990s 
brought a high volume of business failures and so pressure from the business lobby to 
finally take some action; on the other hand the landlord lobby remained a powerful 
force. As Davey remarked, the Conservative government “felt compelled to tread a fine 
line between the demands of two broadly conflicting interest groups, both of whom 
might reasonably be considered to comprise its own natural supporters” (Davey 1996: 
85).  It is perhaps not surprising that procrastination always seems to dog attempts to 
legislate in this field.  Because of the strong conflicting lobby groups, another feature of 
legislation in this area (described by Davey) is the need to have the support of the key 
stakeholders before bringing measures forward.  This was even more apparent in the 
legislation on privity of contract which was finally the subject of a Private Member’s 
Bill; such a bill can only be enacted if there is no opposition from the house.  Thus 
consultations were held, deals were done, particularly between the BPF and the British 
Retail Consortium (representing retail tenants), and amendments were agreed.  It took 
nine years from the initial recommendation of the Working Group to the enactment of 
the legislation. 
The resulting  Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 abolished privity of contract 
(for new leases only) but allowed landlords to require the assigning tenant to enter into 
an authorised guarantee agreement (AGA) guaranteeing the performance of the 
assignee; this holds until (and if) the assignee themselves assign.  The 1995 Act also 
amends section 19(1) of the 1927 Act enabling a landlord to pre-specify conditions and 
circumstances that must be satisfied before the tenant is free to assign. The 
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requirement within the 1927 Act that these conditions and circumstances be 
reasonable was removed.  Clearly the landlords won some important concessions. 
5.1.3 Review of context 
Commercial leasing has evolved as a market with relatively little intervention by the 
state.  From the 1886 Select Committee through to the introduction of the LTA 1995, 
legislating in commercial leases had proved to be anything but straightforward.  
Landlords have traditionally had a powerful voice although increasingly governments 
have recognised and listened to the opinions of the business community i.e. the 
tenants.  To date there have been only limited, but significant, direct interventions by 
the state in commercial leasing; these have proved controversial and brought out some 
fundamental differences between landlords and tenants.  This is the context into which 
the more recent attempts to change commercial leasing practices are set. 
5.2 The study of the self-regulation of commercial leasing 
This context and particularly the fraught negotiations around the introduction of the 
LTA 1995 set the scene for the parallel push for changes in other key aspects of 
commercial property leasing practices.  The narrative of this attempt to change leasing 
practices is set out in the rest of this chapter.  As noted in Chapter 5, there are several 
ways of dividing up the narrative.  However the aim is to create phases that capture the 
dynamics at particular times and which enable the move through stages of institutional 
change to be best captured.  The production of a new edition of the Code produces a 
natural end of a phase, as each time this happened it marked a point at which the 
industry had created a potential mechanism for change following a period of 
discussion.  However, the period following the production of the 2nd edition of the Code 
was a particularly intense and active period, and it seemed most logical to have a phase 
which focussed entirely on the reactions to this edition and the change processes that 
were happening.  This created a phase which ended with the monitoring report, i.e. 
prior to the production of the 3rd edition. 
This meant that the narrative is divided into five phases: 
1. From the events that provided the stimulus for change in 1992 leading up to the 
production of the first code of practice during 1994; 
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2. The reaction to the first Code in 1995, its apparent failure identified in 2000 and the 
production of a second edition. 
3.  Reaction to the second edition through to government pressure to produce a more 
effective code following their monitoring report in 2005; 
4. The work to produce a third code starting in 2005, through to its lack of impact 
identified in 2009; 
5. 2010 onwards. 
5.3 Period One:  From jolt to code 
Greenwood et al. (2002) categorised the initial stimuli for change as social, regulatory 
or technical sources.  While the legislation on privity of contract was being deliberated, 
the UK suffered the recession and associated property crash of 1989/90 which caused 
widespread hardship.  This essentially social event led to the threat of legislation in 
commercial leasing.  These events served to rock the institutional boat and started the 
process of attempting to change leasing practices. 
5.3.1 Recession 
Table 3 shows the change in the country’s fortunes from the boom times of the 1980s 
into the recessionary period of the early 1990s. Growth in Gross Domestic Product 
slowed and then turned negative, while similar patterns could be seen in retail sales 
and manufacturing output.  Meanwhile unemployment, which had been falling in the 
late 1980s, showed a sharp increase. 
Table 3: Changes in Key Economic Indicators 
 
GDP (%) 
Unemployment 
(%) 
Retail Sales 
Volume (%) 
Manufacturing 
Output (%) 
1985 3.6 3.7 4.5 2.4 
1986 4.0 0.5 5.3 1.1 
1987 4.6 -10.7 5.2 5.2 
1988 5.0 -20.2 6.4 7.4 
1989 2.2 -24.9 2.0 3.6 
1990 0.8 -7.4 0.7 0.0 
1991 -1.4 39.8 -1.3 -5.5 
1992 0.2 21.9 0.8 -0.2 
1993 2.3 5.3 3.0 1.5 
1994 4.4 -9.8 3.7 4.5 
Source: Crosby et al. (2005) using data from Office of National 
Statistics, Small Business Service of the Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
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Table 4: Estimated Rental Value Change (%) 
Year All Property Retail Office Industrial 
1985  6.5  9.5  6.0  2.6  
1986  9.9  9.9  11.7  4.3  
1987  19.3  15.5  24.6  11.7  
1988  22.8  19.6  25.2  22.5  
1989  15.1  14.1  14.4  21.8  
1990  2.8  4.4  0.5  6.8  
1991  -8.5  -2.2  -14.9  -1.9  
1992  -11.9  -3.3  -20.4  -8.9  
1993  -7.9  -1.9  -13.7  -8.9  
1994  -0.9  0.1  -1.3  -3.1  
Source: Crosby et al. (2005) using IPD data16 
 
As commercial property is a derived demand, it was to be expected that the property 
market would suffer as a consequence of the recession.  A key indicator of the strength 
of the market is rental value growth and, after a period of strong growth in the late 
1980s, commercial property rental value levels duly began to slow down and then fall, 
quite dramatically in the case of offices, as shown in Table 4. 
The upward only rent review 
However, businesses that already leased premises did not necessarily see their own 
rents fall to market levels and this was because of one particular institutionalised 
practice, the use of the upward only rent review (UORR). 
Businesses occupying premises under leases were usually committed to long-term 
arrangements.  In 1990, 86% of leases (weighted by rent) within the IPD dataset were 
for 20 years or more; the shorter leases that existed tended to be for properties with 
lower rents (Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions 2000).  Leases 
of this length invariably include provision for the rent to be reviewed.  Rent reviews are 
a well-established feature of UK leases which aim to prevent the erosion of the value of 
the rent during the course of a lease.  It was the inflationary pressures of the 1950s that 
led to their introduction (Scott and Judge 2000).  Through the 1960s and 70s the 
                                                        
16 The Investment Property Databank (IPD) provides business intelligence to the real estate industry.  
Central to this are the detailed records on individual investment properties which are supplied to IPD by 
the landlords.  Crosby, Hughes and Murdoch (2005) reported that the database was believed to 
represent 75% of the commercial investment stock in the UK at the time.  
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intervals between rent reviews gradually fell from 21 years to 5 years (Department of 
the Environment Transport and the Regions 2000) and this remains the norm.   
It was also during this period that the UORR became established as the dominant type 
of rent review.  The basis of the UORR is that the review rent will be the higher of the 
current rent or the prevailing market rent at date of review.  Although called an upward 
only rent review this is technically inaccurate as of course the rent can stay the same.  
However, in a lease with several reviews, this type of review has a ratchet-effect as the 
rent can never go back down, even to a figure previously paid under the lease. 
The UK economy, and its property tenants, went through a recession in the early 1970s 
at the time that UORRs were becoming established yet, as the Department of the 
Environment Transport and the Regions (2000) noted, there was no obvious resistance 
to them at the time.  The authors of that report suggested that this may have been 
because rents that fell during the recession had risen back to at least the same level by 
the time of the next review, or alternatively tenants were agreeing to UORRs as they 
accepted the post-war mantra that rents never went down. 
However, the situation was quite different in the recession of the early 1990s when the 
impact of this clause was felt by occupiers due to the timing of their leases and reviews.  
Many businesses had taken leases in the booming economic conditions of 1987 and 
1988 when rents were also at their highest and, as the recession hit, they found 
themselves paying more than businesses taking new leases because of the UORR 
provisions in their leases; they were not able to rely on rent reviews in 1992 or 1993 to 
bring their rents to market levels.  Businesses were therefore stuck in long-term 
arrangements with high rents and no contractual way of avoiding this; they could not 
assign their leases as no one wanted to take on such liabilities when a new lease could 
be agreed at much lower rents.  There was no legislation in the commercial leasing 
market to help the tenants, and although the implications may not have been foreseen, 
UORRs had been apparently freely agreed by business tenants and their landlords in 
the negotiations at the start of the lease. 
79 
 
5.3.2 The pressure for change 
Voices of disquiet 
There is anecdotal evidence that the effects of the UORR led to MPs receiving a stream 
of letters from disgruntled tenants (Crosby, Hughes and Murdoch 2006) and if true 
then this is likely to have had an impact on the politicians in Westminster.  Certainly 
Burton’s report on retail leases for the Adam Smith Institute (Burton 1992) was 
influential on government thinking.  The report was commissioned by the Property 
Market Reform Group which represented major occupiers, although Professor Burton 
was an academic and not directly connected with the property industry.  Burton 
highlighted the plight of retailers facing high rents, agreed in boom times and persisting 
through the recession due to the institutional framework of commercial leases.  As a 
free-market economist he was deeply critical of the UK leasing system referring to “the 
legal and institutional factors causing the market-defying behaviour of shop rents in the 
UK” (Burton 1992:2).  He identified monopoly, spill over effects, imperfect information 
and ill-defined property rights as failings of the market. 
Burton lambasted the system of rent reviews for focussing only on rental comparables 
and, in his view, ignoring economic variables saying they are “conducted generally on a 
basis that bears no relation to the criteria indicated by economic analysis for 
homeostatic efficiency to obtain in any degree” (Burton 1992:53).  In particular the 
prevalence of upward only rent review clauses led to a distortion in rents and 
inefficiency in the market; Burton argued that UORRs are “not compatible with market-
economic logic” (1992:56). Further he argued for a correction of “contract failure” 
which arises when forms of contract have evolved and are no longer appropriate to the 
economic environment in which they exist, therefore he called for the “immediate 
voiding of all upward-only rent review clauses” (1992:83). 
He also found a lack of transparency in the market, with transaction data not being 
freely available, and concluded that severe information asymmetry in the market 
resulted in tenants being unable to make informed decisions when agreeing the terms 
of their leases.  This, added to the distortion of the normal market forces of supply and 
demand at rent review, led Burton to advocate government intervention in order to 
80 
 
“make the commercial property leasing market work more efficiently according to 
market principles” (1992:82). 
The perceived problems of the commercial leasing market were then raised in the 
House of Commons in November 1992.  There was apparently an earlier mention of 
commercial rents, although no record of this was found in Hansard; the Burton Report 
refers to Notice of a motion put before the House of Commons on 15th October 1990 
by David Steel and others which expressed concern about “increases in commercial 
rents significantly above inflation’ making it ‘extremely difficult for independent and 
specialist traders to survive…’”.  However Burton noted that this did not spark any 
public policy debate at the time (1992:2). 
It was the MP for Tiverton, Angela Browning that, on 10th November 1992, brought to 
Parliament similar concerns to those voiced in Burton’s report (HC Debate 10 
November 1992 vol 213 cc851-8).  The MP set out the hardship that the recession had 
brought to her constituents, which had been grossly exacerbated by prevailing 
commercial leasing practices.  She provided the parliamentary catalyst to examine the 
accepted industry practices in an impassioned speech of some 1500 words which 
opened a debate on business rents.  In the speech she described the escalation in rents 
through 1980s with demand outstripping supply especially in prime shopping pitches, 
while retail sales did not increase at the same rate.  Once recession hit, demand for 
units and shop sales fell away.  Her main targets for criticism were: 
1. The “the iniquitous upwards-only clause” (Ibid col 852); 
2. The 20-25 year lease which made it difficult for tenants to escape the high rents 
and also prevented businesses responding to market conditions; 
3. The rent review process which relies on transactions on comparable properties 
(however few they may be) and so means that the high rental levels are replicated; 
4. Original tenant liability. 
She was forceful in her view that the market was failing: 
While the market mechanism has responded in boom conditions, it has 
completely failed to respond to recession. In a free and fair market, rents for 
leasehold premises should have taken account of all the relevant economic 
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factors and fallen accordingly. Instead, they have defied the laws of economic 
gravity, remaining on top of the outrageously high plateau they had reached in 
1990, while the spending power of their customers has been gutted. The market, 
it appears, is neither free nor fair. 
Ibid Col 851 
The MP gave a first insight into the attitude of the main industry bodies, or at least her 
perception of their attitude, commenting that:  “To date, the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors and the various other landlord interests have shown no interest in 
reforming the system” (Ibid Col 854). 
While she did not elaborate on this, she did comment that she had had discussions with 
the Property Market Reform Group (the same occupiers’ organisation that 
commissioned the Burton Report) and also with a business group led by Sir Desmond 
Pitcher to try and find solutions (Ibid Col 853). 
Government response 
The minister who responded to Mrs Browning’s speech was the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Environment, Tony Baldry.17  He recognised the plight of 
business tenants in the prevailing market conditions where leases are concerned. He 
referred to the Burton report, saying that he: 
…. fully appreciate the concerns of business tenants facing problems with rents 
and other aspects of their tenancy agreements. The recent report, “Retail Rents : 
Fair and Free Market?” by Professor Burton, which the Property Market Reform 
Group commissioned, criticises the so- called institutional leasing system and 
proposes radical reforms to the operation of the letting market. 
Ibid Col 854 
By this time the Law Commission had already reported and recommended changes to 
original tenant liability.  Baldry dealt with the other issues but, referring to the Landlord 
and Tenant Act 1954 as the foundation for business leases, made it clear that the 
                                                        
17 Still within HC Debate 10 November 1992 vol 213 cc851-8 
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government were mindful of keeping a balance between legislation and the freedom of 
the parties to negotiate their contracts.  He emphasised that clauses such as UORR 
were agreed under contractual negotiation and that it was quite possible for terms 
such as this to be varied by the parties: 
it may well be in the best interests of the landlord to agree to other rental levels 
in the light of current difficult market conditions in order to avert the risk of a 
vacancy arising if business pressures on the tenant become unsustainable. That 
is an important point, of which all involved should be well aware. 
Ibid Col 855 
Similarly the 25 year lease: 
…is a contract term which the parties have freely and voluntarily agreed. There is 
no statutory obligation to agree this length of lease. 
Ibid Col 855 
So, ministerial sympathy was peppered with reminders that such contracts had been 
entered into voluntarily; while terms might have become common, they had been 
freely agreed between the parties.  The minister was also very wary of regulation as a 
solution to the problems so was very reluctant to consider regulating the length of 
leases, banning UORRs or prescribing arbitration clauses saying: 
Successive Governments’ policy of non-intervention in business tenancies gives 
tenants and landlords freedom to negotiate the terms of the lease including the 
length of lease, rent levels, rent reviews and dispute terms, in the light of current 
market circumstances, thus avoiding the distortions that invariably result from 
statutory controls…. 
….The Government take the straightforward view that landlords and tenants 
should be free to negotiate agreements in the open market on whatever terms 
they decide. It is in both their interests that they should have flexibility to agree 
terms in the light of particular circumstances and not be constrained by statutory 
provisions. 
Ibid Col 855 
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Thus the debate ended with an acknowledgement by the minister that many 
businesses faced difficulties relating to commercial leases and an assurance that the 
government would consider the various issues raised, while recognising the need to 
keep a balanced approach to the landlord and tenant relationship. 
At this stage the government was apparently reluctant to regulate.  However, from this 
point onwards, a stated willingness to legislate was central to the jolt given to the 
industry. 
5.3.3 Threat of legislation 
In March 1993 Sir George Young (Minister in the Department for the Environment) 
informed the House of Commons that: 
They (the Government) have no intention of legislating in any way that would 
alter the terms in existing contracts. However, the Government will shortly 
produce a consultation paper inviting views on three aspects of commercial 
leasing which have been causing concern: Upward Only Rent 
Reviews; Confidentiality clauses; and dispute resolution procedures. 
We will consult widely with interested bodies and will carefully consider the 
outcome before deciding. 
HC Debate 31 March 1993 Vol 222 Col292 
Pressure on the government to act was increased by a 10-minute rule bill in May 1993 
in which a backbench MP (Richard Ottoway) introduced “a Bill to abolish upwards-only 
rent review clauses in commercial leases; and for connected purposes.” (HC Debate 18 
May 1993 Vol 225 Col 158).  Mr Ottoway made similar points to Angela Browning, 
referring to her speech of November 1992.  His bill was not successful. 
The government duly consulted on legislating in the specific areas of upward only rent 
reviews, confidentiality clauses (which mean that agreed lease terms are not disclosed 
by the parties) and rent determination processes at rent review and lease renewal 
(Department of the Environment 1993).  The proposals for legislation were to: 
1. Prohibit the use of UORRs in new leases, with the rent at rent review being 
determined in line with the current open market value. 
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2. Address confidentiality clauses.  Suggestions in the consultation document 
were: prohibiting their use; make information available by compulsory 
registration of leases at the Land Registry; limit the effect of clauses by requiring 
registration of lease details after a specified time period. 
3. Address rent determination processes by: regulating the content of rent review 
clauses; allowing the reference of disputed rent reviews to a Tribunal. 
It did not however pursue the proposals from Professor Burton and Angela Browning 
MP for restrictions on lease length or changes to the use of comparables to determine 
rents at review.  The government spoke to the RICS before issuing the consultation 
document18 but, despite this dialogue, the RICS was rather surprised at the extent of 
the consultation document when it was published in June 1993.  In May 1993 the RICS 
in-house magazine reported on a speech by Tony Baldry in which he was said to have 
“stressed the benefits of non-intervention in business tenancies “(CSW 27 May 1993) 
and appeared to justify UORRs and long leases.  The RICS interpreted this as meaning 
no intervention was likely.  However, when the consultation document was published, 
the leader article of the magazine reported that “those close to the department” 
indicated that there had been a shift in opinion within government (CSW 3 June 1993 
p.3).  The article suggested that the recent introduction of two 10-minute bills on 
related matters had had an impact.19 
5.3.4 The response of the industry bodies 
The responses to the consultation document by the two main industry bodies give an 
insight into the extent to which they recognised that there were general problems to 
address; this is part of theorisation, a key stage in the process of change identified by 
(Strang and Meyer 1993) and  (Greenwood et al. 2002).  The sequence of stages 
identified by Greenwood et al. suggests that theorisation should come later, however 
the trigger of legislative consultation forced the industry bodies to consider the extent 
of industry failings and to respond.  Their responses show an initial resistance to 
change and a belief that the market mechanisms were working. 
                                                        
18 Documented in Hansard HC 15/12/93 Col 725 
19 The two bills were on abolishing UORRs (as mentioned above) and on retrospective abolition of privity 
of contract. 
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Reported comments by the RICS reveal this attitude.  Chief Executive Michael Pattison 
expressed his view on the consultation: 
I believe this is a serious effort by the government to hear from all sides of the 
industry, so it can decide if there is a need for legislation.  I don’t believe 
ministers are keen to legislate because they believe in the workings of the 
market.”  He believed that changes could happen “if enough noise is made in 
behalf of users. 
CSW 3 June 1993 p5. 
Senior RICS member Richard Lay was quoted in the same article as saying that: 
 the property market is a free market that operates very efficiently and that no 
legislation is required. 
The BPF and RICS submitted written responses to the consultation document which 
make clear their views. 
BPF written response 
The BPF saw no reason to intervene in the market in any of the areas; it did not 
recognise that there were problems which needed to be resolved outside of market 
mechanisms (British Property Federation 1993). 
In its response, the BPF argued against banning UORRs pointing out that this would be 
against the government’s policy of deregulation.  In addition, it contended that the 
market had adjusted by itself in response to market circumstances and so now offered 
flexibility in lease terms (shorter leases and break clauses) along with financial benefits 
such as rent free periods.  Negative consequences from banning UORRs were set out: 
increased risks for investors would mean increased returns needed; property values 
would fall as would investment including that from abroad attracted by UK lease 
structures. The BPF disputed the argument given in the consultation document that 
contracted rent should always equal open market rent or that UORRs are a cause of 
inflation. 
Notably the response drew on research commissioned from IPD.  This was submitted to 
show that UORRs did not cause inflation and that tenants over the last 22 years were 
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better off under UORRs than leases that incorporated RPI rental increases (except for 
lettings in 1989 and 1990). 
The argument against banning confidentiality clauses was based on the premise that, in 
a free society, parties should be entitled to privacy unless there were compelling 
reasons to do otherwise. The BPF did not appear to accept the argument that there 
should be more transparency saying: 
Generally, evidence is freely available and there are no cases to our knowledge 
which have been materially affected by non-disclosure because of confidentiality 
clauses 
 British Property Federation (1993:18). 
There was no perceived problem with dispute resolution; the view expressed was that 
there was no evidence of bias in current system and that a tribunal system would be 
expensive.  It was felt that “Professions are capable of ironing out any imperfections of 
the present system” (British Property Federation 1993:3). 
RICS written response 
The response of the RICS was also that state intervention was not needed although, 
unlike the BPF, there was acceptance that current practices may be causing some 
problems for tenants (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1993). 
In respect of UORRs, the RICS expressed an understanding of the “sense of unfairness 
felt by some tenants ‘locked into’ leases at a rent which is higher than current levels.” 
(Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1993:1)  However, it believed that only 
retrospective legislation would deal with this issue for current tenants and neither 
government nor RICS were recommending this.  As with the BPF, the RICS argued that 
the market was responding by itself; it saw the current market as being “flexible 
enough to adapt to changing circumstances and has done so in a number of ways” 
(Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1993:1). 
Shorter leases and break clauses are given as examples of this.  The negative effects of 
banning UORRs cited were: deterrence for development; the potential move away from 
property as an asset class; difficulties in the ability to borrow money (as property prices 
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would fall); a two tier market while some properties have UORRs. 
The recognition that tenants may currently be facing difficulties because of the UORR 
led to a comment that landlords should find ways to help tenants such as by paying 
rent on easier terms, and that this would be prudent in a depressed market anyway 
(Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1993:8).  However, the RICS does not suggest 
a way of making this happen. 
Primarily the argument made by the RICS was for market forces and the freedom to 
negotiate to prevail. 
We believe instead that market forces, which have already changed the shape of 
the commercial property market, should continue to be allowed to operate, 
adjusting the terms landlords and tenants are able to negotiate according to 
supply and demand. 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (1993:8). 
On the issue of confidentiality clauses, there was stated support for more openness.  
This contrasts with the BPF response.  However, like the BPF, the RICS argued against 
legislating for disclosure saying that sometimes confidentiality was needed for good 
reason.  Rent reviews and renewals were highlighted as areas where confidentiality had 
the most impact but the RICS believed that: 
sufficient information finds its way out to the market for competent advisers to 
take a responsible view as to what is happening given that valuation at the best 
of times is an imperfect art.  We also feel that the particular difficulties in the 
review/renewal market are not in themselves of sufficient detriment to justify 
statutory intervention. 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (1993:18). 
So again there is no sense that there is a significant problem. 
As the government’s criticisms of dispute resolution processes were essentially an 
attack on the RICS arbitration system, this was defended in great detail in the RICS 
response.  The criticisms of bias were said to be misguided; the accusation that 
arbitrators did not take into account economic factors were said to be misconceived as 
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comparable rents reflect economic circumstances. Much of the pressure for change 
was believed to come from small business tenants (SBTs) whose main problem was 
perceived to be unfamiliarity with the system, therefore the RICS reported that it had 
produced a simple guide to rent review. Delay was said to be thing of past and the RICS 
service represented best available value.  Again the argument was made for freedom of 
choice, this time in the method of resolving disputes to be incorporated in leases. 
However the RICS reported that it was taking the lead on a simpler dispute resolution 
service for rents, a voluntary mediation service.  It expressed support for an alternative, 
optional tribunal if it was expert, efficient and independently funded, so again some 
acceptance that there are problems in the current system. 
5.3.5 After the jolt 
The second phase of the model of institutional change (Greenwood et al. 2002) is one 
of deinstitutionalisation.  In this phase the jolts lead to ideas being put forward by any 
of the existing actors within the organisational field or even new entrants. “Their effect 
is to disturb the socially constructed field-level consensus by introducing new ideas and 
thus the possibility of change” (Greenwood et al. 2002:60).  Ideas may then emerge 
from any of the players in the field as “technically viable solutions to locally perceived 
problems” in a stage of preinstitutionalisation.  In this particular case, it was the 
government that was the leading actor, both in identifying the areas of change and 
proposing the code as a framework to provide a solution. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the prevailing neoliberal ideology did not favour direct 
intervention in markets.  It was in this context that, following the consultation period, 
the government withdrew the threat to legislate and the minister, Tony Baldry, set out 
a proposed course of action (HC Debate 19 July 1994 Vol 247 cc111-113W).  Evidence 
of variety on lease terms was acknowledged but there were problems to address, and 
practices did need to change.  They therefore put it back to the property industry to 
develop a system of self-regulation, although the industry was not going to be given 
free rein on this.  It was to be done in partnership with tenant groups and government.  
The latter made clear the problems as they saw them and the outcomes that they 
expected to see.  The Department of the Environment Under-Secretary of State (Tony 
Baldry) reported to the House of Commons: 
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(On UORRs) We consider the best way forward would be for the industry to 
adopt a code of practice which not only draws attention to the implications of 
upward rent review clauses but encourages flexibility on other terms. On the 
assumption that a satisfactory code of practice can be developed and accepted 
by all sectors of the property industry in consultation with occupiers’ 
representatives and put into effect, we consider that statutory intervention to 
regulate rent review clauses would not be appropriate. 
(On Confidentiality) We envisage that the code of practice should encourage 
greater openness, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. We shall 
consult with interested parties on how this could be achieved. 
(On Dispute resolution) We therefore look to discussions about a code of practice 
to stimulate greater awareness of current procedures. More generally the 
competitiveness White Paper refers to other work being taken forward to 
simplify the law on arbitration and encouraging other forms of dispute 
resolution. We also intend to review with interested organisations options for 
providing a quick, cheap and cost-effective method of resolving disputes for 
small tenants. 
(Overall)… the Government will work with representatives of both landlords and 
tenants and other interested parties with the aim of producing a code of practice 
within the next twelve months. The Government will appraise the operation of 
the code after three years when it should have had reasonable time to influence 
commercial practices. In particular, we will review the impact on the flexibility 
and transparency of the market. 
HC Debate 19 July 1994 Vol 247 cc111-113W. 
5.3.6 Developing a code 
While the government had identified some specific practices to be addressed within a 
code, this was associated with a requirement to improve flexibility and transparency in 
the market.  It required a fundamental and wide-ranging review of leasing practices.  
The government made clear that this was to be undertaken by representatives from 
the industry and occupiers, therefore problems and potential solutions were 
immediately being aired at the level of the organisational field and the generalisation of 
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the problems (theorisation) had to occur alongside the stages of deinstitutionalisation 
and preinstitutionalisation.  The industry was being pushed towards revolution rather 
than evolution, much as Meyer et al. (1990) found that the “fusillade of regulatory 
actions” added to prior economic, social and political pressures triggering revolutionary 
change in US hospitals. 
Over the next few months there were fundamental disagreements within the industry 
on the nature of the problems, alongside disagreements on the nature of any code and 
who would draw up such a document.  There are many comments made by industry 
players in the Estates Gazette which reveal the extent to which the property industry 
still did not believe there was a problem with institutional practices( such as the 
dominant UORR). 
The BPF saw no need for change referring to the normal ebb and flow that happened 
during negotiations; the market was self-correcting: 
“British Property Federation director-general William McKee declared: “We are 
quite clear that the code cannot become a substitute for the operation of the 
market, or for negotiations between owners and tenants on lease terms”… 
McKee said: “This is an open market, free negotiation. At times the landlord will 
hold a better negotiating position - and at other times the tenant will. But the 
code cannot regulate an open and free market.” “ 
EG 17-09-1994. 
However, it seems to have been the BPF that, publicly at least, took the lead in shaping 
the code and, in so doing, took the lead in identifying the problems to be addressed.  
BPF homed in on the educational role of a code and took the lead in steering it toward 
this, organising a conference in October 1994 and producing a draft code: 
“BPF director-general William McKee expressed concern that the Government 
had not made clear what the code, which is intended to give guidance on 
upward-only rent reviews, confidentiality issues and the resolution of disputes 
between landlords and tenants, should actually seek to achieve.” 
EG 22-10-1994 
91 
 
McKee was reported as commenting that Baldry’s July 1994 speech showed the 
government: 
…appeared to want a code of the “health warning” kind. “Flexibility is to be 
achieved through greater awareness and understanding of the options open to 
landlords and tenants, rather than through prescriptive measures,” he said. 
EG 22-10-1994. 
In May 1995 the new BPF president (Trevor Moross) reiterated the BPF view that there 
was no real problem with practices, and that the issue was informing and educating: 
“He also rejected legal and fiscal intervention in the commercial operation of the 
property market and welcomed the recent government decision not to legislate 
on leases, but commented that the content of the proposed Code of Practice 
remains an issue: the code “can only - and should only - be to inform, educate 
and warn the parties, particularly small tenants, of the implications and 
obligations of entering into a commercial lease … there is no place in a voluntary 
code for prescriptive interference” he said.” 
 EG 13-05-1995. 
The RICS was less prominent in the EG than the BPF.  Indeed, the RICS seems to have 
come in for some criticism at this time for inactivity with delegates at a BPF conference 
on commercial leasing reportedly questioning why “the RICS and tenant organisations 
were not playing a more active part in shaping the code” (EG 22-10-1994) 
However, the circumstances of the comments perhaps suggest a rivalry between the 
two organisations rather than objective statements.  RICS Assistant Secretary General 
Barrie Clarke claimed that the Institution was taking an active role saying “We are 
taking soundings all the time, and in November we will be holding talks with interested 
parties at a meeting called by the DOE” (EG 22-10-1994) 
The RICS saw itself as being central and in a non-partisan role: Richard Lay, DTZ 
chairman and the RICS’ spokesman, said that “The RICS has a particular role, because 
not only does it represent both the landlord and the tenant but it also acts as an 
arbitrator” (EG 12-11-1994). 
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Nevertheless, even the RICS saw BPF in a central role with Richard Lay saying that “the 
draft code put together by the BPF and launched at a seminar last month could form a 
useful starting point for future discussion” (EG 12-11-1994). 
However the RICS did not seem to have much faith in the success of the code concept 
or of its own ability to ensure its dissemination and use: 
According to RICS chief executive Michael Pattison: “It will work only if the key 
industry parties believe that such a code will work ... I do not see that the basics 
have been established yet.” 
 EG 17-09-1994 
Similarly Richard Lay commented that “Whether landlords promote this code to 
tenants remains to be seen. I think it’s about as likely as an estate agent recommending 
a structural survey,” (EG 12-11-1994) 
5.3.7 The first code of practice 
Despite the problems, the Commercial Property Leases in England & Wales: Code of 
Practice (Commercial Leases Group 1995) was eventually launched in December 1995.  
The authoring group included representatives of the various stakeholders: landlord 
bodies were the BPF, Association of British Insurers and British Council for Offices; 
tenant bodies included the British Retail Consortium, Confederation of British Industry, 
Federation of Small Businesses and the Property Market Reform Group; professional 
advisers associations represented were the RICS, ISVA and the Law Society.  The Code 
was an attempt to steer the property industry into different practices, a first attempt at 
the pre-institutionalisation phase. The stated aims of the Code were to: 
a) Improve practice in the business relationships between landlords, tenants 
and their advisers particularly when the grant of a lease is being 
negotiated and at a rent review; 
b) Encourage greater flexibility and choice through improved awareness of 
the alternatives and terms and conditions which may be negotiable; 
c) Promote greater openness and disclosure in the property market so that 
negotiations and the resolution of disputes, particularly concerning rent 
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review, are conducted with the benefit of more complete and accurate 
information; 
d) Ensure that businesses know more about how the market in commercial 
leases operates. 
Commercial Leases Group (1995:5). 
Much of the document was devoted to the explanation of various aspects of leasing 
such as rent review, alienation and repairing liabilities along with advice on these 
various issues.  However, the use and distribution of the Code was stated to be 
voluntary rather than mandatory, therefore any attempts to change the leasing 
practices of landlords were limited to exhortations; for example where flexibility in 
lease terms is concerned: “Landlords are urged to consider a potential tenant’s 
requests to vary the terms quoted” (Commercial Leases Group 1995:8). Likewise on 
confidentiality: 
 For commercial reasons, sometimes the landlord or tenant will wish to keep the 
details of their transaction confidential.  Generally however, parties and their 
advisers should avoid unnecessary secrecy in transactions.  This will help the 
availability of market data. 
Commercial Leases Group (1995:10). 
5.3.8 Summary of the first period 
The recession of the early 1990s provided the jolt which sparked a revolt against some 
long-standing industry practices.  The main arguments for government intervention in 
commercial leasing were articulated by Professor Burton and the MP for South Devon, 
Angela Browning, who both called for reform in industry practices such as the UORR on 
the grounds that they worked against a free and fair market.  Mrs Browning bemoaned 
the lack of interest shown by RICS and landlord interest groups, suggesting that she had 
pursued the issues with them prior to her speech.  Her speech was aimed at the 
relevant minister and was a clear call to action for government which echoed the call 
for intervention made by Burton. 
While the government’s initial position was to support the notion of freely agreed 
contracts in leasing, legislative solutions which challenged key industry practices were  
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soon presented in a consultation document.  The issues identified in 1993 for 
consultation on potential legislation were: abolition of upward only rent reviews; 
removal of confidentiality clauses; changes to rent review/renewal dispute resolution 
procedures.  The responses of the BPF and RICS to these proposals show that these two 
industry bodies did not at this point agree with the government, Professor Burton or 
Mrs Browning that there were fundamental problems in the commercial property 
leasing market.  A strong defence of UORRs was made along with arguments that the 
property market was responding to changing demands on lease structures.  The 
sacrosanct nature of the freedom to negotiate leases was strongly argued by both 
organisations. However, there were differences between them.  The BPF were 
unswerving and forceful in defending the operation of market forces and disputing the 
existence of the alleged market failings.  While the RICS similarly argued against 
legislation in any of the areas, there was recognition that practices like the UORR may 
be causing problems, particularly for smaller tenants and that more openness in 
transactions would be beneficial. 
The government responded to the submissions from industry and stepped back from 
legislation.  This was also commensurate with the prevailing neoliberal ideology.  It 
subsequently handed over the same issues to industry to address through self-
regulation and to produce a code of practice in conjunction with tenant groups.  This 
forced the industry into questioning and proposing solutions within the framework of a 
code i.e. the stages of deinstitutionalisation and preinstitutionalisation.  However, as 
the nature of this initiative required the recognition of a general problem 
(theorisation).  The published views of the BPF and RICS during the discussions on a 
code confirmed their views as expressed in the responses to the consultation 
document.  This suggests that this initiative for creating institutional change was 
immediately floundering because they did not agree there was a problem to solve; that 
first crucial stage of theorisation was not evident.  Although the RICS was showing 
some willingness to change through a code, it was very vague.  The Code was therefore 
developed with the BPF in particular arguing for an educational document believing 
that tenants simply needed to understand the system better rather than any changes 
being needed. 
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Table 5: Period One 
Stage Meaning Operationalisation Evidence found in first period 
Precipitating 
jolt 
Pressures for 
change  
Evidence of pressures for change 
which could be: social (including 
economic), regulatory or 
technological. 
Social/economic pressures from 
recession of early 1990s. 
Report by academic (Burton) 
and action by MP (Browning) on 
behalf of constituents leading 
to threat of legislation. 
Deinstitution-
alisation 
The removing of 
legitimacy from 
existing  
practices  
Evidence that any of the actors in 
the organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing 
practices 
Gradually stop doing something 
Proactively challenge/reject 
leasing practices 
Government questions leasing 
practices and compels Industry 
to do the same in association 
with occupiers. 
Key industry players largely 
focus on information 
asymmetry, questioning 
tenants’ awareness  
Preinstitution-
alisation 
Introduction of 
new ideas and 
replacement 
practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest new practices (in areas 
such as set out above) 
Independently adopt different 
practices 
Government propose 
framework for changing 
practices i.e. code of practice.  
One is produced, which 
encouraged flexibility, choice 
and openness. 
Explained, and gave advice on, 
lease terms  
Theorisation 
(part 1) 
Recognition and 
specification of 
general 
problem 
Evidence that supply-side actors, 
particularly RICS & BPF: 
Recognise that there is a problem 
with leasing practices (in areas 
such as set out above) 
Believe that there is no problem 
in these areas 
Almost no acceptance by 
industry bodies that there are 
problems beyond tenants 
having a lack of information.  
Theorisation 
(part 2) 
Development of 
principles to 
support 
solutions for 
general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as an 
industry solution 
See regulation as industry 
solution 
Take the lead in shaping the Code 
Propose other industry-wide 
solutions 
Evidence that the Code is gaining 
legitimacy 
The idea of the Code is 
accepted by the supply-side 
although there are clear 
disagreements over purpose. 
Industry bodies take the lead 
(especially the BPF) 
Published Code represents an 
attempt to provide general 
underpinning principles for 
practices.   
Diffusion Legitimated 
ideas spread 
through 
communities 
and are 
adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by actors 
(particularly BPF and RICS) 
Solutions seen to be 
spreading/being adopted 
Solutions not seen to be 
spreading 
Policing the implementation of 
the Code 
Not yet applicable 
Reinstitution-
alisation  
Ideas and 
practices are 
accepted as the 
natural ways of 
doing things. 
Evidence that different practices: 
Have become taken for 
granted/natural way to behave 
Have not become natural way to 
behave 
Not yet applicable 
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The resulting code seemed to shift the focus quite a long way from the initial desire to 
change practices to information provision, with only general recommendations for 
landlords to offer choice and flexibility.  Nevertheless, at first sight the development of 
the Code by a broad group of interests is part of the theorisation stage in terms of 
developing general principles. 
During this period several stages of the model of institutional change can be observed.  
The evidence found during this first period for the different stages of the model has 
been summarised and added to the operationalised model as set out in Table 5. 
The threat of legislation and the initiation of industry self-regulation by the government 
required industry theorisation alongside the questioning and discussion of ideas 
required to establish a code.  This immediately suggests a less linear sequence of stages 
in these circumstances to that set out in the model.  Following the jolt, the 
deinstitutionalisation and preinstitutionalisation of one actor (government) initiates the 
same stages and the need for concurrent initial theorisation by industry.  The second 
part of theorisation occurs together with preinstitutionalisation as the ideas being 
developed by actors are the same as the general principles; all are concerned with the 
development of an industry Code.  The movement between the initial stages is shown 
by the arrows in an amended diagram of the model at Figure 3.  The later stages are 
shown in grey as they have not been found to be part of this stage. 
5.4 Period Two:  Reaction to the Code through to second edition 
On the face of it, the production of a code of practice, co-created by the major industry 
bodies, represents a significant step in terms of theorisation.  It suggests some 
agreement as to the problems and the practices that need to be change.  To encourage 
changed practices, the industry bodies could show continuing support for the need for 
change, conferring legitimacy on the Code as the way to achieve this and could ensure 
its diffusion and adoption. 
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5.4.1 Legitimisation and diffusion of the Code 
The vice president of the RICS, Richard Lay, who was also one of the authors of the 
Code, expressed a belief that the Code was important and also that there was a need 
for change saying that the Code “tackles the criticism that the industry is still too often 
inflexible and secretive in landlord and tenant matters by pushing for a change in 
attitude and practice.” (CSM Nov/Dec 1995 p3) 
However, the BPF saw the introduction of a code, rather than state intervention, as 
vindication of the efficient working of the property market indicating that there was 
still no acceptance of problems in leasing practices by them: 
Director-general of the British Property Federation, Will McKee, said: “This 
debate arose out of fear that the property market was acting inefficiently, and 
an implied proposition that this was due to landlords’ inflexibility. The fact that 
the government decided not to intervene shows that this was not the case.” 
 EG 06-01-1996. 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation Fads and fashions 
Figure 3: Model of Period One 
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Nevertheless he conferred some legitimacy on the code, seeing the creation of it as 
evidence of a cooperative industry: 
… a new spirit of co-operation has developed between the various industry 
representatives bodies, he says, best illustrated by the publication of the Code of 
Practice for Commercial Property Leases last year. 
EG 05-10-1996. 
Reported reactions to the Code from tenant groups suggested that the spirit of co-
operation was a positive step but that, despite their involvement in developing the 
Code, it did not go far enough in terms of change.  The director general of the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) commented: 
“The code marks a distinct improvement in the approach between landlords and 
tenants as it shows they can work together with a common interest and for the 
common good”….. Despite this, May says that many retailers are still 
disappointed with the government’s decision not to intervene, particularly on the 
issue of upward-only rent reviews. “Ideally, the code could have had more teeth 
and been backed up with sanctions. What we have is a negotiated compromise,”  
EG 06-01-1996. 
Later that same year, the Assistant Director of the BRC said that “the code, designed to 
smooth landlord and tenant relations, was of limited use and has had no significant 
effect” (EG 05-10-1996). 
Despite authorship by a broad range of interest groups, there was very little evidence 
of the code gaining legitimacy and its recommendations becoming widely adopted. 
However the BPF made clear that they wanted the Code to take hold and that they 
were a leading organisation for the property industry.  In January 1998 the launch of a 
policy agenda was announced: 
 Partnership in Property - a manifesto of legislative reforms which the federation 
wants the government to implement over the next five years...The 35-page 
document pledges that the BPF will continue to seek close liaison with 
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government on all relevant policy and actively promote the property industry’s 
value to the economy. 
EG 24-01-1998. 
One of the priorities within this document was reported to be the introduction of 
measures to improve the effectiveness of the Commercial Leases Code of Practice. 
5.4.2 Independent initiatives 
Meanwhile the RICS introduced an independent initiative in conjunction with another 
professional group, the Incorporated Society of Valuers and Auctioneers (ISVA),20 and 
also DETR.  During 1999 their Small Business Scheme was launched21 which aimed to 
make the rent review process more understandable for small businesses and which 
provided for the appointment of an independent expert at rent review for a fixed 
maximum fee. 
5.4.3 Assessment of Code impact 
As announced at the launch of the Code, the government conducted its own 
assessment of its success.  The University of Reading was commissioned to monitor the 
first three years of the operation of the Code.  The report (Department of the 
Environment Transport and the Regions 2000) considered whether the Code was in 
regular use in the market, whether the changes required by government had happened 
and if so whether the Code was responsible.  The Code itself was found to have had 
almost no impact, not least because it had been poorly disseminated; professional 
advisors were largely aware of it but were not bringing it to the attention of their 
clients.  Diffusion of the Code had not happened. 
However the report found that there had been changes in the market.  The 
Government threats to legislate underlying the Code may have contributed to the 
changes, although it was not possible to establish the extent of this.  The changes were 
established by analysis of data from Investment Property Databank (IPD) and the 
Valuation Office Agency (VOA), which showed lease lengths getting generally shorter 
and also more diverse.  Figure 4 shows the diversity in the IPD dataset in 1998.  These 
                                                        
20 The ISVA merged into the RICS in 1999. 
21 Reported in CSM May 1999. 
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can be compared with the 25 year lease that was prevalent and uniform in 1990.  It was 
not clear whether tenants were benefitting more from break clauses in their leases 
than in the past, as there were differences between data sources. 
Confidentiality clauses were found to be few and far between, although the report 
suggested that this had always been the case.  The report did not probe the experience 
of tenants in dispute resolution processes but did identify a lack of knowledge on 
provisions for this within their leases.  However the key lease clause that was always 
going to provide the acid test was the UORR and the report found that remained intact 
and was the dominant form of rent review. 
In summary, the first code was little known and was, in any event, considered by 
tenants to lack the required sanctions to ensure compliance.  Even the BPF had set out 
the need for strengthening the Code to make it more effective.  Despite this and the 
RICS introduction of its simplified dispute resolution service, there was no sign that the 
RICS and BPF were leading a charge to ensure the Code changed industry behaviour. 
 
Figure 4 Distribution of different lease lengths in 1998 (rent weighted) 
Source: Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions (2000) (IPD data) 
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5.4.4 Government response to failure of first code 
Nick Raynsford, Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
announced the publication of the government’s report on the operation of the Code in 
April 2000 (HC Debate 19 April 2000 vol 348 cc494-5).  His statement made clear that 
the Government was continuing to highlight practices that needed to change. 
Raynsford emphasised that the issue was not simply about providing information to 
prospective tenants, but about enabling appropriate choices to be made (the 
implication being therefore that landlords should be offering a choice): 
We need to consider how Government, industry and the professions can be more 
proactive. It is not just a matter of providing information: we need to prompt 
those setting up in business to ask the right questions at the outset, to help them 
make the right choices, thus ensuring that their form of property occupation 
assists rather than hinders their business development. 
Ibid Col 494-495. 
Raynsford also commented on flexibility; the move to shorter leases was welcomed 
unlike the continuing predominance of UORRs in longer leases: 
I am concerned that upward-only rent reviews still predominate in longer leases, 
and while I welcome the report’s evidence of greater flexibility, I am 
disappointed that the Code of Practice has not had a greater influence. 
Ibid Col 495. 
Despite the apparent failure of the Code to have any real impact, there was still no 
appetite from the politicians for regulation and the government was apparently intent 
on making a code work.  However there was a reminder of the ‘jolt’ as the threat of 
regulation was maintained; Mr Raynsford pressed the industry to rethink the Code and 
its dissemination, and to sit around the table with him to take this further: 
To see if we can avoid regulating lease terms, I invite the industry and property 
professions to consider: the scope and contents of the Code of Practice; the 
arrangements for disseminating the Code and other forms of advice for 
tenants; how the market could promote alternatives to upward-only rent review 
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clauses, ensuring that they are presented attractively while bearing the 
appropriate price tag; and how to promote a better understanding of the 
workings of dispute mechanisms; in particular, to encourage wider take-up of 
the special disputes resolution scheme for small businesses which the RICS 
introduced last year. 
I will be asking the industry and professions to consider these points, as they 
digest the Reading University report, and I will invite them to discuss them with 
me at a forthcoming meeting of my Department’s Property Industry Forum 
Ibid Col 495. 
After the production of the report and the associated ministerial comment, the 
industry was again defensive about existing practices, showing support for the UORR 
and vehement opposition to any suggestion of regulation.  Will McKee (Director-
General of BPF) said that the Reading University report showed “few complaints about 
the existing code of practice for commercial leases” (EG 26-04-2000) and he reiterated 
the argument that abolition of UORRs would drive up rents and be harmful to the 
interests of landlords: 
Investment in property has to be profitable for the landlord as well as profitable 
for the tenant. The profitability of commercial property is less than the 
profitability of the retail. The poor relation is property not retail. 
EG 26-04-2000. 
Similarly the RICS director of policy Michael Chambers reportedly argued that 
 further regulation of commercial leases would not help the small firms it is 
intended to benefit…Standard institutional leases tend to be on properties in the 
most desirable locations…”Small firms are less likely to be in prime areas.” 
EG 31-05-2000. 
5.4.5 Producing the second edition of the Code 
The minister’s threat of legislation on UORRs in early 2000 was quickly withdrawn to 
the relief of the BPF and RICS: 
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Minister Nick Raynsford’s backing down from banning upward-only rent reviews 
has met with approval from the British Property Federation. 
BPF director general Will McKee said he was “very pleased” with the outcome of 
Tuesday’s Property Industry Forum meeting, when Raynsford held off from his 
threat to introduce legislation to ban the reviews. 
Michael Chambers, head of policy at the RICS, was also relieved. “Nick 
Raynsford’s threat to legislate had set the cat among the pigeons, but this is a 
sensible outcome” he said. 
EG 09-09-2000. 
This again put the commercial leases group in the deinstitutionalisation, 
preinstitutionalisation, theorisation loop, with a wide review of the 1995 code and so 
questioning existing practices and specifying the general problems.  This was alongside 
the specific task of suggesting alternatives to UORRs.  The group found it difficult to 
agree a revised version of the code and to meet the various deadlines set for it by 
government.  The difficulties were probably exacerbated by the re-formation of the 
disbanded Property Market Reform Group with the stated aim of lobbying for the 
abolition of UORRs (EG 06-01-2001); this organisation had been part of the original 
code group and now would play a part in reviewing it. 
The government imposed a deadline for the group to produce their proposals for the 
Code (end of March 2001); as this date arrived, the group had not reached a consensus 
and the threat of legislation seemed to be in the air again (EG 24-03-2001).  The RICS 
was perhaps getting a little exasperated with landlords’ representatives: 
RICS policy chief Michael Chambers said that tenants and landlords remain on 
opposite sides of the battlefield, with landlords opposed to anything other than a 
revision of the discredited voluntary code on commercial leases, produced by the 
industry five years ago. 
EG 24-03-2001. 
Meanwhile the government continued to frame the problems and encourage industry 
solutions, while reserving the legislative option: 
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Referring to the review of the property industry’s Code of Practice on Commercial 
Leases, the Minister looked forward to the industry’s proposals for more choice 
and flexibility in the property markets and for better property guidance for small 
business. His preference was for a voluntary solution, but he could not rule out 
legislative options in the absence of effective measures to promote alternatives 
to upward only rent reviews. 
EG 28-03-2001. 
The difficulties in theorisation by the working group can be seen in this anonymous 
comment from a member of the group: 
It’s not looking good. We do not want to present a document that is so vague as 
to be meaningless, and the only other alternative is to present a list of the 
arguments posed by each group.  Each side is thinking in terms of gain, not give 
and take. 
EG 31-3-2001. 
Eventually the group did come up with some fairly radical proposals for three 
alternative lease structures, set out in Table 6, although it is not clear that these had 
the support of all sat around the table. 
Whatever the views of those individuals on the working group, these ideas were 
roundly rejected by the members of the representative groups on both sides, the terms 
and trade-offs being proposed being considered unacceptable.  At this point there 
appeared to be no meeting of minds in terms of theorisation: 
Working party chairman and Law Society representative Philip Freedman of 
Mishcon de Reya wrote to Raynsford last week saying: “These ideas have met 
with varying degrees of opposition from both sides, leading to an impasse.”…. 
Freedman said: “I am not confident that we will find a middle ground between 
the two vastly opposed sides. My guess is that the BPF will come up with 
something that NACORE will agree with, but other tenant groups will reject. 
“Raynsford will publish a consultation paper, the landlord and tenant groups will 
offer comments, and the minister will then decide on legislation.” 
EG 07-04-2001. 
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Table 6: The options 
Option 1- short term: Five year period; no security of tenure; rent fixed; assignment subject 
to reasonableness and Authorised Guarantee Agreement 
Option 2 - medium term with conditional occupier break and security of tenure: 10 year 
period; review at end of year five to market rent, but at a minimum of the initial rent; 
occupier may terminate on giving six months’ notice if rent is to go up at review, but owner 
may agree to continue the passing rent instead of accepting; if break is exercised, six months’ 
rent compensation paid to owner 
Option 3 - medium term with unconditional occupier break and no security of tenure: 10 
year period; review at end of year five to market rent, but with minimum of the initial rent; 
at the end of year five, occupier may terminate on giving six months’ notice and 
compensation to be paid to owner equal to six months rent 
Source:  EG 07-04-2001. 
 
Legislation was once more considered very likely but, paradoxically the uncertainty 
over whether this would happen may have hampered negotiations: 
Chairman of the Commercial Leases Joint Working Group Philip Freedman of 
Mishcon de Reya accepts that lengthy consultation between landlords and 
occupiers has resulted in a stalemate, and that legislation to outlaw upward-only 
rent reviews now looks likely. But he says that the government’s equivocation 
has hindered negotiations: “If retailers believe Raynsford is seriously considering 
legislation, it might be in their interest to not reach a consensus. If landlords 
believe he is not serious, they have every reason not to act.” 
EG 14-04-2001. 
The continuing uncertainty whether regulation was imminent proved difficult to deal 
with.  Even the BPF put it back to the government to decide on a regulatory framework 
for the leasing industry.  Once again they made clear their view that the leasing market 
was already operating efficiently: 
In a letter to the minister, BPF president Chris Bartram claims that the market is 
already delivering leasehold flexibility and urges the government to clarify its 
position on the future of leasehold reform. 
“Since the players in the industry have reached an impasse, it is our view that it 
now falls to government to decide upon the regulatory framework within which 
the market should function. We hope you will accept our view that the market 
should continue to provide the flexibility you seek within the present framework 
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but if this is not the case, we will respond constructively to any proposals which 
you bring forward.” 
EG 18-04-2001. 
Later in April 2001 Beverley Hughes MP was asked in the Commons about the property 
market and small businesses, and was forced to admit the extent of disagreement in 
the lease group: 
The issue of advice for small businesses arose in the course of our review of the 
property industry’s Code of Practice on Commercial Property Leases, along with 
more general issues about the degree of choice and flexibility in the commercial 
property market. Representatives of landlords, occupiers and the professional 
bodies undertook to address these concerns, but have failed to reach consensus 
on the key issues. We are disappointed at this lack of agreement, and my right 
hon. Friend the Minister for Housing and Planning is now considering future 
options. 
HC Deb 23 April 2001 Vol 367 cc5-6W. 
Later in 2001 the group did manage to come to an agreement on a draft code which 
based on landlords giving prospective tenants priced alternatives to UORRs on request, 
but the rent would never fall below the initial rent (to safeguard funding).  Comments 
made by BPF and RICS at this point show the clearest acceptance so far that some 
practices need to change. 
The British Property Federation (BPF) has welcomed the agreement. President 
Jeremy Newsum, Group CEO of Grosvenor, said: “This is a very good result both 
for property owners and occupiers. I do not believe that legislation would have 
been helpful to anyone. 
The revisions will reinforce the clear market trend towards greater lease 
flexibility and choice to match differing circumstances. I think we will find the 
days of the ‘standard institutional lease’ are numbered.” 
EG 31-10-2001. 
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The group’s main advice is: “Rent reviews should generally be to open-market 
rent. Wherever possible, landlords should offer alternatives that are priced on a 
risk-adjusted basis including alternatives to upward-only reviews.” 
EG 03-11-2001. 
Early the next year, the RICS reported the imminent launch of the Code saying “It is 
clear that the ministers have been persuaded that the adversarial nature of the leases 
industry is not in the long-term interest of the property industry” (CSM Mar 2002 p4). 
5.4.6 The second Code 
The second edition of the Code (Commercial Leases Working Group 2002) was 
launched by the Regeneration Minister in April 2002 at the RICS headquarters (who 
again provide the secretariat).  The RICS was keen to be seen to be central to the Code 
remarking that the Code was “again brokered by the RICS at the government’s request” 
(CSM April 2002 editorial).  The minister showed support for the Code but also 
reiterated threats of legislation. 
Speaking at the launch of the code at the RICS, Keeble said: “The code of practice 
is a major step forward for the property industry and its tenants. But self-
regulation is not a soft option. 
“I would be very disappointed if after all we had to resort to legislation.” 
EG 22-04-2002. 
The themes running through the second edition of the Code were choice and flexibility 
and tenant awareness.  It was much more specific than its predecessor in providing 
guidance to the parties.  The first part of the Code was a set of 23 recommendations.  
There were 10 recommendations for landlords and tenants negotiating new leases (set 
out in Table 7); a central idea here was that of offering different lease terms and pricing 
the rent accordingly.  This was quite innovative as specific pricing of alternatives in this 
way was not something that landlords and their agent would typically do in leasing; a 
rent was normally agreed simply as a single figure.  The hope was that that by enabling 
landlords to price terms that they would be prepared to offer choice, not only in rent 
review but also in respect of repairing liabilities. In this way the industry might be 
moved away from the default terms that the government believed still predominated.   
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Table 7: Ten recommendations for landlords and tenants negotiating new leases 
Recommendation  Explanation  
Renting premises Both landlords and tenants should negotiate the terms of a lease openly, 
constructively and considering each other’s views. 
Obtaining 
professional advice 
Parties intending to enter into leases should seek early advice from 
property professionals or lawyers. 
Financial matters Landlords should provide estimates of any service charges and other 
outgoings in addition to the rent. Parties should be open about their 
financial standing to each other…. 
Duration of lease Landlords should consider offering tenants a choice of length of term, 
including break clauses where appropriate and with or without the 
protection of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Those funding property 
should make every effort to avoid imposing restrictions on the length of 
lease that landlords, developers and/or investors may offer. 
Rent and VAT Where alternative lease terms are offered, different rents should be 
appropriately priced for each set of terms. The landlord should disclose 
the VAT status of the property and the tenant should take professional 
advice as to whether any VAT charged on rent and other charges is 
recoverable. 
Rent review The basis of rent review should generally be to open market rent. 
Wherever possible, landlords should offer alternatives which are priced 
on a risk-adjusted basis, including alternatives to upwards only rent 
reviews; these might include up/down reviews to open market rent with 
a minimum of the initial rent, or another basis such as annual 
indexation. Those funding property should make every effort to avoid 
imposing restrictions on the type of rent review that landlords, 
developers and/or investors may offer. 
Repairs and 
services  
The tenant’s repairing obligations, and any repair costs included in 
service charges, should be appropriate to the length of the term and the 
condition and age of the property at the start of the lease. Where 
appropriate the landlord should consider appropriately priced 
alternatives to full repairing terms. 
Insurance Where the landlord is responsible for insuring the property, the policy 
terms should be competitive. The tenant of an entire building should, in 
appropriate cases, be given the opportunity to influence the choice of 
insurer.  If the premises are so damaged by an uninsured risk as to 
prevent occupation, the tenant should be allowed to terminate the lease 
unless the landlord agrees to rebuild at his own cost. 
Assignment and 
subletting 
Unless the particular circumstances of the letting justify greater control, 
the only restriction on assignment of the whole premises should be 
obtaining the landlord’s consent which is not to be unreasonably 
withheld. Landlords are urged to consider requiring Authorised 
Guarantee Agreements only where the assignee is of lower financial 
standing than the assignor at the date of the assignment. 
Alterations and 
changes of use 
Landlord’s control over alterations and changes of use should not be 
more restrictive than is necessary to protect the value of the premises 
and any adjoining or neighbouring premises of the landlord.  At the end 
of the lease the tenant should not be required to remove and make 
good permitted alterations unless this is reasonably required. 
Source: Commercial Leases Working Group (2002) 
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Another key aspect of the recommendations was control; the accepted practice was for 
landlords to keep tight control of aspects such as alienation and alterations.  The Code 
attempted to move landlords to a less restrictive and more flexible position.  
A further 13 recommendations in the code covered conduct during the lease and 
included matters such as a tenant’s request for consent to make alterations to the 
property, rent review negotiations, repairs, service charges and dispute resolution.  
These recommendations encouraged landlords and tenants to be open and prompt in 
their dealings with each other, as well as flagging up some key issues for tenants such 
as repairs/dilapidations at the end of a lease.  The second part of the code was an 
explanatory guide which supplemented each recommendation and was largely aimed 
at the smaller business tenant operating without property knowledge or advice. 
5.4.7 Summary of the second period 
The differing reactions to the 1995 Code highlight the difficulties in developing 
principles for an industry group (part 2 of theorisation) without agreed identification 
and acceptance of the nature of the problem.  There were only sporadic calls to action 
from the BPF which were at least partially negated by the repeated comments of the 
director-general that there were no problems anyway and that the property market 
was operating well.  While the RICS had expressed some acceptance of the need to 
change, the government’s report (Department of the Environment Transport and the 
Regions 2000) found that this had not translated into their members using or 
disseminating the Code.  Tenant groups were not happy with the Code either.  The 
report showed that the UORR remained a common lease term and there was no 
recognition within the property industry that this should change; confidentiality clauses 
were (it appears) rare anyway and the rent dispute resolution process was unchanged.  
There were continuing reductions in lease lengths but these could not be attributed to 
a code that was poorly disseminated. 
The main impetus for changing lease practices was still coming from the government 
who maintained the pressure by reintroducing the threat of regulation in the light of an 
apparently failed initial attempt at achieving change through a code of practice. 
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The period of reviewing the first Code and producing a second was characterised by 
frustration and lack of agreement within the working group.  The failure of theorisation 
by the leading industry bodies is evident; the BPF showed a continuing disbelief that 
there were any real problems to address. Both the BPF and the RICS were clearly keen 
to avoid legislation and this seems to have been a motivation to ensure some form of 
agreement was reached.  However, the use of threatened legislation as a jolt to the 
industry looked like it might backfire at one point as negotiations stalled while the 
parties waited to see what the government would do. 
Even after a code had been agreed, disputes over who should pay for the production 
and dissemination of the document showed the degree to which the industry clearly 
still felt it was being dragged in a direction not of its own making: 
An inside source said: “After the DTLR’s insistence that the property industry 
should compromise on this, we were extremely angry when they offered such a 
meagre sum and have made this clear to them.” 
EG 18-04-2002 
Nevertheless the second edition of the Code showed a marked shift from generalities 
to more specific recommendations across a range of issues.  It pushed landlords to 
overtly consider offering different lease terms and to move away from default terms 
such as the UORR.  It also encouraged landlords to price lease terms in determining the 
rent.  So, some eight years from the government’s initial threat to legislate it looked 
like the industry might be beginning to change and the process of theorisation starting 
to take place.  It was launched with high expectations and again accompanied by the 
threat of legislation if it failed. The evidence found during this period of the different 
stages of the model has been summarised and is set out in Table 8. 
The loop identified in Period One continued in to Period Two.  With the failure of 
theorisation (and so a lack of diffusion) after the introduction of the Code, there was a 
further precipitating jolt (i.e. threat of legislation) which then fed back into the loop 
culminating in the 2nd edition of the Code as a result of preinstitutionalisation and 
apparent theorisation.  The cumulative movement between the stages of the model by 
the end of Period Two is shown by the arrows in Figure 5. 
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Table 8: Period Two 
Stage Meaning Operationalisation Evidence found in second 
period 
Precipitating 
jolt 
Pressures for change  Evidence of pressures for 
change which could be: social 
(including economic), 
regulatory or technological. 
Government frequently 
reiterating threat to legislate 
Deinstitution-
alisation 
The removing of 
legitimacy from 
existing  practices  
Evidence that any actors in 
the organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing 
practices 
Gradually stop doing 
something 
Proactively challenge/reject 
leasing practices 
At beginning of period, 
tenant groups are a little 
more vocal about 
questioning UORR. 
Government criticises 
practices following failure of 
Code to have impact. 
Preinstitution-
alisation 
Introduction of new 
ideas and 
replacement 
practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest new practices (in 
areas such as set out above) 
Independently adopt different 
practices 
Code monitoring report 
shows changes and diversity 
in lease length. 
RICS introduces Small 
Business Scheme to help 
SBTs deal with rent reviews. 
2nd ed of Code produced. 
Theorisation 
(part 1) 
Recognition and 
specification of 
general problem 
Evidence that supply-side 
actors, particularly RICS & 
BPF: 
Recognise that there is a 
problem with leasing 
practices (in areas as above) 
Believe that there is no 
problem in these areas 
Initially BPF defending 
market mechanisms. RICS 
show some acceptance of 
criticisms. 
Prior to launch of 2nd 
edition of Code BPF and 
RICS show some acceptance 
of problems. 
Theorisation 
(part 2) 
Development of 
principles to support 
solutions for general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as 
an industry solution 
See regulation as industry 
solution 
Take lead in shaping the Code 
Propose other industry-wide 
solutions 
Evidence that the Code is 
gaining legitimacy 
First code had limited 
acceptance by supply-side. 
Regulation becoming 
accepted as a solution due 
to lack of agreement on 
revising Code. 
Second Code shows 
development of a more 
detailed set of principles. 
Diffusion Legitimated ideas 
spread through 
communities and 
are adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by 
actors (particularly BPF and 
RICS) 
Solutions seen to be 
spreading/being adopted 
Solutions not seen to be 
spreading 
Policing the implementation 
of the Code 
Stage not yet reached 
Reinstitution-
alisation  
Ideas and practices 
are accepted as the 
natural ways of 
doing things. 
Evidence that different 
practices: 
Have become taken for 
granted/natural way to 
behave 
Have not become natural way 
to behave 
Not yet applicable 
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Figure 5: Cumulative model after Period Two 
 
5.5 Period Three: The response to the second edition of the Code 
Once the 2nd edition of the Code was launched, the government once again 
commissioned Reading University to monitor its success, asking for an interim report by 
the end of 2003 and a final report at the end of 2004.  The industry was aware of this 
monitoring activity. 
5.5.1 Industry reaction 
In 2002 the process of theorisation within the industry, and particularly the BPF and 
RICS, appeared to be finally underway.  These industry bodies also actively promoted 
diffusion.  They spoke positively about the Code and enthused about the principles and 
practice of offering priced alternatives (choice), being flexible and ensuring that 
prospective tenants are fully informed.  However, this was usually tinged with the 
reminder that legislation will follow if the Code is not seen by government to be having 
an effect, suggesting that avoiding legislation was still a key driver of behaviour. 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
Fads and fashions VI: Reinstitutionalisation 
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RICS activity 
In the same month that the Code was launched, the RICS published Property Solutions, 
a free guide to leasing for small businesses that provided practical help on issues which 
included acquiring a lease.  It was endorsed by CBI, FSB and British Chamber of 
Commerce (Reported in CSM April 2002).  Meanwhile the RICS reported that the 
intention of the new Code was: 
to underline the importance of professional advice when taking commercial 
leases and of the need for greater flexibility and choice in the commercial leases 
market. 
CSM April 2002 p11. 
The focus on small businesses was emphasised by the RICS: 
RICS spokesman David Melhuish says “This new code will make them (small 
businesses) better informed, providing an essential document setting out the 
issues they need to consider.  It will also enable the industry to regulate itself and 
allow a more flexible commercial property market to develop.” 
CSM June 2002 p4. 
The RICS was proactive in monitoring their members and encouraging compliance, and 
had a more visible leadership role than previously.  Graham Chase (Chair of RICS 
commercial property faculty) encouraged the industry to adopt lease pricing and so 
follow the Code.  He urged the industry to do this and avoid legislation: 
Option pricing is a process that should not hold any fear for landlords, tenants, 
their advisers or valuers. This approach is adopted by those who operate in the 
property market on an almost daily basis. … 
...there is of course a real need to ensure that in promoting flexibility the costs 
and returns can be accurately assessed so that both landlords and tenants can 
fully identify and negotiate what is best. Flexibility does have its price. But, the 
above said, there is only one option - follow the code and avoid legislation. 
EG 28-09-2002. 
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Likewise Duncan Preston, the Chair of RICS Valuation Faculty remarked that if a free 
market based on open negotiation was wanted “we must encompass the concepts of 
flexibility and choice” (CSM July 2002 p9).  He argued that tenants must be offered 
fairly priced options:  “If we want to keep a free market we must learn to offer and 
price choice and engage in the spirit of the new code.” (CSM July 2002 p9). 
Other high profile RICS members articulated a more general problem in the Estates 
Gazette and argued that the industry has to respond or face legislation.  Richard Lay 
(former RICS president) argued that practices must be adapted and that the industry 
could not hide behind the flexibility brought about by changing balance of supply and 
demand in current market: 
Little will be achieved by our merely asking what is the minimum we need to do 
to avoid legislation. Let us recognise what others see is wrong in our market and 
respond positively…Our lease structures have more to do with what the landlord 
wants than what is required by the tenant. 
EG 14-09-2002. 
He went on to argue for the Code to be given, and explained, to all prospective tenants 
and for the industry to get to grips with pricing. 
The RICS also set up a group to monitor the second code chaired by Richard Lay.  Alan 
White, a member of this group and Chair of the RICS Corporate group, publicly 
encouraged the industry to be proactive and to see it from the perspective of 
occupiers.  In an EG article of some 1500 words he articulated the problems primarily 
from the perspective of a small business tenant, unadvised and with inappropriate 
lease terms.  He reiterated the point that the industry had to demonstrate that it had 
changed its ways and was offering alternatives to the longer-term, full repairing and 
insuring lease with upward-only rent reviews and with restrictive alienation and service 
charge arrangements (EG 21-09-2002) otherwise legislation would follow. 
By the end of 2002 the RICS was promoting the Code quite strongly to the membership: 
The awareness campaign led by RICS’s code monitoring group chairman Richard 
Lay, and commercial property faculty chairman, Graham Chase, has included 
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letters urging members firms to draw attention to the code and help monitor its 
effectiveness.  Reminding members of the threat of legislation, including a ban 
on ‘upwards only’ rent reviews, should the code fail to create greater flexibility in 
the market, the letter states: “This is the last chance for the industry to prove it 
can self-regulate.” 
CSM November 2002. 
Graham Chase also exhorted members to use the Code through the in-house magazine 
saying that the Code: 
…is not about a set of rules but is a thought piece which should help the property 
industry operate more effectively and reflect a modern marketplace-adapting to 
the needs of business while creating value for landlord and tenant businesses. 
CSM November 2002. 
In the same article Chase argued that although it was a challenge to get the Code 
adopted, it was worth it as it would promote the “perception and reality” of lease 
flexibility and prevent legislation.  He set out the negative consequences of legislation 
for tenants and so argued for the need to “push more rigorously a strong landlord-
tenant relationship” to avoid legislation.  Finally he said that during the Code 
monitoring period, all in commercial property “must demonstrate that flexibility 
already exists”. 
BPF activity 
The BPF also mounted a concerted campaign to encourage its members to comply with 
the code.  Liz Peace, the CEO of BPF, commented: “The code merely sets out good 
practice. It is not trying to strait-jacket landlords into particular terms. It simply asks for 
a degree of negotiation and choice” (EG 05-10-2002).  She saw raising awareness of the 
Code to small businesses as the main target saying that “educated and questioning 
customers are an essential part of a well-functioning market” (EG 05-10-2002) 
In November 2002 the BPF set out a range of measures to this end: 
The code merely sets out good practice. It is not trying to strait-jacket landlords 
into particular terms. It simply asks for a degree of negotiation and choice. To 
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facilitate this and guide our own efforts at promoting awareness and 
compliance, we have established a working party chaired by John Bywater of 
Hammerson, which counts a number of leading industry players among its 
membership. 
The working party is pulling together a toolkit of 10 measures to aid the 
industry’s compliance. There are simple things that any of our members can do, 
such as establishing a link from their website to the code website 
(www.commercialleasecodeew.co.uk). We are also raising awareness of the 
code by introducing a logo for use in property advertisements, and we hope to 
have soon a proactive list of code supporters. 
We are also encouraging landlords to advertise that they support the code in 
their letting particulars and in covering letters sent out by their lawyers with 
draft leases to potential tenants. This builds on the practice that some in the 
industry are already following, such as Hermes (see box) and Prudential. 
EG 05-10-2002. 
By November the BPF had produced a checklist and logo for use on company literature, 
a series of standard letter clauses to be sent to clients and advice to members on how to 
make standard leases code-compliant.  The BPF also urged members to have a single 
person responsible for compliance within their organisations (EG 09-11-2002). 
The BPF continued to be proactive into 2003 and to give the Code with a high profile.  
They publicly announced that they were considering asking the Government to legislate 
to enforce the Code for small businesses (EG 01-02-2003) whilst also developing model 
clauses for office leases with the British Council for Offices (BCO); these clauses were 
said to be designed to complement the Code( EG 07-02-2003).  However, observers 
such as lawyer Alan Riley (EG 17-05-2003) noted that the clauses are not all code 
compliant as, for example, a UORR is included.22 
                                                        
22 The BPF and BCO model clauses for an office lease for FRI office lease of whole is available on the BPF 
website: http://www.bpf.org.uk/info-landlords.  Accessed 19 August 2015. 
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5.5.2 Threats of legislation increase 
Meanwhile, the government maintained the pressure, reminding the industry that 
legislation was a distinct possibility.  The Minister for housing, planning and 
regeneration, Tony McNulty, gave a reply to a point made by another MP on the 
ineffectiveness of the Code, the problems with UORRs and the need for legislation.  The 
Minister believed that the new Code was much better than the previous edition and 
had more chance of success.  He also appeared to put the RICS in a central role of 
responsibility. : 
When speaking to RICS, I said that we were loath to go down the legislative 
route, not least because of the regulatory burdens that my hon. Friend 
suggested. However, if we need to go down that route, we will. 
We are being ever so slightly precipitate. The code was published in April, it has 
extensive support from a range of key players in the property industry and we 
need to give it time to bed in…. 
Finally, I am pleased to have had the opportunity to reiterate what I said about 
the strength of the new code of practice. We are keeping a watchful eye on that. 
When I said that to RICS at its conference in June—my first ministerial speaking 
engagement—there was an open ear and a will and desire to move forward. 
Perhaps it knows that if the code of practice is not successful, the legislative 
option stands behind it. Nevertheless, I think that there is a good deal of 
equanimity and support for the notion that, in terms of the commercial property 
world, things have moved on significantly compared with how they stood when 
upward-only rent reviews first became the norm. That being the case, it is, 
perhaps, in the interest of RICS to consider relevant matters seriously in terms of 
supply and demand, and the regulation and efficacy of the market. 
HC Deb 29 October 2002 vol 391 Col 242WH. 
The pressure increased in March 2003 when things took a twist with the mention of the 
Code of Practice in the Chancellor’s budget report (HM Treasury 2003).  Until this point 
the commercial leasing issues had been the domain of the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minster (and its predecessors). 
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3.130 Commercial property is an important factor of production, contributing 
directly to economic growth and regeneration in towns and cities. However, 
inflexible lease terms can restrain business growth and expose them to undue 
risk. The Government is working with all parts of the industry to promote a 
voluntary Code of Conduct on Commercial Leases to improve lease flexibility. The 
effectiveness of the Code is being independently evaluated. Should the interim 
independent evaluation of the Code show that there has been little progress in 
the commercial lease market towards greater flexibility, the Government will 
consult later this year on possible legislative options to ameliorate the 
situation. 
HM Treasury (2003). 
This meant that the Treasury were now taking an active interest in the commercial 
property leasing market; the economic arguments against lease terms (such as UORR) 
which had first been made in 1992, and which were seen to restrict business, were 
once again brought to the fore. 
5.5.3 Indications that the Code was not effective 
This renewed pressure came at a time when there was once again evidence of an 
attitude that the market would determine lease structures (rather than any code) and 
that tenants did not want to pay more for flexibility.  This meant that the industry 
bodies would have to continue to work hard to convince their members to use the 
Code, and even try to convince tenants that it was to their benefit.  This can be seen in 
several articles in Estates Gazette.  When Grosvenor opened their new shopping centre 
in Basingstoke, the reporter commented: 
It is clear that it was market conditions, rather than introducing the code of 
practice for commercial leases last spring, which got Grosvenor and the retailers 
the deals they wanted. After having its arm twisted by government to provide 
more flexible lease terms, the property industry finally signed up to a new code 
which demanded that developers offer tenants a variety of options, including 
shorter leases and an alternative to upward-only rent reviews. Interestingly, not 
a single retailer mentioned the code… 
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…Arcadia’s Constantine supports this view: “The code of practice is positive. But, 
at the end of the day, if you can get what you want without actually using the 
code and paying for the extra flexibility then you don’t mention it. The code is 
going to be more important for small retailers.” 
EG 26-10-2002. 
And similarly from an article on arbitration: 
Q Is it likely that upwards/downwards reviews could be more commonly secured 
by tenants as a result of government concerns over upward-only rent reviews, 
and the resulting new commercial lease code? 
A There has not been any evidence of this yet. Over recent years there has been a 
move towards shorter leases and more flexible lease terms, but this reflects 
actual market changes rather than initiatives such as the commercial lease code. 
EG 02-11-2002. 
Towards the end of 2003 there were stronger hints that the Code was not having the 
effects desired by government.  The BPF were reported to be asking the government 
for more time in the face of little change on key leasing practices: 
Research from the British Property Federation (BPF) on a voluntary code 
designed to limit the use of upward-only rent review clauses shows it is not 
working.  The BPF studied 1,334 leases signed since the introduction of the code 
in April last year.  This could mean the commercial property industry will face 
legislation to ban the clauses.  The BPF will argue today in a submission to Keith 
Hill, planning minister, there is no precedent in any other commercial sphere for 
the government interfering with the terms of a transaction between two 
consenting parties.  It will call for the government to give the code more time to 
work.  The Times says ministers could make a statement on commercial property 
leases as soon as the Pre-Budget report on 10 December. 
EG 24-11-2003. 
The government’s interim report from the University of Reading on the success of the 
code was not made publicly available until April 2004 (University of Reading 2004).  
However, the government had received the first draft in December 2003 and key 
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figures within the property industry had seen it; the word soon spread that the news 
was bad and that the government was considering legislation. 
The industry fears legislation on commercial leases may be imminent, following 
a damning report by Reading University.  The interim report, compiled by Neil 
Crosby, Reading University’s professor of real estate, concludes that the 
voluntary code of commercial leases introduced in 2002 has been followed by big 
landlords such as Land Securities, Hammerson and Slough Estates, but ignored 
by smaller ones.  The code promotes more flexible leases and discourages 
upward-only rent reviews, but the report concludes that landlords across the 
board do not offer significantly more flexibility in leases to tenants than they did 
three years ago. 
Speaking at the EG/RICS Five Counties conference in High Wycombe on 
Thursday, Slough chief executive Ian Coull urged landlords to work closely with 
occupiers to avoid legislation. 
“The report does not make good reading and I think we are going to face 
legislation. This will be as catastrophic for occupiers as for landlords. We need to 
understand our customers’ needs and remedy any problems,” he warned. 
EG 07-02-2004. 
The prospect of legislation angered the BPF who believed that this was rather 
precipitate given the monitoring period was only at an interim stage and that the 
industry was working hard to make the Code work. 
The BPF has responded angrily to a fresh commitment from the Treasury to 
enforcing commercial lease reform. The Treasury move comes ahead of the 
publication of a Reading University report on the success of voluntary measures. 
BPF chief executive Liz Peace criticised the move, saying: “There is no basis on 
which to launch such an important consultation exercise.” She added: “In such 
inauspicious circumstances this will not leave the industry with a great deal of 
confidence in the process.” The Reading report is an interim review of the 
industry’s attempt to provide alternatives to upward-only rent reviews without 
regulation. Peace said: “The property industry is rightly very disappointed.  
“Many companies have put a lot of work into making the [voluntary] lease code 
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work and its success is being judged on just 46 interviews with surveyors and 
lawyers in three towns and without any input at this stage from occupiers, 
landlords or financiers of property.” 
EG 05-04-2004. 
The government published the interim report from Reading and at the same time 
announced the intention to consult on legislation on lease terms (HC 23 April 2004 
Column 32WS).  The report showed that the Code was having little direct effect on the 
market and that knowledge of it was limited.  Diffusion was not happening, and this 
was clear in the piece by the report’s authors, Crosby, Murdoch and Hughes, in EG: 
The 2002 Code has been more effectively disseminated than its predecessor, but 
is having little direct effect upon lease negotiations. Knowledge of the code 
appears to be limited to property professionals and large landlords and tenants. 
But knowledge does not translate into effect; the code is having little direct 
impact on lease negotiations one year after its introduction. The present code, 
unlike its forerunner, contains a number of specific recommendations on lease 
terms. Implementing these in the first year of the code’s operation would 
indicate that the code is influencing the market. The evidence so far is that the 
recommended lease terms are not reaching the marketplace. 
EG 01-05-2004. 
The involvement of, and pressure from, the Treasury again became clear with reports 
of a speech by Ruth Kelly (Financial Secretary at the Treasury) speaking at the annual 
BPF conference and commenting that there is “a feeling that there has not been much 
progress made” on the adoption of voluntary guidelines to provide flexible leases, and 
so “clearly there is a need to consider legislation” (EG 23-04-2004). 
Immediately the EG carried reports from landlords upset by the prospect of legislation 
and proclaiming the changes that had been made.  The CEO of Slough Estates 
commented: 
Some of the changes we have seen over the past couple of years have come 
about because of the difficult market conditions, but some have undoubtedly 
122 
 
arisen following the application of the code during that period. My company has 
seen average lease lengths for new leases, during 2003, fall from 10.5 to 9.3 
years. This is not a huge change, but it is a trend that I expect will continue. 
EG 08-05-2004. 
However, alongside these came articles from tenant representatives which suggested 
that theorisation and diffusion had not really happened within the property industry; 
they argued that there had been little change in leasing practices.  The BRC welcomed 
the prospect of legislation to ban UORRs and made clear that retailers still found other 
lease terms very restrictive: 
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) has again clashed with the property industry 
by welcoming hints from the Treasury that it is considering banning upward-only 
rent reviews. 
The BRC has urged the government to begin consultation on commercial 
property lease legislation following the publication of a long-awaited report by 
Reading University… 
Kevin Hawkins, BRC director general, said: “There is no merit in further delaying 
the consultation process. It is clear that the code is not working - the interim 
report has confirmed this. 
“Many commercial tenants are suffering. Long lease lengths, upward-only rent 
reviews and restrictive provisions prevent retailers from reacting swiftly to 
changes in the business cycle… 
“Retailing is a fast-paced industry and retailers often find it difficult to obtain 
leases that meet their operational needs.” 
EG 23-04-2004. 
There were reports of even more outspoken comments from the head of property at 
the Dixon Group, Martin Meech: 
“The property industry does not see its occupiers as customers,” says Meech. “If 
we behaved like that towards our customers we’d have empty shops.” He points 
out that where flexible alternatives are offered, retailers are expected to pay for 
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them – and to get rid of an upward-only rent clause, some landlords demand up 
to 30% more than the market rent. 
Meech finds this ridiculous. “If something’s inequitable, why should you have to 
pay to make it fair?” He believes that if upward-only rent reviews were banned, 
the market would change, but landlords would probably not find themselves 
worse off. Rather, asset management would become more important. “It would 
certainly limit the market for investors who see retail boxes as a bond-style 
income stream you can buy into then sit around collecting the cheques.” 
EG 22-05-2004 
5.5.4 Another consultation on legislation 
A consultation document entitled Commercial property leases: Options for deterring or 
outlawing the upward only rent review clauses was produced in June 2004 (Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister 2004).  As the title suggests, the consultation was entirely 
focussed on UORRs.  The government presented a range of options, with comment on 
the advantages and disadvantages of each, as well as the likelihood of being able to 
enforce the options.  The options were: 
1. Do nothing 
2. Ban upward only rent review clauses 
3. Ban upward only rent reviews subject to a floor of the initial rent 
4. Give tenants a right to break if the UORR produced a rent above open market 
levels 
5. Limit lease length 
6. Require landlords to give prospective tenants priced options 
The report concluded with the statement that: 
 If the final report from the University of Reading at the end of 2004, including 
the further study mentioned at paragraph 13 above,23 indicates that use of 
UORR provisions continues on a significant scale, in cases where tenants do not 
                                                        
23 This further study was an additional section for the final report commissioned by the Government to 
investigate the reasons for the continued use of UORRs in more detail.  
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have a genuine or informed choice of alternatives, the Government proposes to 
consider introducing statutory controls. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004:10). 
In the RICS in-house magazine, Brian Berry (Deputy Director of Public Affairs at RICS) 
expressed disappointment that ODPM had gone to consultation at this point, noting 
the influence of the Treasury (RICS Business July/August 2004).  He also objected to the 
focus being on one aspect of leasing arguing that a more fundamental view of 
commercial leasing as a whole should be taken by government.  He argued that the 
evidence was that UORRs are not the main concern of tenants and that they preferred 
the lowest rent even if it means having a UORR.  In relation to the Code, he pointed to 
two membership surveys which in which “RICS members have made clear that they see 
the Code as primarily an information tool, while the market itself is controlled by the 
forces of supply and demand” (ibid). 
Michael Chambers (RICS Director of Policy) likewise expressed scepticism on legislation 
but noted that it may be attractive for a government wanting to be seen to support 
small businesses and so saw it as a realistic prospect (RICS Business January 2005). 
Alongside such comments, more formal responses were given to the government.  The 
overall responses of the key bodies were as may be expected with bodies representing 
landlords and investors opposed to legislation and those representing occupiers being 
in favour, according to the summary provided by the ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister 2005). 
BPF response 
Alongside the arguments for UORRs, the BPF argued that the industry had changed 
(British Property Federation 2004); as in its response to the 1993 proposals for 
legislation, it argued that the market was functioning efficiently and that it did not 
recognise a situation of market failure.  This is the opening paragraph of the Executive 
Summary: 
The property industry supports change in the lettings market and has been 
delivering it over the past decade. Occupiers now have a better range and choice 
of leases than is found in many other European countries with a preponderance 
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of short leases (5 years or less) and a lot of leases of 6 to 15 years duration with 
tenants’ break clauses. Such changes will continue, driven by market forces (e.g. 
globalisation, new competitors) and other external factors (introduction of lease 
duty, changes to international accounting standards, far greater transparency in 
lease terms as a result of new land registration rules). Upwards only rent reviews 
(UORRs), however, are a strength of the UK market, they assist the sector to 
access cheaper capital, which is ultimately reflected in greater investment and 
lower rents. UORRs are also critical to major development and regeneration 
projects. Canary Wharf or the redevelopment of the Bull Ring would have been 
nigh impossible to fund with private money on short leases or 
upward/downward rent reviews. 
British Property Federation (2004). 
The BPF had commissioned four different pieces of research which underpinned their 
response.  This was used to show that UORRs were no longer important because of 
shorter lease lengths and also that there would be negative impacts on development 
and investment, including regeneration, if UORRs were banned.  The BPF argued that 
UORRs were not the result of market failure, rather they were an integral part of a well-
functioning UK leasing market and brought benefits for all parties.  Essentially the BPF 
saw no real problems. 
RICS response 
As noted in Chapter Four, the RICS response to the consultation document has proved 
elusive and so could not be located.  The summary of responses from the ODPM (Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005) simply notes that the RICS was opposed to 
legislation. 
Occupier response 
At this point it is worth noting the occupier response as it again gives an insight in to 
the perceived progress made by the industry.  The BRC, representing a large part of the 
retail industry said this in its response to the consultation (British Retail Consortium 
2004): 
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 As businesses, we support the principle of self-regulation but are disappointed 
by the property industry’s lack of progress in addressing their leasing practices. It 
is clear that continuing with a voluntary approach, however well-intentioned, 
will do nothing to deliver more flexible leases for tenants. 
British Retail Consortium (2004:1). 
The BRC cites its own survey of 2004 to make the point that landlords are not being 
flexible. It is not clear what is meant by flexible here, although it appears to mean 
offering a lease without a UORR: 
During the past 12 months, only 22% of retailers have successfully negotiated a 
lease with flexible terms in line with the Code of Practice for Commercial Leases. 
For smaller and medium size retailers this proportion was even lower with only 
9% successfully negotiating flexible leases. Landlord’s refusal is the most 
common reason why retailers are unable to negotiate flexible lease terms while 
almost a fifth of respondents claimed they could not afford the additional cost. 
For 14% of retailers, landlords’ ignorance of the Code was the main reason for 
failing to negotiate more flexible lease terms. 
Furthermore, retailers’ experience of the code to date suggests that landlords 
when pricing alternatives over compensate for the perceived risks associated 
with flexibility in higher premium rents. This deters the tenant from actively 
seeking alternatives to upwards only rent reviews and undermines the credibility 
of the code by fuelling the perception that upwards only reviews are inevitable. 
The issue of pricing is an important one, as real choice cannot exist unless 
tenants are offered flexibility at a price they can afford. 
British Retail Consortium (2004:3). 
The various interests seemed as polarised as ever and the extent to which there had 
been real and sustainable change in the property market (Code-driven or otherwise) 
was disputed. 
5.5.5 Final assessment of the 2nd edition of the Code 
The government’s final assessment of the Code’s success was published in February 
2005 (Crosby et al. 2005).  The report identified some significant changes in lease 
127 
 
terms.  The average length of lease within the IPD dataset had continued to gradually 
reduce over the years and there was variety in lease lengths; Figure 6 shows a further 
marked change from the situation in 1990 as reported by Department of Environment 
Transport and the Regions (1990). 
 
Figure 6 Distribution of different lease lengths in 2003 (rent weighted) 
(Source: Crosby et al. 2005, from IPD data) 
This report also showed that there were significantly more, and earlier, break clauses 
now included in leases.  Repairing liabilities on second hand property were now often 
tempered by the use of a schedule of conditions to establish the starting position.  
However, for rent reviews, UORRs continued to predominate.  This appeared to be 
because tenants had other priorities, such as the ability to assign without difficulty; this 
was the finding from a series of case studies in the report, which aimed to find out why 
major tenants had agreed to UORRs in recent lease negotiations.  These case studies 
revealed a perception that rents would not go down in the near future (and so they 
would not pay extra for the benefit of a different review clause) and a belief that 
landlords would not, in any event, agree to anything other than a UORR.  The report 
included surveys which showed that major landlords and their advisors were very 
aware of the second edition of the Code, in marked contrast to that found with the first 
edition.  However around half of the landlords surveyed thought that it was rare for the 
Code to influence negotiations directly.  Where it did have an influence, this seemed to 
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be general rather than impacting on specific terms.  The surveys of tenants highlighted 
the continuing lack of awareness that SBTs had of the Code and leasing matters more 
widely. 
The RICS interpreted these findings as showing changes in lease terms.  In their in-
house magazine, the RICS summarised the findings, highlighting as the main 
conclusions:  “that fewer than half of all commercial leases included upwards only rent 
reviews and that most tenants are aware that term are negotiable.” (RICS Business 
April 2005 p4). In the same article, the RICS argued that the report supported a non-
interventionist approach by government and once again argued for a holistic approach 
to leases, quoting David Melhuish (senior policy officer at RICS): 
RICS believes that the report has not made the case for legislation. “We remain 
of the view that to focus on one aspect of commercial leases- the rent review 
provision- is wrong and that if the government is to consider commercial lease 
reform then it should do it from a more holistic perspective.” 
RICS Business April 2005 p4. 
However, the report’s findings did not dampen the BRC’s argument for abolition of the 
UORR: 
The report also reveals that most tenants are reluctant to negotiate with 
landlords on rent reviews, as they know that it is not negotiable, says the BRC. 
Kevin Hawkins, BRC director general, said: “Upward-only rent reviews are an 
iniquitous system found only in the UK and have no place in an open and 
competitive economy 
EG 24-02-2005. 
5.5.6 Government drops plans to legislate and initiates review of Code 
Even as late as the Budget Statement of 16 March 2005, the government were keeping 
the pressure on and the threat of legislation alive: 
While the Government welcomes the recent trend towards greater market 
flexibility, it believes much more can be done to strengthen the impact of the 
code of practice on the market. It will continue to work with the industry on 
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strengthening the code, but remains willing to pursue legislation if further 
movements towards greater market flexibility are not forthcoming. 
HM Treasury (2005:76). 
Nevertheless the report on the Code (Crosby et al. 2005) provided the rationale for the 
government to once again drop their plans for legislation and, to some extent, also 
shifted the government’s focus away from UORR as the key lease term that offended.  
Yvette Cooper (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, ODPM) announced to the 
House of Commons: 
We continue to have concerns about the prevalence of upward only rent review 
clauses in longer leases. The Reading report shows that their impact has been 
diminishing, as fewer leases contain any form of rent review provisions, and that 
tenants are currently more concerned about inflexible assignment and subletting 
provisions than they are about upward only rent reviews. We do however believe 
that further progress in this area is necessary to improve the flexibility of the 
market. We will therefore continue to monitor the situation and retain the 
option to legislate in future if necessary. But we do not propose to legislate 
against upward only rent review clauses at present. 
HC Written Ministerial Statements 15 March 2005 Column 12WS. 
The minister also promised a review of the law recognising the problems brought about 
by inflexible assignment and subletting provisions in leases with a possibility of 
legislation in these areas. 
In terms of bringing about changes in institutional practices, the minister made clear 
that the government once again intended to put pressure on the industry to do this by 
means of self-regulation, using the industry code as the main vehicle: 
We are asking the property industry to undertake a joint review of the code of 
practice, to carry out a renewed campaign to disseminate the code and provide 
an effective mechanism for dealing with complaints. We want to make sure that 
everyone negotiating a lease adopts the code. 
 HC Written Ministerial Statements 15 March 2005 Column 12WS. 
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5.5.7 Summary of Period 3 
Once the second version of the Code was in place, the industry bodies were proactive 
in promoting it to their members and the wider industry.  They encouraged members 
to adopt the Code, including overt lease pricing.  Therefore, the theorisation process 
appeared to be much stronger at this point, with no dissenting voices reported.  The 
general problem that appeared to be accepted by the industry bodies was one of 
landlords not offering choice or being flexible.  The BPF reassured members that 
adoption of the Code would not ‘straitjacket’ landlords but would help to solve the 
perceived problems.  The language used by the BPF and RICS conferred moral 
legitimacy to the adoption of the Code, fitting it into a normative framework as 
something that the industry should be doing.  They championed and encouraged 
diffusion, making it easy for members to adopt the Code by use of standard letters, 
checklists, logos, model lease clauses etc. 
The commitment to change was less clear when the BPF introduced a model lease with 
clauses that were not Code compliant.  Alongside this, the impact of the Code began to 
be questioned.  The government intensified the pressure and, when it became clear 
that the main target lease term, the UORR, had not been displaced, the threat of 
legislation once more loomed with the consultation on banning UORRs.  This was 
welcomed by tenant groups who again argued that the industry was not really changing 
at all. 
However, the government once more pulled back from legislating when their own 
review of the Code suggested that the UORR was not as important to tenants as had 
been thought.  While this was rather at odds with the proclaimed view of the BRC and 
others in the press, it did mean that the practices to be questioned through 
deinstitutionalisation had to be revisited and issues like alienation given more thought.  
Once more the government’s intention was that this would be done through a review 
of the Code and its dissemination; it was still not in use during lease negotiations and 
the government retained its ambition for this to be rectified. 
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Table 9: Period Three 
Stage Meaning Operationalisation 
Evidence found in 
third period 
Precipitating jolt Pressures for 
change  
Evidence of pressures for change 
which could be: social (including 
economic), regulatory or 
technological. 
Threat to legislate 
maintained- consultation 
on banning UORRs after 
report shows still 
dominant. 
Deinstitutionalisation The removing 
of legitimacy 
from existing  
practices  
Evidence that any of the actors in 
the organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing 
practices. 
Gradually stop doing something 
Proactively challenge/reject 
leasing practices. 
Issues to be addressed 
seem settled, until end 
of period when 
government report 
shows alienation clauses 
proving problematic to 
tenants. 
Preinstitutionalisation Introduction of 
new ideas and 
replacement 
practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest new practices (in areas 
such as set out above). 
Independently adopt different 
practices. 
Lease structures 
continuing to change 
with reduced lengths, 
diversity, break clauses 
and changes in repairing 
liabilities. 
Many activities 
channelled to supporting 
Code. BPF and BCO 
produce model lease 
clauses. 
Theorisation (part 1) Recognition and 
specification of 
general 
problem 
Evidence that supply-side actors, 
particularly RICS & BPF: 
Recognise that there is a problem 
with leasing practices (in areas 
such as set out above). 
Believe that there is no problem in 
these areas. 
Stronger statements 
from industry bodies 
showing recognition of 
problems- identified as 
lack of choice an 
inflexibility.  
Theorisation (part 2) Development of 
principles to 
support 
solutions for 
general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as an 
industry solution. 
See regulation as industry 
solution. 
Take the lead in shaping the Code. 
Propose other industry-wide 
solutions. 
Evidence that the Code is gaining 
legitimacy. 
Clear statements from 
industry bodies that 
Code is the solution and 
is given moral legitimacy. 
BPF/BCO model lease 
clauses launched which 
partially support Code.  
Diffusion Legitimated 
ideas spread 
through 
communities 
and are 
adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by actors 
(particularly BPF and RICS). 
Solutions seen to be 
spreading/being adopted. 
Solutions not seen to be 
spreading. 
Policing the implementation of the 
Code. 
Despite efforts to ensure 
diffusion, second edition 
of Code not being used 
in lease negotiations or 
being disseminated to 
potential tenants.  
Reinstitutionalisation  Ideas and 
practices are 
accepted as the 
natural ways of 
doing things. 
Evidence that different practices: 
Have become taken for 
granted/natural way to behave. 
Have not become natural way to 
behave. 
No evidence.  
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Figure 7: Cumulative model at end of Period Three 
 
The evidence found during this period of the different stages of the model has been 
summarised and is set out in Table 9.  The loop identified in Periods One and Two can 
be seen in Period Three.  Despite apparent theorisation by the industry bodies and 
efforts to ensure diffusion, the evidence of little change in some lease terms and lack of 
reference to the Code in negotiations led to a further precipitating jolt (i.e. threat of 
legislation) which then fed back into the loop for reconsidering the problem practices 
with the prospect of revising the Code once more through preinstitutionalisation and 
theorisation.  The cumulative movement between the stages of the model is 
represented in Figure 7.  The black arrows represent the main flows, with the white 
arrows indicating some limited evidence of these flows. 
5.6 Period Four: More initiatives and a third edition of the Code 
In the immediate aftermath of the minister’s statement there was a renewed 
enthusiasm by landlords and occupiers to try and move things forwards. 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation Fads and fashions 
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Property Week (15 July 2005) announced the creation of a ‘property owners and 
occupiers forum’, set up by a group of major landlords, large real estate occupiers, BPF 
and BRC along with firms of lawyers and property agents under an independent 
chairman, Sir Bryan Carsberg.  The aim of the group was reported to be driving forward 
a review of the code and improving landlord and tenant relations more widely, 
particularly through an accreditation scheme for good landlord practice.  Meanwhile 
the RICS launched a CD-ROM guide “Getting serious about your business premises” for 
businesses looking to move, improve, sublet or run their premises more efficiently.  It 
“promotes chartered surveyors as best placed to provide business property advice.”  
(RICS Business June 2005) 
Despite the vociferous calls for legislation, even the BRC seem to support the 
government in its pursuit of a self-regulatory route: 
Dr Kevin Hawkins, BRC director general, said: “The BRC has always said that its 
preferred outcome was an effective voluntary code, which delivers much-needed 
flexibility in commercial leases. 
…The BRC added that it would “support any practical initiative, which will 
promote awareness of the Code, particularly on the part of smaller retailers.” 
 EG 15-03-2005. 
Later that year, the chairman of the BRC made clear to a meeting of BPF members that 
there were still fundamental issues to address: 
Michael Wemms said retailers “need to get more predictability into rent reviews, 
possibly through some form of index linking”.  Wemms, who is also the chairman 
of House of Fraser, warned that retailers were suffering from inflexible lease 
terms. 
EG 21-10-2005. 
5.6.1 Producing a third version of the Code 
In July 2006, it was reported in the Estates Gazette that the code working group was 
reconvening and focussing on the issues of most concern to government.  The 
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government had reconsidered the practices it believed required change and now 
included alienation in this.  Philip Freedman, chair of the code group wrote: 
The government clearly believes that the property industry provides inadequate 
flexibility for tenants and that it is time to reconsider the rights given to landlords 
by the 1995 Act with regard to assignment and AGAs. Although legislation 
amending the Act or banning upward-only rent reviews has not been ruled out, 
the government has signalled its desire for change to be achieved voluntarily and 
for the code to be updated and its dissemination to be improved, particularly to 
small businesses. It appears to be giving the property industry one further chance 
to put its house in order. 
The joint working group that produces the code has therefore been reconvened. 
It is looking at the possibility of producing a stronger and more concise code for 
landlords to follow, a plain English, easily disseminated guide for tenants and 
model heads of terms to be used by landlords and letting agents, reflecting both 
the code and the guidance. Particular attention is being given to the areas of 
most concern to the government. 
EG 01-07-2006. 
The new RICS chairman, Graham Chase, was interviewed in the same edition of the 
Estates Gazette and surprisingly seemed to want the Code to be used to remove 
security of tenure from tenants. 
...he hopes that the new code, due to be published later this year, will address, 
alongside assignment and subletting, the issues of guarantees and security of 
tenure… 
Chase feels that the government has refused to look at security of tenure. He 
claims that smaller tenants may still need protection from landlords, but that 
larger businesses will not. “I find it difficult to believe that companies such as 
Marks & Spencer need protection,” he says. “Many of those companies are 
landlords in their own right.” 
But he is “not on a crusade” about security of tenure, which he feels has been 
simplified by the reform of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. “This isn’t a 
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generic matter of scrapping security of tenure… more debate is needed to 
determine the areas in which it would still be appropriate.”... 
“Does the government want to encourage best practice and allow flexibility in 
the true sense, or does it want to dictate and lead on a political agenda?” he 
asks. “In order to legislate, the government must fully understand the political 
implications for the economy from both sides of the equation. 
“Property is about one thing - occupation. Landlords and developers recognise 
that occupiers are vital. But the former should also be considered because they 
provide the opportunity.” 
EG 01-07-2006. 
By September 2006 a draft code had been produced, just two months after the code 
group had reconvened.  The speed of agreement may have been because, according to 
a spokesperson for the BRC, the draft addressed the same issues as the 2002 Code but 
used more forceful language:  “We’ve tried to move away from ‘consider’ to much 
more forceful language, such as ‘must’ and ‘will’” (EG 01-09-2006). 
5.6.2 The third Code 
The publication of the third edition of the Code (Joint working group on commercial 
leases 2007) was announced by Yvette Cooper (now the Minister for Housing and 
Planning) in the House of Commons on March 2007.  She noted that there had been 
positive developments in the property industry and that this had led to a strengthened 
code: 
We have had a positive and collaborative response from all sides of the industry -
owners, occupiers, small business organisations and the professional bodies. The 
industry has developed new ways of working, setting up the Owner and 
Occupiers’ Forum and the Property Industry Alliance. Alongside this, Government 
have been working with business to bring about change. 
The outcome has been agreement on a new Code, which I am launching today. 
This comprises three documents: a Landlord’s Code of Practice, an Occupier 
Guide and Model Heads of Terms. The Landlord’s Code is significantly stronger in 
tone and content than the previous Code, while the occupier guide and model 
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heads of terms are designed to improve business understanding of lease terms, 
helping them to get more suitable lease terms. 
She still had concerns over the leasing practices and the threat of legislation remained: 
I recognise the considerable changes in commercial leasing practices over recent 
years, especially the trends towards shorter leases. But I am concerned about 
continuing elements of inflexibility, particularly the predominant use of upward 
only provisions in rent review clauses and inflexible provisions for tenants exiting 
property they no longer need. 
We will want to keep a close eye on market practice in these areas. If the market 
does not deliver, we have identified legislative options. Communities and Local 
Government will shortly be consulting the bodies that drew up the Code about 
suitable monitoring arrangements. 
HC 28 Mar 2007 Column 87WS. 
This version of the code (which is currently in force) is markedly different from its 
predecessors; it is stronger in tone and aims to be a more practical tool than the first 
two editions.   
This is the introduction to the 3rd edition of the Code: 
This revised lease code is the result of pan-industry discussion between 
representatives of landlords, tenants and government. The objective is to create 
a document which is clear, concise and authoritative. 
However, our aims are wider. We want the lease code to be used as a checklist 
for negotiations before the grant of a lease and lease renewals. Landlords should 
be transparent about any departures from the code in a particular case and the 
reasons for them. 
We have provided model heads of terms and whilst we recognise the code will 
apply to leases in England and Wales, we believe its intent should apply to the 
whole of the UK. 
Most importantly, we are launching the code with an objective to ensure that 
parties to a lease have easy access to information explaining the commitments 
they are making in clear English. We will encourage trade and professional 
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bodies, lenders and government (at all levels) to ensure small businesses are 
made aware of the code and the advisory pages which accompany it. 
Although the code applies to new leases, please also see the British Property 
Federation declaration, which applies to existing leases, in relation to 
applications for consent to sublet where there is an existing lease covenant 
requiring subleases to be at the higher of the passing rent and the market rent. 
We hope the code will help the industry in its quest to promote efficiency and 
fairness in landlord and tenant relationships. 
Joint working group on commercial leases (2007). 
It consists of three parts: 
1. A guide for landlords with 10 specific requirements in order for their lease to be 
Code-compliant covering 
a. Lease negotiations 
b. Rent deposits and guarantees 
c. Length of term, break clauses and renewal rights- clear lease term and no 
onerous pre-conditions for operating the break clause. 
d. Rent review- instructing landlords to be clear and offer priced alternatives to 
UORR on request. 
e. Assignment and subletting - allowing assignment and not asking for 
automatic AGAs, subletting at market rent (not passing rent). 
f. Service charges 
g. Alterations and changes of use- not to be more restrictive than necessary 
preferably with no requirement to remove alterations at the end of the 
lease. 
h. Insurance- landlords to ensure policy terms fair and reasonable and value 
for money. 
i. Ongoing management- prompt, open and constructive. Specific on timing 
for dilapidations and dealing with applications for consents. 
2. A guide for occupiers, explaining terms and providing helpful tips; and 
3. A model Heads of Terms (which can be completed on line and downloaded). 
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The issues covered by the landlords’ guide included those that had appeared in 
previous versions of the code and were perhaps proving somewhat intractable: these 
include the UORR, restrictions on alienation and on alterations, as well as onerous 
break clauses.  Alongside guidance on these specific lease clauses were more general 
exhortations for openness and prompt action. 
5.6.3 Industry reaction 
The RICS was enthusiastic about the new edition saying that it is “a vast improvement 
on the previous version and has the potential to deliver market change for the better if 
the recommendations are followed and used in practice.” (RICS Business February 2007 
p22).  In the same article, it noted that the previous two editions of the Code “have 
been largely by-passed by the industry and swept under the carpet despite its 
importance to business occupiers.”  The Institution went as far as to issue a warning to 
members who did not use it saying it “is representative of best practice in the industry, 
and where landlords are non-compliant they could end up in court justifying their 
departure from it.”  The commentary continued in very positive vein about how user-
friendly the Code is, and how clarity and transparency should “eliminate potential 
conflicts”; compliance with code will “build confidence between landlords and 
tenants.” 
In the weeks that followed the launch of this edition of the Code, the issue of 
dissemination quickly became seen by the industry as key to its success: 
Ian Fletcher, BPF director of commercial policy, said: “The job is only half done 
and the far harder task of ensuring the documents are disseminated by all 
players in the industry is a challenge we must all rise to. The challenge of getting 
it into the right hands is not one we underestimate.” 
EG 28-03-2007. 
The RICS said that it “has a marketing plan to ensure the dissemination continues 
through the year and beyond by organising road shows, sending e-briefs, newsletters 
and updates.”  (RICS Business February 2007 p22) 
A significant initiative to encourage use of the Code was taken by the property owners 
and occupiers forum.  They devised an accreditation scheme for landlords which was 
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subsequently adopted by the BPF (British Property Federation 2007).  It was primarily 
designed to encourage small landlords to adopt best practice (the view being that the 
large landlords were already adopting the Code); best practice included providing SBTs 
with the occupier guide and model heads of terms from the Lease Code, abiding by the 
landlord guide within the Code and explaining any departures from this. Its launch was 
announced in the Estates Gazette: 
The British Property Federation has launched an accreditation scheme to 
encourage tenant-friendly leasing. The Commercial Landlords Accreditation 
Scheme will guide businesses towards landlords who offer a wider range of 
flexible, manageable leases, who understand business needs and who deal with 
their customers’ complaints fairly and quickly, says the BPF. 
EG 23-07-2007. 
However the success of this scheme appears to be limited. There are 44 members on 
the website (at 8th December 2014), including occupiers and advisors, some large 
landlords but few smaller ones; the list also appears to be out of date and includes 
companies that no longer exist or have changed names. 
Nevertheless, from 2007 through to the early part of 2009 there is some evidence of 
professionals adopting the Code, legitimising it and seeing it as a useable tool, for 
example: 
With the introduction of the code, the property industry has available, for the 
first time, a standard form set of heads of terms. This should encourage a revised 
approach to the negotiation of leases. The MHT provide a workable checklist for 
certain lease transactions, but they will need to be supplemented for higher 
value or more complex lettings. 
Claire Hughes, chartered surveyor and lawyer, Pinsent Masons EG 24-05-2008. 
In 2008 the Law Society revised its standard forms of business leases for leases to be 
compliant with the 2007 Code; these standard forms are concise leases aimed at use in 
shorter leases i.e. less than 10 years. 
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5.6.4 Assessment of the 3rd edition of the Code 
During this period the University of Reading had been monitoring the dissemination, 
use and impact of the Code on behalf of the government.  In July 2009 the latest report 
was published (Crosby and Hughes 2009).  The specific objectives of the research were 
to identify: 
• How far the Code has been disseminated into the market as demonstrated by 
awareness of it among landlords and tenants and their advisors 
• The extent to which the Code is being used in negotiations 
• Sources of advice to tenants on the Code 
• The perceptions of landlords, tenants and their advisors on the impact of the Code 
on leasing. 
Crosby and Hughes (2009:8). 
Surveys of landlords, tenants and their advisors led the researchers to conclude that 
awareness of the 2007 Code was no better than for the 2002 edition.  In fact small 
business tenants and small landlords seemed to be even less aware of the most recent 
Code than the previous one; only limited advice on the Code was getting through to 
tenants from any source.  The Code was not being widely referred to in negotiating 
leases.  The authors noted that the research was undertaken in a relatively poor letting 
market so many letting agents had remarked that the Code wasn’t necessary for 
tenants to negotiate good terms with landlords. 
The report noted that the lack of awareness was despite the efforts of industry bodies.  
There had been a range of activities undertaken by BPF to promote the code, including 
the landlord accreditation scheme; RICS and the Law Society had been publicising the 
Code to their members through newsletters, seminars etc. and the Law Society had 
produced a Code-compliant business lease for short term lettings.  However, in 
interviews both professional bodies had emphasised the over-riding obligations that 
their members had to their clients: 
However, the interviewees from both of these organisations referred to the 
obligations on their members to act in the best interests of their clients. This was 
given as the reason why the RICS will not make the use of the code, or its 
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dissemination to other parties, mandatory. Nevertheless, their stated position is 
that agents should pass on the code to other parties unless the client says 
otherwise and the RICS website states that all members should “fully adopt it as 
part of day to day business”. 
The Law Society publicises the code but stops short of telling members to adopt 
or promote it. The interviewee made it clear that their rules oblige members to 
place the interests of their clients first. It is left up to the individual solicitor to 
decide whether even giving information on the code of practice breaks that rule. 
Crosby and Hughes (2009:26). 
 The reaction to the report from government was one of extreme disappointment with 
the industry.  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government (Mr. Ian Austin) announced the report and spoke about the findings in the 
House of Commons: 
This report about dissemination and use of the 2007 Code paints a very 
disappointing picture. It suggests that small business tenants are not receiving 
any substantive information on the code from any source. Except for some well-
advised major tenants, the code is not a primary tool for the negotiation of new 
leases. 
If parties do not know about the code and do not use it, it will have no impact. 
The property industry has asked us not to legislate in this area, and we have held 
back to give the 2007 Code a chance to work. But if the more substantive 
research shows that the market has not responded, legislation is bound to come 
back on to the agenda. 
HC 3 July 2009 Written Ministerial Statements: Column 29WS. 
In response the BPF focussed on the importance, and difficulty, of getting information 
to prospective tenants. 
Ian Fletcher, director for commercial policy, said: “We would like to see every 
small business receiving a copy of the code at the right time, but I don’t think we 
should underestimate the challenge that represents and hard work it requires 
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from all parties concerned. What is also important is that businesses are getting 
the best lease for their needs and a flexible approach when things get tough. 
EG 10-07-2009. 
5.6.5 Summary of Period 4 
The pressure from government was maintained, with practices concerning alienation 
being added to the list of issues to be addressed.  Despite an outburst from the RICS 
president that was rather defensive of landlords, the Code group quietly and quickly 
put together the third version of the Code.  This version was a practical three part 
document with clear guidance for landlords and tenants.  The relative ease with which 
it was achieved suggests there was engagement with theorisation by the industry 
bodies; recognition of the problems and the solutions appears to have been much 
clearer.  Alongside the Code there were various initiatives from BPF, RICS and others 
which again supported this and seemed to take the process a step further towards 
diffusion. 
RICS and BPF expressed views that that dissemination was key and publicised the Code 
to their members.  However, the professional bodies (RICS and Law Society) did not 
mandate their members to use or refer it to it.  The awareness of the new version of 
the Code in the industry and among tenants was found to be poor, in fact worse than 
for the previous version of the Code.  The diffusion process did not seem to be 
happening.  Therefore the threat of legislation continued to loom large at the end of 
this period.  Table 10 summarises the evidence found during the fourth period for the 
different stages of the model.  
Period Four started with government revisiting the deinstitutionalisation stage to 
restate and add practices to be questioned.  From then the revision to the Code took 
the process through preinstitutionalisation (with additional associated initiatives from 
the industry bodies) and concurrently theorisation.  This appears to have been a more 
straightforward process than for previous editions of the Code, with less of a sense of a 
loop.  However once again, despite apparent theorisation by the industry bodies and 
efforts to ensure diffusion, the lack of dissemination and use of the Code led to a 
further precipitating jolt (i.e. threat of legislation) at the end of the period.  The 
cumulative movement between the stages of the model is unchanged from the end of   
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Table 10: Period Four 
Stage Meaning Operationalisation 
Evidence found in third 
period 
Precipitating jolt Pressures for 
change  
Evidence of pressures for change 
which could be: social (including 
economic), regulatory or 
technological. 
Threat to legislate 
maintained through launch 
of 3rd edition of Code and 
reiterated after report on 
(lack of) dissemination.  
Deinstitutionalisation The removing 
of legitimacy 
from existing  
practices  
Evidence that any of the actors in 
the organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing 
practices. 
Gradually stop doing something 
Proactively challenge/reject 
leasing practices. 
UORRs and also alienation 
presented by Code 
chairman as most 
important areas on 
government agenda. 
Preinstitutionalisation Introduction of 
new ideas and 
replacement 
practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest new practices (in areas 
such as set out above). 
Independently adopt different 
practices. 
Various initiatives form 
BPF, RICS and others 
during this period- e.g. 
RICS guide to leases and 
BPF accreditation scheme.  
Theorisation (part 1) Recognition 
and 
specification of 
general 
problem 
Evidence that supply-side actors, 
particularly RICS & BPF: 
Recognise that there is a problem 
with leasing practices (in areas 
such as set out above). 
Believe that there is no problem in 
these areas. 
Speedy work on Code 
suggests agreement on 
issues. Comment from RICS 
chairman on security of 
tenure indicates still 
question on accepting 
nature of problems.  
Theorisation (part 2) Development 
of principles to 
support 
solutions for 
general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as an 
industry solution. 
See regulation as industry 
solution. 
Take the lead in shaping the Code. 
Propose other industry-wide 
solutions. 
Evidence that the Code is gaining 
legitimacy. 
Third edition of Code 
produced - a three part 
practical document with 
clear principles. 
Clear statements that Code 
is solution and is given 
moral legitimacy by BPF 
(particularly through 
accreditation scheme) and 
RICS through statements of 
support 
Diffusion Legitimated 
ideas spread 
through 
communities 
and are 
adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by actors 
(particularly BPF and RICS.) 
Solutions seen to be 
spreading/being adopted. 
Solutions not seen to be 
spreading. 
Policing the implementation of 
the Code. 
RICS and BPF state that 
dissemination paramount.  
RICS and Law Society 
publicise through 
newsletters, seminars etc.  
However, government 
report found Code not 
being used in lease 
negotiations or being 
disseminated to potential 
tenants.  
Reinstitutionalisation  Ideas and 
practices are 
accepted as the 
natural ways of 
doing things. 
Evidence that different practices: 
Have become taken for 
granted/natural way to behave. 
Have not become natural way to 
behave. 
No evidence.  
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Figure 8: Cumulative model at end of Period Four 
 
Period Three, as shown below in Figure 8. Again the black arrows represent the main 
flows, with the white arrows indicating some very limited evidence of these flows. 
5.7 Period Five: after the 2010 election 
With the general election of May 2010 and the formation of the coalition government, 
commercial leasing largely slipped off the political agenda.  Although the 2007 Code 
remains in force; there has not been the substantive research promised by the previous 
administration. 
5.7.1 Limited government engagement 
In 2011 the government commissioned retail consultant and broadcaster Mary Portas 
to undertake an independent review of the future of Britain’s high streets.  Her report 
(Portas 2011) brought the Code to the attention of the coalition government: 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation Fads and fashions 
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Recommendation 18: Encourage a contract of care between landlords and their 
commercial tenants by promoting the leasing code and supporting the use of 
lease structures other than upward only rent reviews, especially for small 
businesses 
Portas (2011:34). 
The government’s response to Portas (Department of Communities and Local 
Government 2012) showed an aspiration to continue promoting change and to help 
embed practices that had changed: 
The Code advocates the provision of alternatives to Upward Only Rent Reviews. 
We recognise the market has moved to shorter, more flexible lease 
arrangements, but we will continue to work with the industry to ensure these 
progressive measures become firmly embedded across the market… 
Department of Communities and Local Government (2012:18). 
However the government’s focus was entirely centred on dissemination of the code: 
We are currently working on various options for disseminating the Code, 
targeting small businesses and landlords who could benefit most from the 
guidance offered by the Code. We have written to key industry players such as 
the British Property Federation, Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors and the 
Law Society, to urge greater promotion of the Code. We are already discussing a 
dedicated awareness-raising event with the British Property Federation and The 
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors 
will also undertake a campaign to communicate the Code, and the need to abide 
by it, to its 60,000 members. And we will be working with the “Rightmove” 
property search website to provide information on the Code and Code related 
events through their commercial property pages.24 
Department of Communities and Local Government (2012:18). 
                                                        
24 As at  1st October 2015 there is no reference to the Code on Rightmove. 
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5.7.2 Industry initiatives 
The RICS has taken various steps to embed the change in practices required by the 
Code within its membership.  In November 2011 it introduced a set of standards for 
commercial real estate agents (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 2011).  In this 
agents are asked to “encourage their (landlord) clients to promote flexibility, such as 
stating whether alternative lease terms are available and proposing rents for different 
lease terms”  (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 2011:74). Agents are also told to 
refer to the Code for guidance. The standards paraphrase the requirements of the 
landlord guide within the Code, setting these out as good practice.  However, 
somewhat inconsistently, while there is a checklist for heads of terms, the Code 
template for this is not mentioned or used. 
More recently a small business retail lease was launched by RICS and BRC (RICS 2012) 
with direct reference to the recommendation by Portas (Portas 2011).  This is a 
template for a short lease of up to 5 years with no rent review.  It is a much simpler 
document than traditional leases which conforms to the introduction to the Code in its 
use of clear English. It also conforms in aspects such assignment and the state of repair 
required on exit.  However it is less compliant with the Code in that it is an FRI lease 
(with no options to amend this) and requires all lease obligations to be met on exit by 
the tenant, including at a break clause.  It is also counter to the Code in that it also only 
allows limited alterations, which must be removed at the end of the lease.  The short 
duration of the lease may perhaps be put forward as justification for some of these 
clauses.  The short duration also means that the issue of the type of rent review is 
avoided; one is not provided for.  Its launch was reported in the Estates Gazette: 
The lease, developed in collaboration with the British Retail Consortium and 
authored by Nick Darby at SNR Denton UK, has been devised to simplify 
commercial property leases. 
RICS said that the freely available contract will enable quicker occupation of 
retail premises by SMEs, helping to support the independent retail sector and 
stimulate the British high street. 
Paul Bagust, associate director in RICS’s professional groups and forums division, 
said: “In simplifying the leasing process for landlords and small business tenants, 
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we hope to support SMEs and provide a boost to the British high street in a time 
of decline, thereby contributing to overall UK economic productivity. Moreover, 
by offering mutually beneficial terms to landlords and tenants in a flexible lease, 
we are directly addressing the principles of the Code for Leasing Business 
Premises - identified in the Portas Review as a key tool in tackling the high 
street’s decline.” 
EG 04-07-2012. 
The BPF continues to promote the Code on its website and through CLAS.  It has been 
instrumental in creating a suite of model commercial leases, which are free to 
download and use from the Model Commercial Lease (MCL) website (Anon, 2014).  The 
suite of documents covers retail, office and industrial property as well as buildings for 
food and drink use.  The website makes clear that the BPF commissioned the leases but 
states that: 
A large number of well-known law firms, clients and trade organisations have 
been represented on the working group that produced the documents, or taken 
part in extensive informal consultations. 
Anon (2014). 
These parties are not named and there is no apparent ownership of the site or the 
model leases set out.  The website sets out the compliance of the MCL with the various 
provisions of the current Code.25  This makes clear that the MCL departs from the Code 
in many important aspects using the words “Not appropriate for inclusion in the lease” 
to indicate noncompliance with individual requirements in the Code.  These are 
examples of noncompliance listed: The MCL does not include the right to renew under 
LTA 1954 as a default position; the rent review is UORR with no provision for 
alternatives; the requirement for an AGA on assignment is not limited as suggested in 
the Code.  Despite the anonymity of the website, given that the BPF commissioned the 
MCL these departures would appear to be indicative of the BPF’s stance on lease terms, 
more so than the Code.   
                                                        
25 http://goo.gl/rZyo6O. Accessed 15 October 2015. 
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5.7.3 Current position 
The recent evidence on lease lengths and break clauses shows increased diversity, 
although average lease lengths have started to rise again (Investment Property 
Databank 2014).  The IPD note that recession, alongside structural factors caused the 
lease length to fall and interpret the recent rise as largely attributable to growing 
occupier confidence; even SBTs are recorded as taking longer leases.  This report shows 
that influence of market factors on lease structures.  Alongside these changes, there is 
better information available for SBTs in the form of the 3rd edition of the code. 
However, it is not clear if the information is getting to tenants.  There is no recent 
evidence collected on the use of UORRs in longer leases or whether AGAs are still 
automatically used.  Nor is it possible to tell if landlords are still adopting default 
positions or being more flexible and responsive to individual circumstances on repairing 
liabilities or control over alterations.  This means that the extent to which the industry 
has embraced theorisation and moved beyond it is not clear after 23 years. 
5.7.4 Summary of Period 5 
Much of the momentum for change within the Code project disappeared with the 
change of government in 2010. However, there is some ongoing impetus for change 
coming from RICS and BPF, who continue to promote the Code to their members.  This 
has been encouraged by the small jolt from government following the Portas 
recommendation.  However, there is no longer the apparent threat to legislate as the 
focus of this jolt was entirely about encouraging dissemination of the current version of 
the Code.  The RICS and BPF together produced simplified lease forms for shorter 
leases aimed at SBTs wanting short leases.  While this initiative for smaller tenants 
conforms to the Code, the wider suite of leases commissioned by the BPF as a Model 
Commercial Lease departs from the Code in many key respects.  Table 11 summarises 
the evidence found during the fourth period for the different stages of the model. 
Period Five adds initiatives from the RICS that incorporate the Code, therefore 
strengthening the theorisation stage.  However the most recent BPF initiative, the MCL 
shows clear departures from the Code, reinforcing existing practices and suggests a 
weakening in the acceptance of the general problems which were identified in the 
Code.  While there has been no recent formal study of the change in practices or the  
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Table 11: Period Five 
Stage Meaning Operationalisation 
Evidence found in third 
period 
Precipitating jolt Pressures for 
change  
Evidence of pressures for change 
which could be: social (including 
economic), regulatory or 
technological. 
Portas report leads to 
push from government, 
but this is specifically on 
dissemination of 
existing Code 
Deinstitutionalisation The removing 
of legitimacy 
from existing  
practices  
Evidence that any of the actors in 
the organisational field: 
Ask questions about leasing 
practices. 
Gradually stop doing something 
Proactively challenge/reject leasing 
practices. 
No new action found. 
Preinstitutionalisation Introduction of 
new ideas and 
replacement 
practices 
Evidence that actors: 
Suggest new practices (in areas 
such as set out above). 
Independently adopt different 
practices. 
RICS initiatives include 
standards for 
commercial agents and 
a retail lease for small 
businesses (with BRC).  
BPF commission Model 
Commercial Lease. 
Theorisation (part 1) Recognition 
and 
specification of 
general 
problem 
Evidence that supply-side actors, 
particularly RICS & BPF: 
Recognise that there is a problem 
with leasing practices (in areas such 
as set out above). 
Believe that there is no problem in 
these areas. 
The MCL suggests that 
the BPF do not 
recognise the problems 
in some lease areas 
articulated in the Code. 
Theorisation (part 2) Development 
of principles to 
support 
solutions for 
general 
adoption 
Evidence that actors: 
See Code/do not see Code as an 
industry solution. 
See regulation as industry solution. 
Take the lead in shaping the Code. 
Propose other industry-wide 
solutions. 
Evidence that the Code is gaining 
legitimacy. 
Code is given moral 
legitimacy by RICS 
references in their 
initiatives (above).  BPF 
continues to promote 
on its website and 
through accreditation 
scheme.  The BPF- 
commissioned MCL is an 
alternative solution as it 
does not conform to 
Code in key respects. 
Diffusion Legitimated 
ideas spread 
through 
communities 
and are 
adopted 
Evidence of: 
Dissemination efforts by actors 
(particularly BPF and RICS). 
Solutions seen to be 
spreading/being adopted. 
Solutions not seen to be spreading. 
Policing the implementation of the 
Code. 
No evidence of specific 
dissemination efforts by 
industry bodies.  
Inclusion in initiatives 
(above) may encourage 
adoption. 
Reinstitutionalisation  Ideas and 
practices are 
accepted as the 
natural ways of 
doing things. 
Evidence that different practices: 
Have become taken for 
granted/natural way to behave. 
Have not become natural way to 
behave. 
No evidence.  
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Figure 9: Cumulative model at end of Period Five 
 
impact of the Code, diffusion still appears to be limited.  It seems that the Code itself 
may have become consigned to ‘Fads and fashions’ although with some changes of 
practices being potentially adopted.  This is represented in Figure 9 showing the 
cumulative model.  The black arrows represent the main flows, with the white arrows 
indicating some evidence of these flows.  The dotted line indicates very minimal 
evidence of this flow. The findings of the analysis using the model are discussed further 
in Chapter Six. 
5.8 Chapter summary 
State intervention in commercial leasing was first considered at the end of the 19th 
Century as tenants coming to the end of their leases were seen as requiring protection 
from their more powerful landlords.  Since then, there have been limited, but 
significant direct interventions such as the Law of Property Act 1927, the Landlord and 
Tenant Act (LTA) 1954 and the LTA 1995.  It was as the latter was being finalised that 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation Fads and fashions 
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the government’s drive to change commercial leasing practices through self-regulation 
started.  The stimulus for change came in 1992 with the recession and some high 
profile criticism of commercial leasing.  Since then there have been three editions of a 
code of practice, created and then revised by a group of stakeholders representing 
both supply and demand sides of the market.  There have been three reports 
commissioned by the government to assess the impact and dissemination of these 
reports.  There have also been two formal proposals to legislate to outlaw certain 
practices and many threats to legislate.  However, there is no evidence that the Code 
has significantly changed practices over this time or that it has become a tool used in 
negotiation.  The most recent initiatives by the RICS and BPF present mixed messages; 
the most recent BPF initiative, the Model Commercial Lease, departs from the Code in 
many key respects. 
The process of attempted change has been mapped against the model of institutional 
change developed by Greenwood et al. (2002), with a particular focus on the actions of 
the industry bodies.  The findings are summarised and discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Findings and discussion 
The UK government has used industry self-regulation to try and achieve fundamental 
changes in commercial leasing practices.  Using self-regulation is consistent with the 
neoliberal ideology that has underpinned the approach to the governance of markets in 
western democracies since the 1970s. However, the choice of self-regulation rather 
than legislation in any particular field of economic life does not necessarily result in a 
government that is disengaged from the regulatory process.  The discussion in Chapter 
2 shows that disengagement is often far from the case and that there is a range of ways 
in which the state can be involved in self-regulation.  The particular part that the 
government played in the Lease Code initiative is central to the discussion below and to 
the conclusions in Chapter 7. 
Whatever the role of the state, trade and professional bodies are at the heart of self-
regulation.  These bodies have a long history of governing their memberships and 
providing leadership for them.  However, as the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 shows, 
while these organisations have the potential to promote and legitimise change, they 
may alternatively reinforce existing practices.  One reason for this is because they 
operate in a market environment which brings pressures which may conflict with a 
more normative desire for change. 
Industry change can be viewed as a process.  The model of institutional change 
developed by Greenwood et al. (2002), as set out in Chapter 3, provides a framework 
for examining change from this perspective.  This model has been used to analyse the 
role played by industry bodies in the self-regulation of commercial leasing.  In Chapter 
5, the activity at the various stages within the model was identified and analysed.  In 
the first section of the current chapter the findings from the research are summarised 
using this framework.  The discussion that follows evaluates the use of the model as a 
framework and relates the findings to the research aims and the literature. 
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6.1 Summary of findings 
The findings from the analysis are summarised below under the headings of the model. 
Jolt 
The stimulus for change or initial ‘jolt’ can come from a variety of sources, categorised 
by Greenwood et al. (2002) as regulatory, social and technological.  Within commercial 
leasing the jolt was regulatory as it was a threat of legislation.  This threat arose as 
government responded to calls from business occupiers, or those arguing on their 
behalf, for changes to commercial leasing practices in the recession of the early 1990s.  
The arguments for radical changes were well-articulated by Professor Burton (1992) 
and also by MPs within parliament in 1992.  They argued that institutionalised leasing 
practices hampered tenants’ businesses and contributed to their failure in the 
recession.  In response, the government, while making arguments for the free market, 
recognised that there were problems within commercial leasing practices and so began 
to apply pressure on the property industry.  This was in the form of proposed 
legislation.  There was a consultation on legislating within three key areas of leasing: 
UORRs, confidentiality clauses and dispute resolution procedures (Department of the 
Environment 1993). The withdrawal from this in favour of self-regulation has always 
been presented by government as provisional.  The threat of state intervention by 
legislation has hung over the industry since then and it is has formed a continuing ‘jolt’.  
For example, the government consulted on proposals to ban UORRs in 2004 (Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister 2004).  The pressure has been most apparent with the 
publication of the four reports commissioned by the government to monitor the impact 
of the various editions of the Code (Department of the Environment Transport and the 
Regions 2000, University of Reading 2004, Crosby et al. 2005, Crosby and Hughes 
2009).  Following each report the threat has been reiterated.  The government has 
accepted that there has been market-driven change but has not considered this to be 
enough in terms of pace or nature of change and so, while allowing the industry to 
change through self-regulation, has kept the pressure on.  This has continued through 
governments of different hues; it started under a Conservative government and 
continued through the Labour administration of 1997-2010.  However the threat to 
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legislate has not been reiterated since the election of the coalition government of 
2010. 
Deinstitutionalisation 
Existing practices are questioned in this stage, usually by those within an industry.  
Greenwood et al. (2002) described such a phenomenon in their study of change in the 
accountancy profession.  However in commercial leasing, the government has led the 
questioning of practices; it has not emerged from the industry.  Therefore it is pertinent 
to identify the government’s objectives for the Code from the analysis as these have set 
the agenda for change and, to a limited extent, identified specific practices that the 
government believed needed to change.  In turn, this agenda has determined those 
practices which the industry believed needed to change to satisfy the government. 
The government’s objectives were not specifically articulated at the outset.  The 
analysis indicates that they have evolved over time, largely in the light of the reports 
commissioned by government to monitor the progress of the Code (Department of the 
Environment Transport and the Regions 2000, University of Reading 2004, Crosby et al. 
2005, Crosby and Hughes 2009).  Therefore, deinstitutionalisation is a stage that has 
been revisited several times.  Although not clearly stated, the first allusion to the 
nature of the objectives came from the Department of Environment Under-Secretary of 
State as he announced the intention to produce an industry-wide code in the House of 
Commons in 1994.  The minister said that the government would assess the impact of 
the Code on “the flexibility and transparency of the market”.26  Achieving flexibility 
remained a central theme.  An essential part of this was the objective of making the 
UORR less prevalent.  The response by the Minister of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions to the failure of the 1st edition of the Code recognised that 
there was greater flexibility in the market but he rued that the UORR still 
predominated.27  In the same debate he also made clear that ensuring prospective 
tenants had the information to make informed choices was a government objective. 
                                                        
26 HC Debate 19 July 1994 vol 247 col 113W 
27 HC Debate 19 April 2000 vol 348 col 495 
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As the Code group worked towards a 2nd edition, the Minister articulated his hope for 
the Code providing “more choice and flexibility in the property markets and for better 
property guidance for small business”.28  These three aspects then remained the 
government’s objectives for the Code.  Lessening the prevalence of the UORR remained 
at the heart of the objective of increased flexibility as could be seen in the threat to ban 
them in 2004. The consultation document started with these statements: 
The Government is committed to promoting more choice and flexibility in the 
commercial property leasing market. The Labour Party 2001 Business Manifesto 
said: 
“Upward-only rent reviews are a source of grievance to many in the business 
community. We will promote greater flexibility in the commercial property 
market.” 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004:3). 
The objective of improving flexibility has been expressed generally, but also specifically 
in respect of lease terms such as the UORR and, more recently, assignment and 
subletting terms.  These latter terms were referred to as key areas of concern for 
tenants as the government dropped its plans to legislate on the UORR.29  Therefore, as 
a 3rd edition of the Code was announced in the House of Commons, the relevant 
minister spoke of her concerns over “continuing elements of inflexibility particularly 
the predominant use of upwards only provisions in rent review clauses and inflexible 
provisions for tenants exiting property they no longer need”.30  Alongside this the new 
Code was said to “improve business understanding of lease terms”.31 
The government’s main objectives for the self-regulation of commercial leasing can be 
summarised as improving choice and flexibility in lease terms, particularly with regard 
to rent review provisions and alienation.  A further objective has been to improve the 
information flow to prospective tenants (particularly SBTs) in order that they could 
make informed choices on lease terms.  Under these headings, the industry has had to 
                                                        
28 EG 28 March 2001 
29 HC 15 March 2005 Col 12WS 
30 HC 28 March 2007 col 87WS 
31 Ibid 
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identify the specific practices that required attention and to produce/refine a code of 
practice.  The government has also determined the parties that would do the 
questioning, insisting that tenant representatives were part of these discussions.  The 
issues that were included in this questioning became wider as more data was gathered 
through the various reports monitoring the Code (Department of the Environment 
Transport and the Regions 2000; University of Reading 2004; Crosby et al. 2005; Crosby 
and Hughes 2009) and the areas of concern became clearer.  While much of this was 
about lease terms and landlord practices, the issue of information asymmetry creating 
uninformed small business tenants became increasingly apparent with successive code 
monitoring reports.  This then became an area for the Code to tackle.  However, the 
UORR remained central to the drive for change.  Signs of movement by landlords 
towards agreeing other forms of rent review became a benchmark against which 
institutional change could be measured by the government. 
Preinstitutionalisation 
This is the stage in the model for new ideas and innovation.  In the examples of industry 
change set out in Chapter 3, different players had their own ideas of how to respond to 
the jolt and the circumstances that precipitated the need for change.  These were 
generally local innovations and addressed apparently local problems as, at this stage, 
there is not typically a perception of an industry-wide need for change.  However, in 
commercial leasing, the government compelled the property industry and its advisors 
to address the issues in a way that was industry-wide and to include organisations 
representing customers i.e. tenants alongside supply-side bodies.  The government also 
determined that the response to the jolt would be new practices embodied in a code of 
practice.  This meant that the process did not allow for a plethora of independent 
initiatives preceding the realisation that there was an industry-wide problem to be 
resolved.  However, there were initiatives from the various bodies running alongside, 
and related to the Code, as part of the theorisation stage. 
During the period under study, changes in lease structures took place that were 
independent of the Code initiative.  The research undertaken for the two main 
government Code monitoring reports found that average lease lengths got 
progressively shorter; there was increased diversity in lease lengths; tenants’ break 
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clauses became more common and at earlier points in leases; repairing liabilities 
became less onerous on second hand properties (Department of the Environment 
Transport and the Regions 2000; Crosby et al. 2005).  Changing lease lengths and 
prevalence of break clause have also been documented in the annual Lease Events 
Reports32 from Investment Property Databank.  These changes are local in that they are 
not part of co-ordinated industry action; the data is simply the aggregate of 
negotiations between individual landlords and tenants.  Evidence of these changes 
influenced the industry bodies in the theorisation phase but also influenced the 
government’s objectives for future change i.e. this was an input into the revisiting of 
the deinstitutionalisation phase. 
Theorisation 
This stage is identified by Greenwood et al. (2002) as critical to changing practices, as it 
is where problems are identified and accepted as being industry-wide.  Tolbert and 
Zucker (1996) saw a central role for industry groups as champions of change in this 
phase.  Therefore the extent to which the BPF and RICS appeared to have engaged with 
theorisation was critical.  In the early days, when legislation was threatened and then a 
Code proposed,  the BPF gave out a strong message that the market was operating 
efficiently and responding to demand through the normal processes of negotiation; 
practices did not need to change in any fundamental way and all that was needed was 
better provision of information to prospective small tenants.  While the BPF took a 
leading part in developing the first Code, this rather negative attitude continued into 
the 2000s and into the efforts to revise the Code.  Eventually there was some 
recognition that the Code would ‘reinforce market trends’,33 showing little in the way 
of theorisation.  Nevertheless the BPF did show more consistent support for the 
principles set out within the 2nd Code.  In reinforcing the suggested changes in practices 
(such as providing priced alternatives) it showed an attempt to legitimise the Code.  
However, this was somewhat undermined by the production of the BPF model lease in 
2003 which was apparently designed to complement the Code yet the clauses were not 
                                                        
32  This series began in 2014 and was a merger of two previously annual publications: Lease Events 
Report and Lease Report 
33 EG 31 October 2001 
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compliant with the Code in key aspects such as rent reviews.34  Nevertheless the stated 
support for the Code remained strong and commitment to it contributed to the BPF’s 
angry response to the renewed threat of legislation in 2004.  As the Code moved into 
its third edition, the BPF maintained support for the Code but once again focused on it 
as an information document rather than changing practices, giving legitimacy to the 
notion of more openness by landlords.  The Model Commercial Lease (Anon, 2015) 
commissioned by the BPF departs from the Code in several key respects not least as it 
includes a UORR.  This suggests that some of the problems apparently recognised by 
the BPF in co-authoring the Code were not actually accepted.   
As a professional body with clients on both the supply and demand side of property the 
RICS might be expected to have a different perspective to that of the BPF.  Certainly, its 
response to the 1994 consultation on legislation did recognise that some 
institutionalised practices (such as UORRs) might cause problems for tenants but 
nevertheless it defended the self-correcting operation of market forces in leasing 
(Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 1993).  While the RICS was a central player in 
developing the first Code, it did not seem to have much faith in the concept as a 
mechanism for change.  However, the RICS endorsed the use of the Code by its 
members, recognising that it addressed criticisms of inflexibility and secrecy and also 
encouraged change in attitude and practice.35  During the life of the first Code the RICS 
introduced its own initiative, the Small Business Scheme for rent reviews.  This 
demonstrated that the RICS was recognising and acting on the problems of small 
businesses in this aspect of commercial leasing, an area that was included in the initial 
proposals for legislation (Department of the Environment 1993).  With the failure of the 
first Code and the move towards a second edition, the RICS appeared to remain very 
quiet through this turbulent period.  Nevertheless the RICS saw itself as brokering the 
Code; the fact that the RICS provided the secretariat and the launch venue for the new 
version may be seen as legitimising the Code.   
As with the BPF, the RICS seemed to become galvanised into action following the 
publication of the second edition of the Code; there was a clearer recognition of the 
                                                        
34 Available at: http://www.bpf.org.uk/info-landlords.  Accessed 15 September 2015. 
35 RICS vice president quoted in CSM Nov/Dec 1995. 
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need to change, efforts made to give the Code legitimacy alongside other initiatives 
such as a guide to leasing for small businesses.  The flexibility and solutions offered by 
the Code (such as the pricing of alternative lease terms) were promoted and justified to 
members.  It was reinforced and legitimised by key RICS figures, for example the chair 
of the commercial property faculty said that option pricing should not “hold any fear 
for landlords, tenants, their advisers or valuers.  This approach is adopted by those who 
operate on the property market on an almost daily basis”.36  The Code was presented 
to members as a way to ensure the market remained free but also responded to the 
needs of occupiers, and so the industry could avoid legislation.  The RICS did become 
defensive of current practices in the face of the further threat of legislation, however 
the third edition of the Code brought with it renewed enthusiasm.  Its efforts at 
supporting use of the Code at that time included warnings that a surveyor who did not 
use the document might have to defend their actions in court. 
The RICS introduced a short retail lease (RICS 2012) in response to issues raised by the 
Portas report (Portas, 2011), referencing the Code.  However, by this time any wider 
discussion by the RICS of changing leasing practices seemed to have all but 
disappeared.   
For both the RICS and BPF it is difficult to find evidence of theorisation with the general 
election in 2010 and the more limited engagement of the new government with the 
Code.  The evidence of the Model Commercial Lease (Anon 2015) suggests that the BPF 
had not actually accepted many of the problems or solutions set out in the Code 
despite being a co-author; theorisation for the BPF appears to have been very limited. 
Diffusion 
This is the stage where newly legitimated ideas spread and become adopted.  Tolbert 
and Zucker (1996) identified the importance of industry bodies in this stage of the 
change process.  However, this stage is dependent on the earlier stages of the process 
having created legitimated ideas and practices.  This was not found to have happened 
in commercial leasing to any significant extent.  Nevertheless evidence of dissemination 
and adoption of the Code as the mechanism for introducing new practices was looked 
                                                        
36 Graham Chase reported in EG 28 September 2002. 
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for in the historical analysis.  The monitoring reports for the government provided 
some insights into the lack of diffusion.  The reports on the first two versions of the 
Code did show that property advisors were largely aware of these specific versions of 
the Codes (Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions 2000; Crosby et 
al. 2005).  However, by the third edition this became diluted to a general awareness of 
the code concept but not specifically of the detail (Crosby and Hughes 2009).  Even 
where there was awareness, these monitoring reports found that property advisors 
were not bringing the Code to the attention of their clients or (when acting for the 
landlord) to the attention of prospective tenants.  Awareness of the Code improved for 
larger landlords and tenants with the second Code; however the property advisor was 
not a key source of information.  In any event, there was very little evidence of the 
Code being referred to in lease negotiations. 
The development of the Code shows a growing focus on small tenants and landlords 
with the Code including increasingly detailed advice for them on a range of lease terms 
and practices.  However this advice did not get disseminated through the professional 
advisors, who were not promoting adoption of these practices.  Throughout, small 
landlords and tenants remained largely unaware of the Code project, as noted in all the 
monitoring reports. 
There is evidence that the RICS made strong attempts to increase the Code awareness 
of members, through newsletters, seminars etc.  There seems little doubt that, at some 
level, RICS members were aware of the 2nd and 3rd editions of the Code.  However, 
despite the threats that members who did not adopt the Code might be flouting best 
practice and so be liable to negligence claims, the institution stopped short of 
mandating members to use the Code.  The RICS exhorted its members to use the Code 
at various points, but refused to instruct them to use it.  Likewise, when acting for the 
landlord in a lease negotiation, RICS members have not been compelled to give the 
Code to unrepresented tenants. 
After the failure of the first edition of the Code to reach those negotiating leases, the 
BPF mounted a strong campaign to ensure its members knew about and complied with 
the second version.  It produced marketing material for them to show code 
compliance.  A significant initiative by the BPF to encourage diffusion, particularly to 
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the smaller landlords, has been its landlord accreditation scheme; a condition of 
membership is adoption of the Code.  There is a mechanism for complaints if scheme 
members don’t abide by its conditions.  However, as noted in Chapter 5, the 
membership list is short and there are few small landlords on the list; its impact on 
diffusion is unlikely to be great. 
Reinstitutionalisation 
The final stage of the process is where the new ideas and practices become the 
accepted ways to behave.  Alternatively ideas may not become institutionalised and go 
by the wayside as a ‘fad or fashion’.  There was no evidence found of the Code project 
having created new practices.  There has been no recent study of the change in 
practices or the impact of the Code; however the lack of any continuing impetus 
suggests that the Code itself may have become consigned to ‘fads and fashions’.  The 
reports for the government have found a resistance to change in key areas identified by 
the Code.  This can be seen in the continued default use of the UORR, and the 
resistance to providing information to prospective tenants.  The changes in lease 
structures that have taken place have been noted, and offering a choice of lengths and 
a break clause may now be accepted practice.  However there is no evidence that the 
Code has been responsible for this.  The recent increases in lease lengths being taken, 
including those agreed by SBTs (Investment Property Databank 2014), as the UK moves 
away from recession, would suggest market forces are the main driver. 
6.2 Discussion 
The overall aim for this research is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the 
process of institutional change, particularly in the context of industry self-regulation.  
The specific concern is with the governance of the commercial leasing market and the 
role of the key industry bodies (RICS and BPF) in changing leasing practices.  The 
research question asked is:  What role have the industry bodies played in the attempt 
to achieve institutional change in commercial leasing through self-regulation? 
The discussion of the findings is structured around the key elements of the research 
aims.  These elements are the degree of institutional change, industry bodies as agents 
of change and the part played by industry bodies in self-regulation.  These aspects have  
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Figure 10 Model as applied to commercial leasing 
 
been investigated by taking a process view of change.  The historical analysis using the 
model of institutional change developed by Greenwood et al.(2002) was used to 
provide the data to address the research question and also the broader aim.  The next 
section considers the findings on the process of change in commercial leasing and the 
use of the model as a framework for analysis. 
6.2.1 The process of institutional change 
The progress of an industry as it sheds institutionalised practices and establishes new 
ones can be followed through the stages of the model by Greenwood et al. (2002).  
Evidence of the early stages was found in the study of commercial leasing but there 
was little or no evidence of the later stages, as neither the Code nor associated 
activities have led to the reinstitutionalisation of new practices as envisaged.  The 
I: Precipitating Jolts 
II: Deinstitutionalisation 
III: Preinstitutionalisation 
IV: Theorisation 
V: Diffusion 
VI: Reinstitutionalisation Fads and fashions 
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evidence of the stages that did occur showed that, in this particular case, the process 
did not have the linear flow set out in the model.  Earlier stages were returned to and it 
was essentially an iterative process.  Additionally, several stages occurred concurrently, 
as the distinctions between the stages of de-institutionalisation, pre-institutionalisation 
and theorisation become increasingly blurred.  The sequence that was found is shown 
in Figure 10. 
This does not suggest that the model is wrong or that it is inappropriate to use in this 
study; rather these differences are useful in understanding what happened in 
commercial leasing.  The model was developed from studies of change in industries 
where the initial jolt led to the questioning of existing practices by those within the 
industry leading to local innovation.  This then came together in the process of 
theorisation by industry bodies.  This is a bottom-up process and this is what is 
described by the model.  The process of change attempted in commercial leasing has 
not been driven by independent actors questioning practices and local innovation.  
Instead, it was driven by government objectives for changed practices across the 
industry.  This meant that innovation was not local; it was immediately industry-wide.  
Further, it was at the level of the organisational field as the government insisted that 
tenant groups were part of the discussions to agree a code of practice.  This means that 
the nature of the change process was fundamentally different from that in the 
industries discussed in Chapter 3. 
This government-led approach could not ensure that the theorisation stage was 
successful and, on the contrary, it may have hampered it.  Greenwood et al. (2002) 
echo Tolbert and Zucker (1996) in arguing that theorisation is a crucial stage in the 
process without which change is likely to flounder.  Under the threat of legislation, the 
government was in a position to compel the industry bodies to work together with 
other stakeholders and to produce a Code.  However it could not ensure that industry 
bodies believed that there were problems to address (through theorisation), or alter 
their views that all practices would in any event change as necessary in response to 
market forces.  These underlying views, combined with unclear government objectives, 
made it difficult for the bodies to agree the purpose and content of the Code.  Despite 
being central to the development and revision of the Code, there was no clear 
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recognition of general problems by the industry bodies.  There was only some 
acceptance of problems and solutions once the focus had narrowed to information 
provision to small landlords and tenants.  Consequently there was no sense that the 
RICS and BPF were spearheading change as industry bodies in the role of ‘champions’ 
identified by Tolbert and Zucker (1996). 
The circularity in the process may also be attributable to the government-led approach 
to change in commercial leasing.  The initial ‘jolt’ can be seen as regulatory, within the 
categories of the model.  It could also be classed as political in terms of the categories 
identified by Oliver (1992), which perhaps seems more accurate as a classification in 
this instance.  In any event,  far from being simply the spark that ignited the process, 
this was a stage that was revisited many times as the government’s approach relied on 
regular ‘jolts’ in the form of threats of legislation.  This was necessary because, as just 
discussed, the industry bodies were charged with effecting change despite being 
unsure quite what was wanted or believing change was needed.  This led to an 
ineffective Code which drew further government threats, leading to further revisions of 
the Code.  This approach did not create the conditions for the stages of the process to 
happen linearly and fully.  The sequence of the stages may be significant and may have 
impacted on the result.  Greenwood et al. (2002) noted that gaining a shared 
understanding of a problem can take a long time.  If the government had managed a 
period of deinstitutionalisation and then theorisation, this may have reduced the need 
to go round the circle several times and potentially increased the chance of achieving a 
shared understanding. 
The use of the model has therefore enabled the process to be identified and exposed 
the difficulties of the various stages.  Use of this framework has also highlighted the 
departure from the model in commercial leasing.  This raises questions regarding the 
significance of this departure to success in achieving change. 
6.2.2 Industry bodies as agents of change 
The literature discussed in Chapter 3 shows that industry bodies have the potential to 
drive change but also to reinforce current practices.  The work of D’Aunno et al.,(1991) 
and Suchman (1995), suggests that this degree of influence arises because industry 
bodies are in a position to confer legitimacy on the behaviours of individuals and 
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organisations within their membership.  The BPF and RICS do not represent all property 
advisors or all landlords, nevertheless these are bodies with large memberships and a 
strong presence in leasing.  Therefore it is primarily to them that government turned 
with an expectation that they would be agents of change who could influence their 
members. 
Given the government’s threat-led process, and the difficulties around theorisation 
already discussed, it is not surprising that the BPF and RICS attempted to legitimate 
change but frequently could be seen to reinforce existing practices.  They initially 
pushed back against the ‘jolt’ i.e. the threat of legislation in 1993 by making responses 
that justified current practices and which supported the market as an efficient 
mechanism responding to changing circumstances.  At this time, the RICS extolled the 
virtues of competent advisors to deal with any problems within the existing 
institutional framework.  However, having gained a reprieve from legislation, from this 
point they were expected by government to be central to the drive for change via a 
code of practice. 
The BPF had difficulties in coming to terms with the use of a code in preference to 
negotiation and the unfettered operation of market forces.  Therefore the theorisation 
needed to legitimate change and so aid diffusion was a long time coming.  When it 
came it was largely by focussing on the Code as a means of providing information to 
prospective tenants. This focus removed any requirement for the BPF to encourage its 
members to change practices on lease terms.  It has also focused on educating smaller 
landlords through its scheme for accrediting landlords.  This makes it less surprising 
that the BPF model lease clauses (2003) included terms that did not accord with the 
Code’s wider aims.  Similarly as the political pressure was largely removed in 2010, it is 
of little surprise that the BPF-commissioned Model Commercial Lease (2014) does not 
conform to the Code in key respects.   
Nevertheless, whilst not overtly accepting the problems as defined by others, or 
spearheading major changes in specific lease terms or practices, the continuing 
engagement of the BPF with the Code and its associated initiatives has perhaps 
combined to confer legitimacy to, and aided the diffusion of, the notion of a ‘tenant-
friendly’ landlord. 
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RICS members advise landlords and tenants on the leases they agree.  As an institution 
it also has an obligation to serve the public interest within its charter.  Nevertheless its 
starting position prior to the first edition of the Code was one of defending the market 
and current practices.  Since then it has promoted change to some extent.  At the peak 
of activity on the second edition, senior RICS members were extolling the virtues of the 
Code as a means to help the market be more efficient37 as well as admitting that 
current practices were designed to meet the landlord’s needs rather than the 
tenants.38  Later, the RICS proclaimed that the third edition of the Code embodied best 
practice and that a non-compliant landlord might have to justify this departure in 
court.39  Yet, crucially it stopped short of mandating members to either use it or to 
ensure tenants were aware of its contents, arguing that clients’ interests might 
preclude this.40  This is particularly significant given the RICS’s public interest obligation 
and could be interpreted as a strong signal against legitimating change. 
Recent RICS initiatives have, like those of the BPF, been ambiguous.  The inclusion of 
the current Code within the set of RICS standards for commercial real estate agents is 
partial as it does not contain the Code’s heads of terms (Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors 2011).  While the RICS small retail lease41 is in accordance with Code 
principles, there is no attempt to deal with issues such as UORRs which occur in longer 
leases.  These initiatives do not suggest the RICS is pushing for a sea change in 
attitudes. 
The RICS and BPF have been put in the spotlight to spearhead change within a process 
driven by the government.  The analysis shows these bodies struggling with the 
deinstitutionalisation, preinstitutionalisation and theorisation stages.  For both 
organisations the emphasis has been on disseminating the information on the various 
Codes to their members and exhorting them to use and further disseminate, 
particularly to small business tenants.  However, the initiatives running alongside the 
Code show omissions or errors in lease terms and guidelines. There has also been no 
                                                        
37 Graham Chase CSM November 2002 
38 Richard Lay EG 14 September 2002 
39 RICS Business February 2007 
40 Crosby, N.and C. Hughes. 2009a. “Monitoring the 2007 Code for Leasing Business Premises.” London: 
CLG. 
41 http://goo.gl/SzYvrc accessed 15 September 2015 
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attempt by either body to mandate use or monitor compliance.  The role of these 
bodies has been more reactionary than progressive.  Certainly where the RICS is 
concerned this supports findings of Abel (1989) and even Greenwood et al. (2002) who 
saw professional associations as contributing to the resilience of existing practices.  This 
all suggests that the industry bodies have not acted as convincing agents of institutional 
change for commercial leasing. 
6.2.3 Industry bodies in self-regulation 
Industry bodies are central to self-regulation.  Gunningham and Rees (1997) identified 
that a key role for them in this context is the creation of a normative framework.  For 
commercial leasing it fell to the BPF and RICS, as key industry bodies, to develop this 
normative framework with which to guide their members through the period of 
questioning and into changed practices i.e. through the stages of the institutional 
change from deinstitutionalisation to re-institutionalisation. 
There is little evidence of a framework being established, particularly when considered 
against the requirements for such a framework articulated by Gunningham and Rees 
(1997), as set out in Chapter 2. The circumstances surrounding the introduction of the 
Code in 1995 meant that there was little opportunity for the industry reflection needed 
to bring about change.  However as the Code project developed, the industry bodies 
took more ownership of the Code and its aspirations.  Therefore, for the second and 
third editions of the Code both organisations could be seen to be engaging in reflection 
to some extent.  They were also assuming some responsibility for other stakeholders in 
the leasing process, particularly small business tenants, although this was largely 
through attempts to redefine the aims of the Code. 
There were a few statements to indicate that embracing the Code would enable 
members to develop valuable competences, such as creating more effective and 
responsive relationships with tenants, which would add value and so improve 
organisational performance.  However, the constant references by the industry bodies 
to the threat of legislation undermined the extent to which they showed that they had 
developed a real critical standpoint regarding industry practices.  It suggested that the 
motivation for change was largely about escaping the regulation of lease terms.  This 
may have encouraged ‘grudging acquiescence’ rather than’ willing obedience’ by their 
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members.  A normative framework should enable the industry to provide a legitimate 
account of the industry’s activities to the public (Gunningham and Rees 1997).  This was 
made harder by the insistence by the RICS that members would not be mandated to 
comply with the Code as this may be against the client’s interests; given the overriding 
commitment to the public interest within the institution’s charter, this makes it difficult 
to give a satisfactory account. 
Once in place, Gunningham and Rees (1997) also argued that industry bodies must 
develop ways of regulating their members to ensure that the framework functions 
properly.  However, within the commercial leasing industry, the industry bodies do not 
take on this regulatory role in any significant way.  Attempts at getting organisations to 
comply have largely been by exhortation.  Not until 2007 did the BPF attempt to 
introduce a system to encourage participation.42  Landlords joining this (no-cost) 
accreditation scheme commit to using the Code and this gave it the potential to have a 
regulatory function.  Where self-regulation is concerned, Lennox (2006) noted that one 
of the main roles of an industry body is to ensure that its members join and then that 
they actually take part.  He identified benefits that can act as incentives to firms; 
certainly the BPF scheme aims to encourage adoption of the Code by offering the 
benefits of being distinguished as a ‘good firm’ and gaining legitimacy i.e. being 
attractive to potential tenants.  However this has not been backed up by any proactive 
monitoring. The scheme relies on others to file a complaint if it is believed that a 
member landlord is not complying.  The sanctions are not set out in the handbook, but 
it appears that the most severe sanction is to expel the offending party from the 
scheme.  In any event, the scheme has not attracted the range of landlords and 
appears to be fairly dormant.  As far as the RICS is concerned, it was reported to have 
set up a Code monitoring committee in 200243 yet it is does not seem that any 
monitoring of a regulatory nature actually took place, rather the group appears to have 
focussed on dissemination. Certainly nothing suggesting any regulatory activities was 
reported and the group was short-lived.  The RICS consciously stopped short of 
mandating compliance as discussed above.  Therefore it appears that neither of these 
                                                        
42 The Commercial Landlord Accreditation Scheme 
43 EG 21st September 2002 
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bodies has developed a regulatory regime to monitor performance. The only 
monitoring of compliance that has been done has been by government through its 
commissioned reports. 
Moran (2003) observed that industry bodies have a long history of running markets and 
regulating their membership.  However, they are also used to determining their own 
standards of behaviour and leading their own questioning.  This is unlike the situation 
in commercial leasing where the BPF and RICS were not driving the 
deinstitutionalisation of practices.  These bodies struggled to theorise and so did not 
champion major changes in specific lease terms or practices.  Therefore it is perhaps no 
surprise that the industry bodies have largely failed to create a comprehensive 
normative framework or a regime to ensure and monitor compliance by their 
members. 
The split personalities of industry bodies recognised by Gunningham and Rees (1997) 
and Muzio et al. (2013) may be relevant here as the industry bodies have wrestled with 
supporting existing practices that appear to benefit their members (for the BPF) or 
their members’ clients (for the RICS) yet recognising that they are being asked to 
promote change. 
The industry bodies in commercial leasing have largely been focussed on fending off 
the ‘jolts’ of threatened legislation rather than achieving change within a process under 
their own control.  Perhaps because of these factors they have not developed the 
normative framework or taken on the regulatory role needed for success in self-
regulation. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
The aim of this research has been to shed some light on the role of industry bodies in 
the process of institutional change.  The intention has been to gain an improved 
understanding of this in the context of self-regulation, a mechanism of market 
governance that is favoured by neoliberal governments. 
Commercial property leasing is a market that is monopolistic and characterised by 
asymmetric information.  Consequently customers (tenants) have expressed 
dissatisfaction and frustration with the market, not least their inability to get the leases 
that they feel they need for their organisations.  The Lease Code initiative that was 
initiated by government has largely failed to address these market characteristics or to 
change industry practices.  This failure to achieve substantive changes was recognised 
at the outset of the research.  What was less clear was why it had failed.  There have 
been no studies to try and understand what has gone wrong with the process.  This 
research comprised such a study and aimed to make a contribution to this 
understanding.  In so doing, the intention has been to also make a contribution to 
existing research in the fields of self-regulation and institutional change. 
7.1 Research aim and question 
Conclusions can be drawn in terms of the specific research question and also the 
broader aims set out in Chapter 1. The research question for this study set out in 
Chapter 4 asked: What role have the industry bodies played in the attempt to achieve 
institutional change in commercial leasing through self-regulation? 
Several key issues emerged from the findings and discussion set out in Chapter 6.  
Commercial leasing operates in an institutionalised environment in which industry 
bodies have an important role in setting rules and grant legitimacy to behaviour.  Yet 
neither the BPF nor the RICS championed change or fully legitimised the Code project, 
giving mixed messages to their members about the value of the Code.  These bodies 
struggled to accept that change was needed and so to theorise.  Therefore they did not 
create the normative framework that is central to self-regulation by guiding members 
through a process of change.  They did not ensure that their members adopt the Code; 
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there has been no attempt to mandate use or monitor compliance.  Overall, the 
attitude of the industry bodies has been more reactionary than progressive. 
This evidence points to a conclusion that the industry bodies have not played a role as 
convincing agents of institutional change for commercial leasing.  This is likely to have 
contributed to the failure of the Code.  However, such a conclusion is tempered by 
questions raised in Chapter 6 regarding the role of the state in the Lease Code 
initiative. 
These questions emanate from the finding that the process of self-regulation 
commercial leasing was instigated and steered by government rather than by the 
industry itself.  Therefore, despite being essentially a scheme of self-regulation, the 
industry bodies did not have the control that this might imply.  The industry bodies 
were expected to co-develop a Code to address the government’s objectives and then 
to implement it, under the ever present threat of legislation if the government’s 
monitoring reports were not favourable.  The objectives set out by government were 
initially very vague, largely asking for choice and flexibility in leases but leaving it to the 
industry (including tenant groups) to determine what this meant and creating an 
appropriate Code. 
Any conclusion on the role of the industry bodies therefore invites the question of 
whether the government did all they could to enable the industry bodies charged with 
task of developing and implementing the Code to succeed. 
These questions can be related back to the overall aim for the research set out in 
Chapter 1 which is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the process of 
institutional change, particularly in the context of industry self-regulation. 
The Lease Code is an example of a process of institutional change by self-regulation 
that did not work; it did not lead to significant changes in industry practices, and 
specifically did not lead to the industry change anticipated by government.  
Observations have been made on the extent to which the role of the industry bodies in 
this instance was aligned to that anticipated from the literature review.  From these, 
wider conclusions may be drawn. 
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The analysis showed the difficulties in moving the Lease Code project forward.  It also 
showed the circularity of the process rather than the linear one set out in the model by 
Greenwood et al. (2002).  The revisions of the Code, and repeated jolts from 
government, led the industry bodies to revisit all of the stages from 
deinstitutionalisation to theorisation with stages sometimes running concurrently (see 
Figure 10).  Greenwood et al. (2002) highlighted the protracted time that it took for 
stages to take place, particularly theorisation, but they did not discuss the extent to 
which stages were revisited or ran concurrently, nor did any other author writing about 
this process.  The discussion in Chapter 6 suggested that the lack of conformance to the 
model may be indicative of the problems with the Lease Code initiative. 
The failure to theorise by both industry bodies has been a fundamental problem.  This 
might support the argument by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) and Greenwood et al. (2002) 
that theorisation is a key stage of the process of change and the imperative that 
industry bodies take on the role of champions of change.  While there was the 
beginnings of a normative framework, neither body created the structure suggested by 
Gunningham and Rees (1997) through policies and procedures to actively promote or 
steer their members through a process of questioning and change.  The study of the 
Lease Code initiative suggests that these are needed. 
One major point of difference with the studies of institutional change discussed in 
Chapter 3 is the ‘top down’ nature of the process of change attempted in commercial 
leasing with government managing the process from the beginning; the questioning 
process that results from a jolt has, in other studies, organically developed through the 
actors in the organisational field.  Government involvement in the self-regulation of 
commercial leasing featured prominently in the conclusions regarding the Lease Code 
study.  This aspect may provide a wider conclusion regarding the role of industry bodies 
within the process of change by self-regulation. The findings for commercial leasing 
may be symptomatic of:  a process taken out of the hands of the industry and its 
professional and trade bodies; a process which has ill-defined aims; an initiative which 
addresses problems that the industry bodies do not necessarily recognise.  These 
characteristics of the Lease Code initiative made it very difficult for the industry bodies 
to take on the role of champions of change. 
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This may be indicative of the interaction of self-regulation with the state and the 
mechanisms that need to be put in place to enable industry bodies to take on their 
anticipated roles.  It suggests that it is not effective for input by government to consist 
largely of threats of legislation.  This approach creates an uncertain environment for all 
participants.  If government want to drive the process from such a jolt, their 
intervention must be designed to convert the initial jolt into substantive change and to 
enable industry bodies to perform their necessary role.  Government ambition is not 
enough. 
Therefore the main conclusion suggested regarding the broader research aim is that if 
industry self-regulation is led by government then the state must work with industry 
bodies to harness their potential as champions of institutional change. 
7.2 Limitations 
There are limitations of the study that arise from the approach used and also from the 
specificity of the market under scrutiny. 
The methods used in this study relied on existing data.  The data sources had particular 
perspectives which are important to the story but can make it difficult to construct the 
narrative of the process. Given the passage of time, not all the sources were still 
available.  All of these issues mean that there is a danger that events may have been 
misinterpreted or misconstrued.  Nevertheless, the range of sources used means that 
this risk has been minimised. 
This study is set in a specific market and a specific context and this will impact on its 
generalisability.  The Lease Code was borne of recession and neoliberalism.  This 
provided the setting for taking action within a market that is monopolistic and has 
issues of information asymmetry.  These two key features of the market are 
fundamental to the reason for the Lease Code project and to the issues that the 
initiative attempted to address.  However, this does not detract from the ability of the 
study to contribute to the understanding of fundamental issues around self-regulation 
and industry change. 
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7.3 Implications 
7.3.1 State involvement in self-regulation 
Industry self-regulation is a mechanism popular with neoliberal governments.  It is used 
to achieve policy objectives and to have influence within markets by indirect means.  
Within commercial leasing the government used self-regulation in an attempt to 
change practices; it seemed to believe that this could be done by threatening 
legislation but then largely leaving the industry bodies to lead the industry through 
change.  However the conclusions of this study suggest that this belief was misplaced.  
The implications of this research for governments are that this approach will not work 
as a means of achieving change in institutionalised environments.  More needs to be 
done to harness the potential of industry bodies to drive change. 
The (repeated) threat of legislation was a main input of the government into the 
process.  Gupta and Lad (1983) pointed to the value of the threat of legislation, 
however the experience of commercial leasing calls into question the extent to which it 
can achieve real change.  Certainly the threat was enough to get the attention of the 
industry bodies and it led them to contribute to the creation of the Code.  There have 
been changes in leasing practices which may be partly attributable to the Code.  
However there has also been resistance to change by the industry bodies and 
substantial change has not been achieved in some key aspects of leases.   
The political landscape has changed since Gupta and Lad were writing.  Threats of 
legislation may be perceived as empty in the current political context, and so less 
effective.  Certainly the behaviour of successive governments would support these 
perceptions where commercial leasing was concerned; there have been repeated 
threats of legislation that have not been acted upon.  It may have been apparent to 
some within the industry bodies that the government was never going to legislate.  
While the industry bodies clearly responded to the threats with action, the lack of real 
theorisation and support for some existing practices became apparent once the 
government pressure was eventually removed.  The threats had not been enough to 
ensure acceptance that change was needed. 
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One consequence of these repeated threats was that there was a sense of uncertainty 
which made it difficult for the various parties to agree on a course of action.  During the 
negotiations to produce a 2nd edition of the Code, the chairman of the commercial 
leases working group, Philip Freedman, remarked 
 “If retailers believe Raynsford is seriously considering legislation, it may be in 
their interests to not reach a consensus.  If landlords believe he is not serious, 
they have every reason not to act on it”.44 
Therefore the threat hanging over the negotiations was to some extent 
counterproductive.  It also soured the working relationship between state and industry 
bodies, with anger and frustration shown by the industry bodies towards government 
on several occasions.  There was little sense of a partnership between government and 
industry bodies. 
This may show a need for a more proactive regulator, such as found by Short and Toffel 
(2008).  There are many possible ways that state and industry can work together as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  These involve industry bodies but with different expectations 
of, and support for, their role by the state.  Self-regulation can be bolstered with a 
degree of regulation or the state could take on a more formal role monitoring 
compliance.  But of course such courses of action have ideological dimensions and 
practical consequences. 
The lack of real connection that the industry bodies had with the process within 
commercial leasing is very clear from the analysis.  The engagement of industry bodies 
in the process of change, particularly the stage of theorisation has been highlighted. 
The findings from the Lease Code study support the importance of this engagement.  
Therefore government must incorporate mechanisms to ensure proper engagement.  
This may mean working more closely with the industry bodies to establish common 
ground in the pre-institutionalisation stage from which to move forward. 
                                                        
44 Reported in EG 14 April 2001 
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7.3.2 Small businesses 
Ideology has been suggested as a reason why industry self-regulation was a likely 
choice for government, and it may be why it was pursued over such a long period in 
commercial leasing (rather than resorting to legislation) despite its failings.  However, 
as Brownsword (2006) noted, governments have been very willing to legislate in areas 
such as housing and employment and in consumer contracts.  They have been less 
willing to legislate in business contracts.  There is an apparent ideological resistance to 
‘interfering’ in business contracts by regulating.45  Politicians are keen to be seen to ‘cut 
red tape for business’46 which generally means reducing regulation. Consequently they 
aim to reduce rather to add to the ‘regulatory burden’.  These views further underpin 
the decision to promote self-regulation rather than legislation in commercial leasing. 
It is apparent from the Lease Code study that, while those taking commercial premises 
are business occupiers, many of them are SBTs i.e. individuals or very small companies.  
These SBTs have been found to be frequently ill-informed and usually not advised; they 
sign leases without understanding the detail of their agreements or the implications of 
component clauses (Crosby et al. 2005 and Hughes 2007).  The government 
increasingly recognised the issues around SBTs during the active life of the Code 
project, as did the industry bodies.  At one point the BPF was apparently set to ask the 
government to legislate to enforce the Code for small businesses.47 The issues were 
once again set in a retail context by Portas (2012) as she recommended support for 
SBTs and flexibility in their lease terms. 
The implications are that perhaps a more interventionist approach is needed to small 
businesses in contexts where they are operating much like consumers.  The distinctive 
feature seems to be that small businesses are often in situations where there is 
information asymmetry, as is the case in commercial leasing.  In Australia there has 
long been legislation which aims to protect small retail tenants.  According to Crosby 
(2006) this legislation deals with matters such as prescribing the provision of 
                                                        
45 As shown in the initial debate on commercial leasing in the HoC  by the minister’s comment that “The 
Government are very conscious of the dangers in regulating and interfering with well-established market 
practices for determining commercial rent levels” HC Deb 10 November 1992 vol 213 col 856. 
46 The current UK government has a website devoted entirely to this issue: https://cutting-red-
tape.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/. Accessed 15 October 2015. 
47 Reported in EG 01 February 2003 
177 
 
information during and after lease negotiations, regulating and implying terms into 
leases, providing mechanisms for dispute resolution and outlawing behaviour seen as 
unconscionable conduct (defined as taking advantage of superior market power).  The 
legislation varies from state to state and Crosby observes that is not without its 
problems regarding scope, definition and implementation.  The political and economic 
context in Australia is of course somewhat different to the UK.  Nevertheless, it 
provides an example of targeted intervention which recognises that business occupiers 
are not a homogenous group.  It is an illustration of an approach to small businesses 
that is more akin to consumer legislation. 
7.3.3 Industry bodies and public policy 
Successive governments can be criticised for their handling of the attempt at self-
regulation in commercial leasing and their approach to the industry bodies.  
Notwithstanding this, the Lease Code study raises questions regarding the approach of 
industry bodies, particularly professional institutions where the interests of the public 
and public policy differ from those of their members.  It is recognised that industry 
bodies have split personalities and can be seen as economic and normative institutions 
(Gunningham and Rees 2002).  The BPF has clear purpose as a collective body which 
promotes best practice but with the overall aim to promote the interest of its 
members. However, the RICS, as a professional body, has the public interest at its core 
through its charter.  This remit to serve the public interest is, according to a recent RICS 
president, “what lifts us above being a trade body” (Brooke-Smith 2014).  Therefore, 
regardless of the issues regarding the government’s approach, perhaps the RICS could 
have been expected to take a more active role and even to mandate its members to 
use the Lease Code.  Yet a reason given for not mandating its use was the over-riding 
obligations of members to their clients (Crosby and Hughes 2009); even the more 
general instructions to members to disseminate the Code to tenants (when acting for 
the landlord) were tempered with a proviso that the client could veto this.  
Notwithstanding the circumstances surrounding the Lease Code initiative, the inability 
of the RICS to drive change may be a reflection of the modern professional institution 
and raise a question as to whether it can be said to really have the public interest at its 
core. 
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7.4 Directions for future work 
The focus of this study has been on the role of industry bodies in the process of change, 
but in one specific market.  There are many aspects within the broader sphere of 
property and the built environment where the process of change is underway and 
where industry bodies, particularly professional institutions are involved.  These are 
areas that could be explored.  For example, the property industry has begun to 
recognise the lack of diversity of those working in this field.  There is increasing activity 
to try and address this.  Initiatives have come from many sources, including the 
professions.  Additional studies such as this would bring further evidence of whether  
industry bodies in the built environment were acting as agents of change, leading the 
way and legitimating new practices or conversely reinforcing existing practices,  Such 
change can be investigated while it happens, creating opportunities for different data 
sources to be used. 
Within such studies there can be further investigation of professional bodies, 
particularly with regard to their public interest obligations and change.  The Lease Code 
experience has highlighted potential issues here which may raise the question of 
whether the nature of the professional body is changing to such an extent that it no 
longer can be said to serve the public interest (if it ever did)? 
There is also the opportunity to take the same approach to studies in other industries 
with a different set of industry bodies.  Useful comparisons may be made from such 
studies. 
It has been suggested in the current study that the approach taken by government has 
had a significant effect on the outcome of the Lease Code initiative and on the industry 
bodies’ ability to perform their roles within it.  Future work could include studies of 
other schemes of self-regulation which are government-led.  It may be that commercial 
leasing is a special case; additional studies of other schemes are needed to determine if 
the ideas regarding government involvement have wider explanatory power. 
The model of institutional change was shown to be a framework capable of revealing 
fundamental problems within the commercial leasing change process.  Using it raised 
questions regarding the time taken to get through the process and the linearity of it.  
179 
 
Undertaking further studies such as this will enable the model of institutional change to 
be further tested, including the sequencing and the importance of the various stages 
particularly theorisation.  It may then be perhaps refined as a framework for 
understanding the nature of the process in different change situations. 
Through such a range of further work, the process in institutional change in an industry, 
and the role of industry bodies within this, may be better understood. 
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